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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates the effects of language modality on conceptual categorization. It is 
hypothesized that spoken and signed languages have an influence on the processing and structure of 
conceptual categories. Two aspects of language modality in which spoken and signed languages show major 
differences are Simultaneity and Iconicity. Compared to the audio-vocal modality of spoken languages, the 
visual-gestural modality of signed languages is well suited for simultaneously producing a large amount of 
information and moreover, shows a much greater disposition for iconic signs. The simultaneous articulation 
in signed languages is only possible for concepts which are syntagmatically related (noun related to an 
attribute, action etc.) and the so-called polycomponential signs are iconic. Paradigmatically related concepts 
(noun related to a superordinate, coordinate, subordinate etc.) are expressed in a linear sequence as in 
spoken languages and can be, but are not necessarily, iconic. Because of this difference between the 
languages in two modalities they are particularly interesting for the study of the underlying semantic 
concepts. At the focus of this thesis are especially the questions whether simultaneity and iconicity lead to 
differences in discourse and communication and as a consequence to different semantic relations between 
concepts. It is hypothesized that the preference for simultaneous structures in the visual-gestural modality 
lead to stronger relations between syntagmatically related concepts compared to paradigmatically related 
ones in the visual-gestural modality. Thus, the general objective of this thesis is to investigate the issue of 
‘Modality Relativity’ in terms of the old controversy of ‘Linguistic Relativity’, i.e. whether language can affect 
thought. A series of experiments will be reported testing whether the two aspects of simultaneity and 
iconicity affect the semantic relations of concepts in any significant ways and thus, have an influence on the 
formation of conceptual knowledge.  
The first part of the thesis addresses the theoretical background. An overview of static and dynamic 
theories of concepts and categorization is given. The issue of the organization of concepts in the general 
cognitive system and the question whether concepts are acquired or innate is discussed. In the following the 
influence of language on perceptual and conceptual categorization will be examined. The Whorfian Linguistic 
Relativity Principle will be outlined and the basic arguments will be presented for discursive clarity. 
Subsequently, objections against Whorf’s ideas will be addressed and discussed in some detail. In the next 
paragraph the focus is on experimental studies about Linguistic Relativity within spoken language cultures 
and how new evidence changed the theoretical climate and discussion about Linguistic Relativity. The issue 
of Language Modality, i.e. the condition in which linguistic signs are produced and perceived, will be 
introduced. Commonalities and differences between German Sign Language (GSL) and German Spoken 
Language (GSpL) and some non-linguistic studies, which reveal some evidence for an impact of language 
modality on cognition, are discussed. Finally, in the fourth paragraph, the influence of simultaneity and 
 iconicity of signed languages on conceptual and perceptual categorization is examined. The theoretical part 
of the thesis ends with the formulation of research questions relating to iconicity and simultaneity. 
In the empirical part of the thesis, several experiments will be presented, with the aim of contributing 
and broadening the present research on linguistic relativity. The experiments focus on cross-linguistic 
differences between German Sign Language (GSL) users, German Spoken Language (GSpL) users and cross-
modal bilinguals (GSL and GSpL). Different language comprehension tasks, i.e. verification task, triad-
comparison-task and memory-recognition task, are utilized, in order to study the influence of language 
modality on conceptual structures. Reaction times and Number of Choices, both in linguistic and non-
linguistic tasks, will be used as dependent variables. The studies combine a comparison of structural 
diversities between sign language and spoken language related to language-modality with a demonstration 
of highly distinctive patterns of concept structure. 
Based on the results of the empirical studies, the last chapter finally will summarize and discuss the 
influence of simultaneity and iconicity on conceptualization processes. It will be argued that the studies do 
provide some evidence for the hypothesis that the modality of the language one uses might qualitatively 
alter the structure of concepts. The empirical research presented in this thesis aims at expanding the scope 
of inquiry and discussion on the linguistic relativity proposal by including the aspect of language modality. 
  
  
Zusammenfassung 
‚Mediale Relativität‘? 
Der Einfluss von Gebärdensprache und Lautsprache auf konzeptuelle Kategorisierung 
In dieser Arbeit wird der Einfluss der Sprachmodalität auf konzeptuelle Kategorisierung untersucht. 
Dabei wurde angenommen, dass die beiden Sprachmodalitäten - Lautsprache und Gebärdensprache - einen 
Einfluss auf die Verarbeitung und Struktur von konzeptuellen Kategorien haben. Zwei Aspekte der 
Sprachmodalität, in denen gesprochene und gebärdete Sprache große Unterschiede aufweisen, sind 
Simultaneität und Ikonizität. Im Gegensatz zur auditiv-vokalen Modalität der Lautsprache finden wir in der 
visuell-gestischen Modalität der Gebärdensprachen eine wesentlich ausgeprägtere Präferenz für 
Simultaneität sowie eine größere Anzahl von ikonischen Gebärdenzeichen. Allerdings ist Simultaneität, d.h. 
die 'Verschmelzung' verschiedener konzeptueller Einheiten, nur für Konzepte möglich, die in einer 
syntagmatischen Beziehung zueinander stehen. Diese sogenannten polymorphematischen Gebärden sind 
immer auch ikonisch. Paradigmatisch verbundene Konzepte können in der Gebärdensprache – ähnlich wie in 
der Lautsprache – ausschließlich sequentiell artikuliert werden und können, müssen aber nicht 
notwendigerweise, ikonisch sein. Aufgrund dieser Unterschiede in den zwei genannten Sprachmodalitäten 
soll untersucht werden, ob Simultaneität und Ikonizität einen Einfluss auf die Stärke von Relationen im 
konzeptuellen System haben. Es wird angenommen, dass die Prädisposition und Präferenz für simultane 
Strukturen in der gestisch-visuellen Modalität insbesondere zu stärkeren Relationen zwischen Konzepten 
führen, die in syntagmatischer Relation zueinander stehen. Das Ziel dieser Dissertation besteht demzufolge 
darin, den Aspekt der ‚Medialen Relativität‘ angelehnt an die These der ‚Linguistischen Relativität‘, zu 
untersuchen und damit den Einfluss der Sprachmodalität auf unser Denken zu erforschen. Dafür wurden 
verschiedene Experimente konzipiert, in denen untersucht wurde, inwieweit Simultaneität und Ikonizität 
einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Stärke von konzeptuellen Relationen haben und damit einen Einfluss auf 
die Konstituierung von Wissensstrukturen. 
Im ersten Teil der Dissertation wird der theoretische Hintergrund dargestellt. Statische und 
dynamische Konzept- und Kategorisierungstheorien werden vorgestellt und die Organisation von Konzepten 
im kognitiven System sowie die Frage diskutiert, ob Konzepte erworben werden oder angeboren sind. Danach 
geht es um den Einfluss von Sprache auf perzeptuelle und konzeptuelle Kategorisierungsprozesse. Weiterhin 
wird die These zur ‚Linguistischen Relativität‘ von Whorf (1956), die grundlegenden Argumente seiner 
Ausführungen dazu und die allgemeine Kritik daran ausgeführt. Im nächsten Abschnitt werden empirische 
Studien zur Untersuchung der Linguistischen Relativität in gesprochenen Sprachkulturen beschrieben und die 
Auswirkungen der Ergebnisse auf den damit zusammenhängenden Forschungsbereich. Im Anschluss wird der 
 Aspekt der Sprachmodalität, d.h. die Bedingungen in denen Zeichen produziert und wahrgenommen werden 
können, eingeführt. Die Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Laut- und Gebärdensprachen werden 
dargestellt sowie verschiedene nonverbale Studien, die zeigen, dass es einen signifikanten Einfluss der 
Sprachmodalität auf kognitive Verarbeitungsprozesse gibt. Schließlich geht es um die spezifischen Aspekte 
der Simultaneität und Ikonizität und ihren Einfluss auf perzeptuelle und konzeptuelle Kategorisierung. 
Verschiedene Hypothesen werden dazu formuliert. 
Im empirischen Teil der Dissertation werden acht verschiedene Experimente vorgestellt, die zur 
Erforschung der Linguistischen Relativitätshypothese beitragen sollen. In den Experimenten werden 
Verwender der Deutschen Gebärdensprache (DGS), der Deutschen Lautsprache und crossmodale Bilinguale 
(Gebärdensprachdolmetscher) im Hinblick auf sprachbezogene Differenzen untersucht. Verschiedene 
Sprachverständnistests, wie Verifikationsaufgaben, Triadenrating, Gedächtnisaufgaben, werden eingesetzt, 
um den Einfluss der Sprachmodalität auf konzeptuelle Strukturen zu untersuchen. Reaktionszeiten und 
Anzahl Wahlen in % werden sowohl in sprachlichen als auch non-sprachlichen Aufgaben als abhängige 
Variablen erhoben. Die Studien basieren auf strukturellen Unterschieden in Laut- und Gebärdensprachen, 
die sich auf die Sprachmodalität zurückführen lassen und sie zeigen, dass es zwischen Verwendern der 
Gebärdensprache und Verwendern der Lautsprache unterschiedliche Muster in den konzeptuellen 
Strukturen gibt. 
Im letzten Teil der Dissertation werden die Ergebnisse der empirischen Studien zusammengefasst 
und diskutiert. Die empirischen Ergebnisse werden als Bestätigung der ‚Medialen Relativitätshypothese‘ 
interpretiert, d.h. die Modalität einer Sprache kann konzeptuelle Strukturen substantiell verändern. Mit den 
empirischen Untersuchungen, die in dieser These vorgestellt werden, soll die Forschung und Diskussion zur 
‚Linguistischen Relativität‘ um den Aspekt der ‚Medialen Relativität‘ erweitert werden.  
 
 9 
Contents 
I. General Introduction and Overview .......................................................................... 11 
1. Introduction and General Objective ............................................................................ 11 
2. Structure of the dissertation ....................................................................................... 16 
II. Theoretical Background ............................................................................................ 18 
1. Concepts and Categorization ...................................................................................... 18 
1.1. Theories of Concepts and Categorization ................................................................. 18 
1.2. The Organization of Concepts .................................................................................. 30 
1.3. Innate versus acquired concepts .............................................................................. 36 
2. The Influence of Language on Categorization ............................................................. 40 
2.1. The Linguistic Relativity Principle ............................................................................. 40 
2.2. Influence of different Spoken Languages on Categorization .................................... 43 
2.3. The Influence of different Signed Languages on Categorization .............................. 58 
2.4. Conclusion and Research Questions ........................................................................ 81 
III. Empirical Studies ...................................................................................................... 86 
1. General Method .......................................................................................................... 86 
1.1. Selected Tasks .......................................................................................................... 86 
1.2. Participants .............................................................................................................. 88 
1.3. Materials .................................................................................................................. 89 
1.4. General Procedure ................................................................................................... 89 
2. The Influence of Simultaneity vs. Linearity on Categorization .................................... 91 
2.1. Measurement of Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic Semantic Relation in Deaf, Hearing 
and Bilinguals with a Verification Task ..................................................................... 91 
2.2. Measurement of Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic Semantic Relation in Deaf, Hearing 
and Bilinguals with a Triad-Comparison Task ......................................................... 111 
2.3. Measurement of Syntagmatic Semantic Relations in Deaf with a Verification Task 
with Nonpolycomponential and Polycomponential Signs ...................................... 130 
2.4. Triad-Comparison Task with Nonpolycomponential and Polycomponential Signs. 134 
2.5. Measurement of Nonpolycomponential and Polycomponential Signs related to a 
Noun Referent in a Recognition Memory Task....................................................... 137 
3. Testing the Influence of Iconicity on Categorization ................................................. 142 
3.1. Measurement of Semantic Relations between with iconic signs/non-iconic words and 
pictures in a Verification Task with Deaf, Hearing and Bilingual Participants ........ 142 
10 
3.2. Measurement of Semantic Relations between with iconic signs/non-iconic words and 
pictures in a Triad-Comparison Task with Deaf, Hearing and Bilingual 
Participants ............................................................................................................. 150 
3.3. Sign-Iconicity Rating in Deaf and Hearing Participants ........................................... 157 
IV. Summary and General Discussion ........................................................................... 163 
1. The Impact of Simultaneity ........................................................................................ 163 
2. The Impact of Iconicity .............................................................................................. 169 
3. 'Modality Relativity'? ................................................................................................. 173 
V. Appendices ............................................................................................................ 177 
VI. References ............................................................................................................. 229 
 11 
I. General Introduction and Overview 
1. Introduction and General Objective 
In this thesis, effects of language modality on conceptual categorization will be investigated. The 
exploration of this question was not possible for a long time, because many researchers had not 
even realized that human language existed in at least two modalities. It was not until the 
pioneering work of the American linguist William C. Stokoe (1960) revealed that deaf signers, who 
use visual-gestural signs for communication, construct their utterances in a structured way from 
units that are defined within a language system. Stokoe was the first researcher who showed that 
there are actually two modalities of language: the auditory-vocal modality of spoken languages 
and the visual-gestural modality of signed languages. Stokoe applied linguistic techniques 
borrowed from the structuralist tradition prevalent at the time to study the newly discovered 
language. His research eventually led to a broad interest in the structure of sign languages by 
linguists and gave rise to further investigations by scholars from different disciplines worldwide.  
However, although many linguists at that time could be convinced that sign languages are 
natural languages, they still regarded sign languages as inferior to speech because of their 
iconicity. They perceived sign language as a concrete language, limited with respect to 
abstractions, humor and subtleties, not suited to express complex ideas (Myklebust, 1964; Lewis, 
1968; Davies & Silverman, 1970; Eisenson & Boase, 1975; van Uden, 1986). The alleged iconicity 
of signs was the basic argument advanced against sign languages as being fully developed 
languages equal to spoken languages at all linguistic levels. To many linguists sign language 
iconicity was an insuperable barrier in accepting sign languages as fully developed languages. 
Against this background, the main challenge in the last 40 years of sign language research was to 
provide evidence that signed and spoken languages possess deep similarities in their linguistic 
structure, acquisition and processing, and are not inferior at all. This has been shown by several 
scholars (Klima & Bellugi, 1979; Kyle & Woll, 1985; Lane & Grosjean, 1980; Newport & Meier, 
1986; Siple, 1978, Prillwitz, 1985; Wilbur, 1987), and today most linguists have come to accept 
that sign languages have all of the grammatical and expressive sophistication of true language and 
that indeed human natural language exists in at least two language modalities. This finding is 
without question “one of the most crucial empirical discoveries of the last decades of research in 
any area of linguistics” (Meier, 2002, p.4). 
The intensive search for similarities was deeply rooted in the, at that time contemporary, 
intellectual movement of cognitive science, an interdisciplinary field whose supporters claimed 
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that the actual physical nature of a language is irrelevant for the underlying language structures. 
Differences between signed and spoken languages were neglected, because for cognitive 
scientists language modality is irrelevant for cognition. They merely explored how information is 
represented and processed in the brain, and developed theories in the context of broader 
interdisciplinary communication and research. They combined the areas of psychology, 
anthropology and linguistics with approaches of at that time relatively young fields, such as 
artificial intelligence, computer science and neuroscience. One of the most influential linguistic 
researchers of cognitive science was Noam Chomsky. In the 1950s, he broadly criticized the 
American tradition of behaviorism, especially the behaviorist models of language learning. He 
argued that behaviorism did not offer an explanation for a lot of language phenomena; children 
learn a language very rapidly without being taught, and this cannot be explained by pure 
reinforcement learning. With his review of Skinner's book on verbal behavior Chomsky (1959) 
created an intellectual environment, which eventually led to the so called ‘cognitive revolution’ in 
psychology. It was a response to behavioristic models of language acquisition, and in this context 
Chomsky began to develop his theory of transformational generative grammar, which has 
undergone numerous revisions and has had a profound influence on linguistics in general. 
Chomsky’s generative linguistics (1965) envisages a common underlying structure for all 
languages, and a complex set of rules to generate individual utterances. In his theory, linguistic 
competence and linguistic performance are distinguished. In his later work Chomsky (1993, 1995) 
differentiates between I-Language and E-Language, which was an advancement of his former 
theory and hence similar but not identical to the competence/performance distinction. Speech 
performance (E-Language) to Chomsky is external evidence of language competence (I-Language) 
distorted in its shape by many factors irrelevant to linguistics. Most importantly, Chomsky argued 
that most of the properties of language are fundamentally universal and innate and that language 
is an autonomous cognitive system. Therefore, language acquisition is simply to find labels for 
concepts that they already have. 
In this zeitgeist of cognitive science, many linguists assumed that it did not matter whether 
linguistic inputs are acoustic strings or visual displays and outputs are words or signs. To them the 
differences in phonology, syntax, morphology and semantics between spoken languages and, 
furthermore, the modality of a language, does not have an influence on linguistic competence 
(not to mention on the conceptual system), because “sign and speech are both vehicles for 
language” (Meier, 2002, p. 4) and thus, “why should we be interested in whether specific aspects 
of linguistic structure might be attributable to the particular properties of the transmission 
channel?” (p.5)  
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However, several developments during the last decades changed the theoretical climate 
in the field of linguistics. In the mid-1960s the theory of generative semantics (Lakoff, 1971) was 
developed out of transformational generative grammar and stood largely in opposition to 
Chomsky’s work. Several ideas from later work in generative semantics were integrated within the 
approach of cognitive linguistics, which became an alternative linguistic paradigm to cognitive 
science. Their propronents deny that language is a separate system from general cognition and 
they claim that knowledge of language developes through experience with language. Moreover 
they argue that the use of a language is always situated in a physical, social and cultural 
environment and that all aspects of cognition are shaped by properties of the body (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Turner, 1989; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1992; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999; Lakoff & Nunez, 2000; Gallagher, 2005; Rohrer, 2006).  
Based on such considerations cognitive linguists developed new types of hypotheses 
concerning the nature of language, the cognitive abilities underlying human language ability and 
how these abilities might have evolved. An important question to ask is, whether language has an 
impact on cognitive activities. In the paper ‘The myth of language universals’ Evans and Levinson 
(2010) argue that language diversity can be found at almost every level of linguistic organization 
and that linguistic distinctions affect how we think. For example in the area of space several 
researchers could show that linguistic coding of space concepts correlates with differences in non-
linguistic conceptual coding (Levinson, 2003; Levinson & Wilkins, 2006; Majid et al,. 2004; see also 
chapter II, section 2.2). Whereas for Chomskyan adherents this was not a question of interest, for 
cognitive linguists it became a central topic of their research. With this change in intellectual 
climate the question of language and cognition, generally known as the Linguistic Relativity 
hypothesis (Whorf, 1956) had again – after a prolonged period of general rejection - become a 
field of controversial debates. Researchers from different fields began conducting cross-linguistic 
research, attempting to illustrate how the languages we speak shape or do not shape our thinking 
and experiences with the real world. Cognitive Linguistics, Cognitive Psychology (Psycholinguistics) 
and Linguistic Anthropology, in particular, made it possible to reformulate the thesis of the effects 
of language on thought (Talmy, 1975, 1985; Langacker, 1988; Bowerman, 1980; Miller & Stigler, 
1987; Lucy, 1987; Jäger, 2004; Boroditsky, 2001, 2003; Gilbert, Regier, Kay & Ivry, 2008; Cook, 
2010). Within these fields some innovative ways were developed, in which language relativity 
could be approached. One of the goals of the researchers was to properly determine, what kinds 
of mental representations were constructed by various sorts of linguistic utterances. Initial 
research in the field (e.g., Fauconnier, 1994, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Langacker, 1987) was 
carried out on the methods of introspection and rational reasoning. These methods were 
14 
employed to examine diverse topics, but the observation of one’s mental structures via 
introspection is limited in its accuracy. To examine theoretical claims regarding linguistic relativity 
in more detail, some investigators used experimental empirical methods commonly employed in 
the field of empirical psycholinguistics (Gibbs, 2000; Grady, 2000). Although most research in 
psycholinguistics usually involves the study of language acquisition, comprehension, and 
production, a number of innovative lines of research have been developed, which use 
psycholinguistic methods based on a cognitive linguistic view of language and thought (e.g., Lucy, 
1992; Slobin, 1992, Gumperz & Levinson, 1996; Davidoff, Davies & Roberson, 1999; Roberson, 
Davies & Davidoff, 2000; Boroditsky, 2001; Lucy & Gaskins, 2001; Sera, Elieff, Forbes, Burch, 
Rodriguez & Dubois, 2002; Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Levinson & Wilkins, 2006; 
Casasanto, 2008; O’Neill, 2008; Frank, Everett, Fedorenko & Gibson, 2008; Wolff & Holmes, 2010; 
Holmes & Phillip, 2012) (see chapter II, section 2). These recent theoretical and methodological 
advances have given the discussion on ‘Linguistic Relativity’ new life and made it possible to test 
predictions about how a given language influences the thinking of its speakers. Yet, although many 
researchers from various fields are engaged with the language and thought-question, the 
Linguistic Relativity approach eventually has not been satisfactorily corroborated, and neither 
supporters of the idea nor opponents are convinced of the validity of the approach. Hence, there 
is an intense ongoing debate about the concept of linguistic relativity and about what would 
constitute adequate empirical evidence for the various formulations. Levinson and Evans (2010, 
1) even argue that it is “time for a sea-change in language sciences” and they believe “that 
linguistics is on the brink of major changes in data, methods and theory“. 
In this climate of change from a universalistic (cognitive science) to a more relativistic 
(cognitive linguists) view, the research field of Sign Language Linguistics experienced a further 
development, too. When applied to signed language research, the insights provided by the 
theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics have led sign language researchers to ask new types 
of questions concerning the nature of language, the cognitive abilities underlying the human 
language ability and the influence of language modality on those abilities. Effects of modality 
differences on cognitive processes in particular were investigated by Karen Emmorey. She started 
to study the processes involved in how deaf people produce and comprehend sign language and 
how the use of a signed language can influence visual-spatial cognition. Although Emmorey (2002) 
showed in several studies that many of the psycholinguistic effects in language perception, 
processing, and production observed in cognitive experiments with hearing subjects, were 
transferable to the population of the Deaf, she also identified a modality-effect, namely the 
positive impact of sign language use on nonlinguistic visual-spatial cognition. The empirical 
 15 
psycholinguistic work of Emmorey started a new trend in sign language research. Several scholars 
carried out a series of experimental studies on sign languages, which address the differences and 
similarities in acquisition, production and processing of signed and spoken information from 
phonology to complex sentences and semantics (Wilcox, 2000; Taub 2001; Grote & Linz 2003; 
Fehrmann & Jäger 2004; Vigliocco, Vinson, Paganelli & Dworzynski, 2005; Wilcox & Morford, 2007; 
Iversen, 2004, 2009 Marschark & Hauser, 2008; Carreiras, Gutiérrez-Sigut & Corina, 2008; Hickok, 
Pickell, Klima & Klima, 2009; Thompson, Vinson & Vigliocco, 2009; Bosworth & Emmorey, 2010; 
Perniss, Thompson & Vigliocco, 2010). The findings confirmed that many cognitive foundations of 
language are independent of modality, but there were certain modality specific aspects found, 
too.  
These studies contain enourmous potential regarding the research of linguistic relativity, 
because with the comparison of deaf signers and hearing speakers it is now possible to investigate 
two groups in culturally similar environments using different languages. So far, the opportunity to 
test linguistic relativism within one culture was restricted, because people living in the same 
culture usually share much the same linguistic experiences. Thus, people within one culture are 
unlikely to experience cognitive differences due to language, and therefore researchers usually 
investigated language differences across cultures. Nevertheless, the problem with such research 
is that the findings are usually confounded with education, class and environment. Separating the 
effects of these factors from language is usually impossible. With the comparison of hearing and 
deaf people living in the same country and attending the same education system, the possibility 
of investigating two groups using different languages, i.e. spoken and signed languages, within 
one environment presents a great opportunity to explore the linguistic relativism hypothesis. This 
situation is almost ideal, because spoken and signed languages are perceived and produced in the 
same physical surroundings and geographic region. This implies that potential differences in the 
structure of correlated lexicalized concepts are predominantly cross-language specific and less 
cross-cultural specific. The most of what is known about human concepts relies on the study of 
spoken languages. Thus, the examination of similarities and differences of signed and spoken 
languages, potentially provides the opportunity to investigate the characteristics of the 
conceptual system, which are influenced by particular aspects or specific constraints of a certain 
language. Therefore, to empirically test the hypothesis of 'Modality Relativity', several lines of 
cross-linguistic experiments have been conducted in this thesis. They explore the structural 
differences in the semantic conceptual systems of deaf signers, hearing non-signers and native 
balanced cross-modal bilinguals. The empirical investigations are confined to the meaning of 
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single words or signs. They will not deal with the activation and processing of the meaning of larger 
linguistic units such as sentences and text. 
Based on these considerations, the general objective of this thesis is to investigate the 
issue of ‘Linguistic Relativity’ in terms of ‘Modality Relativity’, i.e. whether the modality of a 
language can affect thought. The empirical research introduced in this thesis aims on the study of 
the relationship between language and conceptual categorization. The term conceptual 
categorization implies that there is yet another aspect to categorization, which is perceptual 
categorization. The two categorization processes are related. Although categorization might occur 
at multiple levels (Bornstein, 1984) it is useful to differentiate it by two (related) processes. 
Perceptual categorization deals with specific sensory stimuli such as colors or sounds which are 
directly perceived by one’s senses. E.g. in the auditive-network, the sound image from the ears is 
parsed into feature segments of frequency, direction, amplitude, etc. in the early auditive stages 
and is further processed in the association cortices. Conceptual categorization (or semantic 
categorization) is based on perceptual categorization and is a process that constitutes categories, 
which are indirectly perceived because of directly perceiving something else. Conceptual or 
semantic concepts are not specific to a sensory input, they are based on knowing and are ideas at 
a more abstract level, which can be used in a wider variety of situations. Concepts in this sense, 
whether perceptual or conceptual, are the subject of this thesis.  
2. Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter II addresses the theoretical background of this thesis. The first section (1.) 
introduces theories of concepts and categorization, discusses the organization of perceptual and 
conceptual categories in the general cognitive system and the question of whether concepts are 
acquired or innate. The first paragraph (1.1) introduces a chronological overview of static and 
dynamic theories of concepts. The distinction between static representational and dynamic 
conceptions of conceptualization provides the organizational principle in the review of literature 
regarding theories of conceptualization. In the following paragraph (1.2) the question of how 
concepts are organized and related to each other will be discussed, followed by the last section 
(1.3) about the issue of innateness vs. acquisition. 
In the second section (2.) the influence of language on perceptual and conceptual 
categorization will be examined. The Whorfian Linguistic Relativity Principle will be outlined in the 
first paragraph (2.1) and the basic arguments will be presented for discursive clarity. 
Subsequently, objections against Whorf’s ideas will be addressed and discussed in some detail. In 
the next paragraph (2.2) the focus is on experimental studies about Linguistic Relativity within 
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spoken language cultures and how new evidence changed the theoretical climate and discussion 
about Linguistic Relativity. In the third paragraph (2.3) the issue of Language Modality, i.e. the 
condition in which linguistic signs are produced and perceived, will be introduced. Commonalities 
and differences between German Sign Language (GSL) and German Spoken Language (GSpL) and 
some non-linguistic studies, which reveal some evidence for an impact of language modality on 
cognition, are discussed. Finally, in the fourth paragraph (2.4), the influence of simultaneity and 
iconicity of signed languages on conceptual and perceptual categorization is examined. The 
chapter ends with the formulation of research questions, respectively relating to iconicity and 
simultaneity. 
In chapter III, the selection and implementation of several empirical studies about the 
influence of language modality on categorization will be introduced, with the aim of contributing 
and broadening the present research on linguistic relativity. The experiments focus on cross-
linguistic differences between sign language users, spoken language users and cross-modal 
bilinguals. Reaction times (RT) and number of choices, both in linguistic and non-linguistic tasks, 
will be used as dependent variables. The studies combine a comparison of structural diversities 
between sign language and spoken language related to language-modality with a demonstration 
of highly distinctive patterns of concept structure.  
Based on the results of the empirical studies, chapter IV will summarize and discuss the 
influence of simultaneity and iconicity on conceptualization processes. The studies do provide 
some evidence for the hypothesis that the visual-gestural and the auditive-vocal language 
modality might qualitatively alter the structure of concepts. The empirical research presented in 
this thesis aims at expanding the scope of inquiry and discussion on the linguistic relativity 
proposal by including the aspect of language modality. 
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II. Theoretical Background 
1. Concepts and Categorization 
What is the nature and structure of concepts and how do we actually acquire concepts? 
Discussions about these questions reflect deeply opposing views about the study of mind (see 
‘Linguistic Wars’). Cognitive scientists or Chomskyan-inspired ‘C- linguists’ (Levinson & Evans, 
2010, p. 1) often state, that people use their concepts to make sense of the world and label them 
with words in order to communicate (Chomsky, 1975; Fodor, 1976; Fodor, Garrett, Walker & 
Parkes, 1980; Jackendoff 1997; Levelt, 1989; Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer, 1999; Roelofs, 1997). This 
is an inherently static representational view of concepts and conceptualization. For these authors, 
every concept is a discrete and abstract mental representation of an object, event, property etc. 
that corresponds to the meaning of words. To cognitive linguists or ‚D-linguists’ however it would 
be more accurate to say that conceptualization is the way in which one makes sense of the world, 
i.e. it would then be a dynamic ongoing activity (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Fillmore, 1982; 
Langacker, 1987, 1991; Talmy, 2000; Fauconnier & Turner, 2004; Evans, Bergen & Zinken, 2007; 
Singer, 2009). The static view corresponds to representational theories of mind, in which thinking 
occurs within a rule-based internal system of representation, while the dynamic view sees 
conceptualization as embodied and culturally embedded, i.e. as an ongoing activity shaped by 
linguistic and non-linguistic interactions with the world. Representational theories include the 
classical view, as well as prototype, exemplar and theory (or explanation-based) approaches. 
Dynamic theories can be traced back to associationism, with most current theories making 
reference to the neurological basis. 
1.1. Theories of Concepts and Categorization 
1.1.1. Representational Static Theories 
Research into the nature of concepts and categorization is ongoing, in both linguistics and 
psychology, and there is no consensus in either field as to the preferred theory. ‘Representational’ 
theories provide the classical view about categorization and all the approaches, which fall under 
the information-processing framework. This representational group of theories contains 
prototype theories (also known as family resemblance or probabilistic views), exemplar theories, 
and theory-based models (also called explanation-based). The classical view is the most static in 
this class. The other theories, which are introduced here, have dynamic proportions. The chronical 
 19 
order in which they were proposed, corresponds to the order in which they are leaning more and 
more towards the dynamic position (for an overview see Smith & Medin, 1981). 
The classical approach of categorization can be traced back to Aristotle. In the text 
‘Categories’ from Aristotle's Organon (Edghill, 1928) language and logic are seen as propositional 
and categories are discrete entities. A linguistic unit denotes a particular object (‘rose’) or a class 
of objects (‘flower’), i.e. the category. The particular object can be defined by ostension (pointing 
at), but the category is defined by its essence, a list of defining features. The features in this list 
are a set of shared properties. They are individually necessary and jointly sufficient to categorize 
an object as belonging to a certain category. Thus, the feature list is the intension (the description) 
of the category, and the class is the extension of the category (the set of objects defined by that 
description). New concepts are acquired by defining and combining definitional constituents. 
Categorization is seen as a process of applying the definitional constituents of the internal 
represented concept to a perceived object in the external world. Aristotle’s theory of categories 
was predominant for twenty centuries, but it has the problem that it is impossible to come up 
with lists of defining features for natural categories, as well as many technical categories 
(Wittgenstein 1970 [1953]).  
In prototype theories categorization is the process of grouping perceived objects around 
on internally represented prototype of these objects. This approach tries to solve the problems 
faced by the classical approach by adhering to central category descriptions, while allowing for 
disjunctive categories. This means that an instance of a category does not have to have all the 
features of all the other instances, but just enough to justify its inclusion in the category. The first 
break away from the classical view by its former adherent Ludwig Wittgenstein was also the first 
rudimentary theory of prototypes. Although Wittgenstein in his first work Tractatus logico-
philosophicus (1921) started out defending the propositional view of word meaning, he later 
realized in his Philosophische Untersuchungen (1970[1953], posthum) that this approach could 
never clearly define the meaning of some categories. In his famous ‘class of games’- example he 
asked, what is common to all exemplars that are subsumed under the name of game. Whatever 
one comes up with, there is always some subset of games that does not share the properties that 
are assumed to define the class. “Betrachte z.B. einmal die Vorgänge, die wir »Spiele« nennen. Ich 
meine Brettspiele, Kartenspiele, Ballspiele, Kampfspiele, usw. Was ist allen diesen gemeinsam? - 
Sag nicht: »Es muß ihnen etwas gemeinsam sein, sonst hießen sie nicht ›Spiele‹ « - sondern schau, 
ob ihnen allen etwas gemeinsam ist. - Denn wenn du sie anschaust, wirst du zwar nicht etwas 
sehen, was allen gemeinsam wäre, aber du wirst Ähnlichkeiten, Verwandtschaften, sehen, und 
zwar eine ganze Reihe.“ ([1953]1970, p. 66). Wittgenstein argues that all the similarities and 
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relationships between the different members of a category make up a family resemblance. With 
this term he refers to the fact that in a family children resemble their parents in different specific 
properties, but exactly what they have in common can vary. Wittgenstein was the first who 
described the problems with the classical view and indicated interesting possibilities to replace or 
extend it. However, he never really defined what a concept is and did not propose a theory that 
could replace the classical description. Nevertheless, with the introduction of the concept of 
‘family resemblance’ he paved the way for developing a new approach to categorization. 
Eleanor Rosch is considered to be the first, who proposed a theory based on 
Wittgenstein’s conception of family resemblance (Lakoff, 1987). Her work revolutionized the field 
and several scholars began conducting extensive research on the structure of semantic concepts. 
Rosch carried out several studies to explore how categories of objects might be structured 
according to Wittgensteins view (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch, 1978). One of the first issues she 
set out to disprove was Whorf’s hypothesis of linguistic relativity. In different experiments 
involving the categorization of colors, Rosch was able to show that the Dani, a Polynesian people 
whose language has only two color terms, nevertheless recognize focal colors as more typical than 
non-focal colors. As cognitive reference points for categorizing color, focal colors are better 
examples of color than non-focal colors. These findings stood in direct opposition to the classical 
notion that all categories are conjunctive, i.e. there are no better examples within a category. 
Moreover, this was strong evidence against the deterministic view of Whorf’s hypothesis (see also 
2.1 of this thesis). Rosch termed these best examples of a category ‘prototypes’ and they have a 
special cognitive status (Lakoff, 1987). Since Rosch’s early experiments, prototype effects were 
found in numerous studies using different stimuli and different research paradigms, like typicality 
ratings, similarity ratings, or generalization.  
Nevertheless, what do the prototype effects reveal about the nature and structure of 
concepts? Although prototype effects clearly falsify the classical view, they are not a theory of 
conceptual categorization. Her experimental work focused on prototype effects and basic-level 
categorization, and her theoretical work concentrated on a model based on cue validity, i.e. the 
conditional probability that an object falls in a particular category given a particular feature or cue. 
Because she was studying color categorization, she thought that prototype effects are based on 
perceptual properties of stimulus features, i.e. their salience, memorability, and the ease with 
which they can be generalized to other instances. In the early seventies, she followed the 
representational information-processing approach and started to make theoretical 
generalizations. She claimed that prototype effects reflect the internal structure of categories and 
that they are represented in the minds of subjects. Lakoff comments on this claim, that “Such 
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interpretations were artefacts of an overly narrow view of information-processing psychology” 
(1978, p.43). In the late seventies Rosch gave up this thesis, now viewing prototype effects as 
setting constraints on concept structures. As Lakoff (1987) points out, Rosch’s work still is most 
often interpreted as constituting a psychological theory of the mental representation of 
categories, but some later remarks by Rosch herself, reflect a changed view on the subject: “It 
should be emphasized that we are talking about the perceived world and not a metaphysical world 
without a knower. What kinds of attributes can be perceived are, of course, speciesspecific. (…) 
What attributes will be perceived given the ability to perceive them is undoubtedly determined 
by many factors having to do with the functional needs of the knower interacting with the physical 
and social environment. One influence on how attributes will be defined by humans is clearly the 
category system already existent in the culture at a given time. Thus, our segmentation of a bird's 
body such that there is an attribute called "wings" may be influenced not only by perceptual 
factors such as the gestalt laws of form that would lead us to consider the wings as a separate part 
[…] but also by the fact that at present we already have a cultural and linguistic category called 
"birds." Viewing attributes as, at least in part, constructs of the perceiver, does not negate the 
higher-order structural fact about attributes at issue, namely that the attributes of wings and that 
of feathers, do co-occur in the perceived world. These two basic principles of categorization, a 
drive toward cognitive economy combined with structure in the perceived world, have 
implications both for the level of abstraction of categories formed in a culture and for the, internal 
structure of those categories once formed” (1978, p. 19-20). At this point, Rosch moved towards 
theories that are more dynamic. In her book ‘The Embodied Mind’ (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 
1991) she views cognition as embodied action and discusses the relevance of this view for 
cognitive science and evolutionary theory.  
However, ‘classical’ prototype theories assume that the mental representation of a 
category is built around one (or at least no more than a few) abstract representations, i.e. the 
prototypes. A prototype is a summary representation of central tendency information (Smith & 
Medin, 1981). Since, according to the prototype view, categories are disjunctive, the information 
that defines the structure of a concept cannot be captured by lists of defining features. Instead, 
the features that make up a category define how central an instance is to a category. Under such 
an information-processing approach, prototype effects are thought to reflect the underlying 
structure of concepts. Since experiments show that some instances of a category are better 
examples than others and that these instances play a central role in how people think about the 
category, prototype theories see concept structure as built up around prototype representations. 
These are representations that reflect which features an instance should have in order to be called 
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a member of the category. The fact that some members of a category are more central to the 
category, and others are placed more toward the periphery, is often described by the term ‘graded 
category structure’ (Rosch & Mervis, 1975).  
But what about objects, which belong to one or another category? Zadeh (1965) proposed 
an extension to classical set theory in mathematics, i.e. ‘fuzzy set theory’ in which objects may 
belong to one or more groups, in varying degrees of fitness. Zadeh introduced fuzzy set notions to 
the domain of categorization and proposed that a category is not a structure with clear 
boundaries, but that a category as a whole is fuzzy and the attributes that make up a conceptual 
representation are fuzzy, to varying degrees. Even though fuzzy set theory was applied to many 
areas within categorization research with some success, to many scholars (e.g., Smith & Medin, 
1981) it was failing to account for how a conceptual representation can be cast in fuzzy terms. The 
classical view at least saw the mind propositional, so it has grounds for seeing categorization as 
the logical manipulation of semantic concepts. At least it is not exactly clear what the relationship 
between fuzzy concepts and conceptual categorization is.  
The exemplar theories that were proposed in the late seventies rejected the assumptions 
of prototype theories that the mental representation of a category is built around abstract 
representations – the prototypes, which are a summary representation of central tendency 
information. They claim that concepts are built around specific instances of the category, i.e. the 
exemplars. New objects are categorized only with respect to how closely they resemble specific 
known members of the category (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Brooks, 1978; Estes, 1986; Hintzman, 
1986; Nosofsky, 1986). The most elaborated exemplar theories are the Context Model of Medin & 
Schaffer (1978) and the Generalized Context Model ([GCM] Nosofsky, 1984, 1986; Ashby & 
Maddox, 1993; McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995). Like the prototype view, the exemplar view is still 
based on similarity. As two instances (the exemplar and the newly encountered object) are never 
identical, there must be some sort of abstraction. The exemplar representation does not involve 
any abstracted information, so this abstraction must take place during the use of the concepts 
(Komatsu, 1992). Different variants of the instance approach vary as to how many instances they 
assume to be stored. A major difference between prototype and exemplar theories therefore is 
that the former see abstract information as part of the category representation, whereas the latter 
see such information as being computed. A theoretical difficulty for the exemplar view is that 
storing a representation of a certain object is already an abstraction, because the next time one 
sees the object, it might be in completely different circumstances. For the two instances of the 
object to be recognized as the same, it is essential that not all the information about the first 
encounter is stored, but only the information that is relevant for categorizing the object. The 
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problem is countered by assuming that the learner has a strategy that determines how many, and 
which, attributes will make up the exemplar representation (Medin & Schaffer, 1978). One 
obvious strategy would involve the learner paying attention to those attributes that occur 
frequently among class members. Of course, this does not explain how, and based on which 
attributes, those concepts are formed in the first place. Some researchers have tried to solve this 
problem by suggesting a multiple prototype representation, which is a compromise between 
exemplar and prototype models (Love, Medin & Gureckis, 2004; Griffiths, Tenenbaum & Steyvers, 
2007; Vanpaemel & Storms, 2008).  
However, prototype, fuzzy set and exemplar theories assume that categorization relies on 
similarity between the perceived object in the world and the former conceptual representation of 
it. The problem with this assumption is, that, for abstract concepts, the perception of similarities 
is too unconstrained to predict categorization results. Therefore, several researchers have 
changed the assumptions on this subject to an alternative view, which assumes that concepts are 
based on knowledge and are influenced by intuitive theories about the world. These conceptual 
theories are called ‘Theory Based Models’ or ‘Explanation Based Approaches’ or ‘Theory-Theories 
of concepts’ (Murphy and Medin 1985, Murphy, 2002; Keil, 1989; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Carey, 
2009). According to these researchers concepts are organized around theories or goals. The 
knowledge that is organized in such theories implies that in different contexts different attributes 
are important in classifying an object as belonging to a category. Learning a new concept is based 
on progressive generalization. An example often mentioned is Murphy and Medin’s (1985) man 
jumping into a pool with his clothes on. One might conclude that the man is drunk, not because 
jumping into a pool with clothes on is a feature of the category drunk, but because we have a 
theory of what it means to be drunk that explains the man’s behavior. Medin (1989) claims that 
the theory-based approach allows us to address the question of why we have the categories we 
have, and why categories are reasonable. The theory-based approaches differ from prototype and 
exemplar theories in many ways. They allow for multiple kinds of concepts where feature 
similarity plays a secondary role, while relations between concepts and general world knowledge 
in which the concept is embedded are more important. Although the theory based models of 
categorization make some important points, they do not explain how categorizing might actually 
work. Nevertheless, they shed light on the context and on the goals under which categorization 
takes place. ‘Theory Based Models’ are less static than the classical models and other information-
processing approaches.  
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1.1.2. Dynamic Theories  
As discussed above, both classical and information-processing approaches are inherently static by 
seeing ‘knowledge as representations’ and ‘mental processes’ working on them. Dynamic theories 
of categorization give up the distinction between representations on the one hand and mental 
processes that work on these on the other, and view categorization as a single process. According 
to Dewey (1958 [1929]) thinking should be conceived of as an active interaction with the world 
and we should speak of knowing (an activity) rather than knowledge, which is inherently static. 
He claimed that “…knowing is itself a kind of action, the only one which progressively and securely 
clothes natural existence with realized meanings” (1988 [1929], p. 134). This activity is not an 
interaction between the cognitive system and the environment, but rather between the body, of 
which cognition is one part – and its environment. As early as the 1920s Dewey proposed the idea 
of an ‘embodied mind’. This became very popular in cognitive science. It goes along with the view 
commonly held by neuroscientists that all thinking is the result and not the cause of neural 
interactions. All mental activities follow neural interactions, rather than preceding them (Singer, 
2009).  
Donald Hebb originally developed this idea of modern neuroscience in 1949 and 
nowadays there is growing experimental and theoretical evidence that his theory of cell 
assemblies is essentially correct. Hebb was the first to claim that local reverberations in groups of 
cortical neurons code the internal representations of categories. Hebb’s work was – like 
Chomskies work - a response to the behaviorists who abandoned all mental phenomena and only 
discussed observable behavior. He started a new research orientation in psychology, i.e. the 
explanation of behavior through the modeling of the neurophysiology of the brain, resulting in the 
approach of connectionism (see also 1.2). In his book ‘The organization of behavior’ ([1949] 2009, 
x ix) he claimed that the brain consists of a large population of cells with more or less random 
connections between them. When some sensory input (e.g. a bar of light) activates the brain, it 
notices the inherent organization of the sensory pattern (a line in this case). Somewhere in the 
randomly connected population of neurons, there is a group of cells with approximately the right 
connections to spot the line shape. Unlike Chomsky at that time, Hebb did not claim that there is 
innate knowledge in the brain about the existence of concepts of lines. Instead, the size of the 
‘random population of cells’ makes it very likely that whatever is presented to the brain will find 
a group of neurons with more or less the right connections to ‘represent’ the sensory input. This 
group of neurons will - in the course of coming across more and more line-shaped stimuli -, be 
fine-tuned, such that the group constitutes a ‘cell-assembly’. This is how new concepts are 
learned. When activated by different examples of the same class of things, the random variation 
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will be wielded out, so that what is left is what is central to the different instances of the class. 
Hebb posited the notion of cell-assemblies because he saw that individual neurons do not have 
the properties for a basic unit of activation. Hebb reasoned that if a concept can survive severe 
lesions of the brain, this must mean that its representation cannot depend on single neurons. Cell-
assemblies can account for this as they are ‘diffuse structures’ consisting of groups of neurons. 
Hebb ([1949] 2009, p.75) based his view on neurophysiologic research which showed that a 
neuron makes connections with other cells over several millimeters of cortex. A group of cells, 
consisting of a moderate number of cells, could thus involve large sections of cortex. Moreover, 
within a cell-assembly there is ‘equipotentiality’, meaning that the assembly can be activated in 
different ways (involving different cells and connections) with the same result. All this means that 
a cell-assembly can survive the loss of many of its cells and connections and still fulfill the same 
function. According to Hebb the fine-tuning of cell-assemblies takes place through two processes 
that is the recruitment, which involves the incorporation of ‘new’ cells into the assembly, and its 
opposite, fractionation, which refers to the separation of cells so that they no longer take part in 
the assembly. The connection between two neurons becomes strengthened if they are active 
simultaneously.  
The mechanism whereby connections between cells is modified has become known as 
‘Hebbian learning’. This kind of learning requires many repetitions, and even then it works only 
because the brain is highly malleable at this time, in the form of a large variation of more or less 
randomly wired ‘circuits’ that as a group contain approximations to all the things that have to be 
learned. Adult learning, on the other hand, involves learning that only involves one or a few 
presentations of the stimulus. Moreover, the associations that must be learned, are mostly 
between elements that have already been established. Physiologically speaking, early learning 
primarily  involves the sensory areas of the brain, while adult learning predominantly takes place 
in the ‘association areas’, because it takes advantage of meaning. A concept has ‘meaning’ when 
it already has many associations with other concepts in place. Moreover, two concepts may be 
associated without ever being present together, through the simultaneous activation of elements 
of both concepts. Hebb claimed, that “The conceptual activity that can be aroused with a limited 
stimulation must have its organized core, but it may also have a fringe content, or meaning, that 
varies with the circumstances of arousal” ([1949] 2009, p. 133). Unlike information processing 
models, which view thinking as a process of perceiving stimuli in the external world, encoding the 
same and storing the data so perceived and encoded in one's brain, Hebb does not distinguish 
between stored concepts (representational theories) and conceptualization processes that 
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operate on them. The latter is an important issue which modern theories of conceptualization, i.e. 
theories of embodied cognition, share with Hebb’s theory of cell assemblies.  
Modern dynamic theories of conceptualization such as the theories of embodied cognition 
claim that the nature of human cognition is largely determined by the form of the human body 
and that all cognitive activity is based on experience in the physical world. The view of such an 
embodied mind has become more widespread through the pioneering work of the philosopher 
Johnson, the linguist Lakoff, the immunologist Edelman and the neuroscientist Damasio (see for 
an overview Linz, 2002). They all claim that what distinguishes us from computers is that human 
thinking, i.e. generating concepts, is largely determined by properties of the human body. This 
view implicitly contains the thesis that the human body is a medium which shapes the information 
we perceive and the knowledge we constitute (Jäger & Linz, 2004). As Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 
p. 6) argue “There is no such thing as a computational person, whose mind is like computer 
software, able to work on any suitable computer or neural hardware— whose mind somehow 
derives meaning from taking meaningless symbols as input, manipulating them by role, and giving 
meaningless symbols as output. Real people have embodied minds whose conceptual systems 
arise from, are shaped by, and are given meaning through living human bodies.” To them it is 
impossible to think in the Chomskian way and they argue that “There is no Chomskyan person, for 
whom language is pure syntax, pure form insulated from and independent of all meaning, context, 
perception, emotion, memory, attention, action, and the dynamic nature of communication. 
Moreover, human language is not a totally generic innovation. Rather, central aspects of language 
arise evolutionarily from sensory, motor, and other neural systems that are present in "lower" 
animals” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 6-7). 
In the book The Body in the Mind (1987) Johnson argued that in early childhood we 
develop embodied schemata of experience, which are the foundation of later, more abstract 
modes of thought. Johnson terms them ‘image schemata’ and claims that by the extension and 
transformation of such, all thinking is determined. Johnson (1987) holds that image schemata are 
figurative, analog, and non-propositional in nature. They are not concrete pictures in the mind, 
nor are they abstract concepts or propositional structures. Johnson stated that such schemata 
operate in the form of ‘metaphor’ and the rational thought is organized through "metaphorical 
elaborations of image schemata" which "give rise to form and structure in our experience and 
understanding" (p. 73). Along with Lakoff (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, Johnson & Lakoff, 1999, 2002; 
see also Coulson, 2000; Turner & Fauconnier, 2000; Clark, 2008; Gibbs, 2005; Núñez, 2009), 
Johnson emphasizes that metaphor is the most important means by which our knowledge is 
structured. It is an unconscious imaginative mechanism of meaning extension across conceptual 
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domains. One uses concrete conceptual knowledge sources to describe an abstract conceptual 
target domain: for example, the conceptual metaphor ‘Life (target) is a journey (source)’ (Lakoff 
& Turner, 1989, pp. 61). Within such a conceptualization, it is possible to create a wide range of 
metaphorical expressions like ‘Beginning and End of the path of life’, ‘Destination of life’ or ‘Being 
without directions in Life’ and so forth. Metaphorical thought is based on basic sensory concepts 
as source concepts. Thus, conceptual concepts are grounded in sensory knowledge and embodied 
experience of the physical world. 
Moreover, Lakoff (1987) claims that knowledge is organized by means of structures of 
what he calls ‘idealized cognitive models’ (ICM). The idea about ICM is based on “Fillmore’s frame 
semantics (Fillmore, 1982), Lakoff and Johnsons theory of metaphor and metonomy (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980), Langackers cognitive grammar (Langacker, 1991) and Fauconnier’s theory of 
mental spaces Fauconnier, 1985)” (Lakoff, 1987; 68). ICMs can contain many concepts and they 
are like schemata in that they organize a coherent body of knowledge. Lakoff gives an example, 
i.e. the concept ‘Tuesday’ is part of an ICM that contains knowledge about weekdays and 
weekends, about a number of days in the week, etc. He calls these mental models idealized, as 
they are human constructions. The concept of a week or of weekends is an abstraction or 
idealization, because there is nothing corresponding to a week in nature. Category structure and 
prototype effects reflect the internal structures of the cognitive models and are ‘by-products’ of 
the organization. This structure can include degrees of membership, classical category structures, 
or metonymic structure. Lakoff calls a highly elaborated structure a ‘radial category’. It consists of 
several central members, around which the cognitive model is constructed. The non-central 
members of the model are said to be motivated’ by the center of the ICM. Lakoff then works out 
how this model leads to a theory of cognitive semantics. Image schematic concepts are directly 
meaningful, as they are based on bodily interaction with the environment. To Lakoff (1987) higher-
order concepts are indirectly meaningful, as they are based on image-schematic concepts.  
At the same time that Lakoff was working on the theory of idealized cognitive models, 
Edelman (1987) was constructing his theory of neuronal group selection (TNGS). Edelman (1993) 
criticizes Lakoff’s lack of depecting how embodiment is the basis of meaning. For this, he argues, 
we need a neurological account of conceptual categorization. In order to explain perceptual and 
conceptual categorization, Edelman claims three principles that work at the neuronal level. First, 
through developmental selection, i.e. during growth and development the brain achieves an 
enormous variation in neuronal anatomy, both within and between individuals. According to 
Edelman this variation is due to topobiological competition, and the result of these processes 
depends on a myriad of local interactions between brain cells. The general processes that route 
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the development of the brain are based on genetic factors. Neurons are permanently in 
competition for activation, and those who don’t get vitalized degenerate. Comparable to Hebb’s 
randomly connected populations of cells, Edelman’s developmental selection leads to primary 
repertoires, i.e. a very large number of variant groups. Thus the unit of selection is not the single 
neuron, but the neuronal groups, because they combine all the functionality that is needed to be 
the basis of selections. It has excitatory and inhibitory cells, neurons that send their signals locally 
and those that bridge the gap with neurons further away. Second, according to Edelman the 
neurons in these primary repertoires  selectively adjust the connection weights with other 
neurons, which leads to secondary repertoires. Similar to Hebb’s cell-assemblies the secondary 
repertoires are functional circuits of groups of neurons. Topobiological competition and selective 
adjustment are overlapped and lead to the formation of neuron maps that receive activation from 
the same input. Some of these maps have a topographical layout, i.e. that their organization 
reflects the structure of the sensory sheets from which they receive information directly or 
indirectly through earlier maps. Third, the brain maps interact through reentry. The neural circuits 
in the brain whose development is evolutionary determined coordinate their activity to achieve 
new functions. The brain maps that form the primary and secondary repertoires are connected by 
tremendous parallel and reciprocal links. Signals are sent back from receiving to the originating 
map, thus strengthening by reentrant signaling the connections between the two maps. With 
reentrant maps, the concept area of a certain object becomes activated and can in turn, through 
a reentrant connection with the right sensory map, activate an image of his specific object or the 
touch of it, the smell and so forth. In this way, reentrant maps implement the distinction between 
impression (perceptual concepts) and ideas (conceptual concepts). To Edelman the selective 
coordination of the complex patterns of interconnection between neuronal groups by reentry is 
the basis of thought and behaviour. His theory describes the process of primary perceptual 
categorization to a high degree. However this is not the case for conceptual categorization. 
Conceptual concepts are more abstract and much more closely linked to language. Topologic maps 
are very important in Edelman’s theory, and it may be that the sensory input of the linguistic sign 
(visual or auditive) plays an important role regarding topographically organized neuronal groups 
and its contribution to concept structure. 
The neuroscientist Damasio argues even more than Edelman against the Cartesian theatre 
view of cognition. In his book Descartes Error (1995) he claims that the number of links between 
the input and output sectors in the brain structures is quite large, and the complexity of their 
connection patterns immense. All those interposed structures construct and change the images in 
our minds and “On the basis of those images (…), we can interpret the signals brought in at the 
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early sensory cortices so that we can organize them as concepts and categorize them (Damasio, 
1995, p. 93)”. The broad-based conceptual knowledge that is needed to successfully interact with 
the environment depends on a variety of systems which are located in relatively separate brain 
regions. Although everybody has the illusion of a holistic perception that is represented at a 
definite anatomical location (Damasio, 2010; see also Dennett, 1991, 1996), it is probably the 
relative simultaneity of activity sites that binds the widely separated parts of the mind together. 
Damasio makes a distinction between perceptual images and recalled images. Perceptual images 
are impressions and are based on a direct source in perception, while recalled images have no 
such source, but arise because we imagine a thing or an idea. The recalled images are partial 
reconstructions of the perceived images and are suspected to “arise from transient synchronous 
activation of neural firing patterns largely in the same early sensory cortices where the firing 
patterns corresponding to perceptual representations once occurred. The activation results in a 
topographically organized representation” (Damasio, 1995, p. 103). Perceptual and recalled 
images activate the same topographical maps in the early sensory cortices. The mechanism via 
which the recalled images activate the maps in the sensory cortex is a learned dispositional neural 
pattern in the higher-order association cortices. These dispositions cause the firing of the neurons 
in the primary sensory cortices, thereby recreating the image. The dispositional representation is 
a potential pattern of neuron activity in small ensembles of neurons called convergence zones 
(Damasio & Damasio, 1994). These dispositions activate neurons in the primary sensory cortices 
in such a way that the secondary representation bears some resemblance to a direct perceptual 
simulation of those sensory cortices. That means that all knowledge is cast in a dispositional form. 
Learning new concepts consists in the continuous modification of such dispositions. Damasio 
notes, that “you never would have formed a dispositional representation without first forming a 
topographically mapped perceptual representation” (1995, p.106). Thus, all categorization, i.e. 
perceptual and conceptual categorization, is embodied in the way that they are processes in the 
brain within the same sensory-motor circuitry on which the enactment of them rely.  
Edelman and Damasio have put forward theories in the sense that Hebb envisioned, but 
they were only able to do this on a speculative basis due to the currently restricted knowledge 
about neurophysiological processes. Although both these sources are relevant to the issue of 
conceptual categorization, neither of them focuses on conceptual categorization as the central 
issue. The neurological models of Edelman and Damasio are, in attempting to be in accordance 
with the physiological facts, presently not yet sufficiently refined to reach beyond ‘lower-level’ 
processes to those structures deemed responsible for ‘higher-level’ conceptual categorization. 
However, for the author of this thesis the dynamic theories are much more suited to explaining 
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the issue of conceptual categorization than the representational static theories of concepts and 
categorization. 
1.2. The Organization of Concepts 
After having discussed theories concerning the nature and acquisition of concepts, the second 
question involves how the mind is organized and how concepts are related to each other. 
Therefore in the following, an overview of theories about the organization of concepts, i.e. the 
architecture of mind, will be provided. The most discussed views on the architecture of mind are 
those of ‘Modularity’ versus ‘Connectionism’. Supporters of the modular approach view the mind 
as a separated system with qualitatively different types of modality-specific semantic information 
formats (visual, verbal, etc.). Connectionist models, respectively, assume that the cognitive system 
is a vast, interconnected network of information nodes with each node influencing and being 
influenced by a large number of adjacent nodes. The system is viewed as a relatively homogenous 
system with relatively unconstrained interconnections. The following section is organized around 
these two views, which are focal points for many researchers on this subject. 
1.2.1.  Modular Models 
As discussed before, static representational information-processing approaches have dominated 
theories regarding the functional architecture of the mind for several decades. The approaches 
are  based on the computer metaphor, in that - just like computers - the human mind is a modular 
symbol-manipulating system, in which the symbols stand in one-to-one relationship with objects 
and categories in the world (for a critical review see Lakoff, 1987; Searle, 1990; Linz, 2002). Since 
the mind is considered to be a computer, i.e. an algorithmic device, thinking is based on the 
manipulation of abstract symbols. These symbols make up mental representations which are 
reflections of reality, attaining their meaning because the symbols stand in direct correspondence 
with objects or classes of objects (categories) in the external world. Fodor (1975) proposed that 
thought is based on a mental language, which he calls ‘mentalese’. According to his theory, the 
mind consists of a system of abstract representations that allows thinking by transforming them 
in a rule-governed manner. This representational system is innate and can be viewed as the 
medium of thought, underlying our ability to learn and use a language. This hypothesis became 
generally known as ‘Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH)’. The specific physical nature of the 
human brain and of the media format in which communication with the external world is 
accomplished is seen as having little consequence on these processes.  
The view that thought is some sort of computation and the mind is composed of separate 
encapsulated modular structures was proposed by Chomsky (1959) and further developed by 
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Fodor (1983), Jackendoff (1992) and Carruther (2006). In the 80s with the publication of Fodor’s 
‘Modularity of mind’ (1983) this concept advanced to the most influential paradigm in cognitive 
science. 
Chomsky (1988) assumes that the mind in general is modular, consisting of separate 
systems with their own properties. In this view, the mind is organized in different interacting, but 
autonomous subsystems, e.g. “knowledge of language, of music, of mathematics, of the behavior 
of objects, of social structure, of human characteristics, etc.” (Chomsky, 1980, p. 180). The internal 
structure of the subsystems is not modifiable. Every module is discrete and encapsulated because 
of its different functionality. Bierwisch (1996, 43) calls the Chomskian approach “modularity of 
knowledge”. 
Jackendoff (1997), however, believes that the cognitive system consists of several 
modules which process distinct representational formats, rather than being divided into different 
faculties in the Fodorian (1983) sense. To Jackendoff not only syntax is a generative aspect of 
language, but also phonology and semantics. All three are separate generative modules, because 
they encode information in different representational formats. He calls the formats ‘languages of 
the mind’. “Each of these “languages” is a formal system with its own proprietary set of primitives 
and principles of combination, so that it defines an infinite set of expressions along familiar 
generative lines” (1997, p. 41). The modules are domain specific and connected through interface 
modules. An interface module partially translates information of one format into another. The 
interface modules can  access only the outputs of the representational modules. Jackendoff calls 
his theory ‘Representational Modularity’. 
Whereas Chomsky and Jackendoff propose a general modular structure of the mind, 
Fodor limits modularity to perception and language. He proposes a modell of the mind (Fodor, 
1983) that has two kinds of systems, i.e. 1. input systems and 2. central systems. The input systems 
are a series of discrete modules with specific architectures that govern perception and language, 
whereas the central system has a holistic structure and this is where thought, imagination and 
problem solving happen and intelligence resides. Each input system is different from each other 
and based on autonomous brain processes, which reflect distinct purposes. These systems are 
located in specific areas of the brain. Fodor characterized the input systems as domain specific, 
i.e. they are separated from the information being acquired by other input systems. A second 
feature of the input modules is that they are informationally encapsulated, i.e. they act separately 
from each other and from the cognitive central system. Encapsulation is “the essence of their 
modularity” (1983, p.71). According to Fodor the input modules are essentially “dumb” systems 
that act autonoumsly and fast. One can experience this in several examples of optical illusions 
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such as the Müller-Lyer arrows, which seem to differ in length apparently, even when one is fully 
aware that the lines are of equal length. The central cognitive systems are very different from the 
“dumb” input systems. According to Fodor, cognitive systems are smart, they operate slowly, are 
not encapsulated and domain-neutral, i.e. they cannot be related to specific areas of the brain. 
The Fodorian view is that evolution has given the modern human mind two separate, but 
coordinated systems: on the one hand input modules that produce fast reactions, e.g. in 
dangerous situations; and on the other hand a slower central cognitive system, to be used when 
there is time for thinking. Based on such considerations, Fodor developed a hierarchical 3-tiered 
system of cognition, which consists of 1. the transducer level, i.e. information from the external 
environment passes through a system of sensory transducers, e.g. from the ears, eyes, which 
transform the data into formats that each special purpose input system can process, 2. the input 
system modules which translate, but cannot access the higher levels, and 3. higher level cognitive 
functions which process, but cannot talk to each other. Fodor postulated domain-specific 
computational systems and hypothesis generators. The development of hypotheses and fixation 
of beliefs through central systems is based on incoming information from the input system and on 
memory. These higher-level processes such as reasoning, judgment, and decision making are 
horizontal, not informationally encapsulated and thus nonmodular. The hypothesis generators 
deliver information top down to the input systems, which then become output systems. In LOT 2 
(2008) Fodor reaffirms his thesis of nonmodular central systems and claims: “In Short, it appears 
that many of the principles that control the nondemonstrative fixation of beliefs have to be 
sensitive to parameters of whole systems of cognitive commitments. So, computational 
applications of these principles have to be nonlocal. So, they can’t be computations in the sense 
of CTM” (2008, p.122).  
Whereas Fodor proposed a system of cognition with on the one hand lower level modular 
peripheral processes and on the other hand higher level non-modular processes, other 
researchers suggest that most central information-processing  is also modular (Cosmides & Tooby, 
1994; Pinker, 1997; Sperber, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). This massive modularity proposal 
(Carruthers, 2006; Samuels, 1998; Sperber, 1994) has been discussed very controversially and 
many researchers have tried to demonstrate that massive modularity must be wrong (Deacon, 
1998; Fodor, 2000; Buller, 2005). One central problem of modularity is that it cannot account for 
flexibility and learning. A computational system of mind, as described by modularists, is 
encapsulated and static, so that there are insufficient possibilities for structural change. Because 
such a system only allows for highly limited learning strategies, Chomsky et al. assume that the 
whole conceptual system is innate and all cognitive systems are genetically determined.  
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Another interesting modular concept of mind is proposed by Shallice and Cooper (2011). 
Based on cognitive-neuropsychological investigations of patients with selective semantic 
impairments, they claim that the overall semantic system is composed of a basic network of 
separable subsystems, computing distinct functions and having different anatomical bases. The 
subsystems include different types of semantic representations (visual auditory, tactile etc.), 
which are based on neuronal assemblies. They claim, “that the assemblies have an attractor 
structure spread across the individual subsystems” (2001, p. 241). The acquisition of a concept is 
based on one or more subsystems, which are called core subsystems for that concept. The 
organizing principle of the concept is based on the internal logical structure of it. Semantic 
categorization is effected by a complex set of separable subprocesses and “the overall 
organizations of the subsystems concerned with language and thought and their interrelations are 
still far from clear, so there is still much work to be done on the basic functional architecture” 
(2011, p.503). 
1.2.2. Connectionist Models 
In parallel with the development of the representational modular theories of mind, a different 
kind of cognitive modelling regarding the organization of concepts has become popular, which 
rejects the mind-computer analogy. These models are called ‘connectionist models’ and they are 
based on the study of neural networks. The most interesting aspect of such networks is that the 
units of knowledge are based on the activation of neurons, which are connected by axons and 
dendrites. Thus, the conceptual system is organized along associative relations. Connectionism 
represents a modern version of ‘associationism’, which is a traditional notion in psychology 
(Deese, 1965; Anderson & Bower, 1973). Connectionists tend to be anti-modularistic, because for 
them the cognitive system is more homogeneous and innate only regarding a general ability to 
learn from experience. 
The first connectionist model of conceptual organization was introduced by Collins & 
Quillian (1972). They conceived of the conceptual system as a hierarchical network consisting of 
interconnected concepts represented as 'nodes', connected to one another by 'links', which 
express a relationship between two concepts. In this model, concepts are organized as 'pyramids', 
with concepts situated above or below other concepts in the network. One important aspect of 
the model concerns its emphasis on cognitive economy. Collins & Quillian assumed that the space 
available for the storage of conceptual information was limited, so that it would be beneficial to 
store information only in one place in the network. They tested their model with a verification 
task and found evidence for their assumptions: the larger the conceptual distance between two 
concepts, the longer the reaction times in the verification task (e.g. property verification 
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statements required more time than category membership statements) (Collins & Quillian 1969; 
1972). Several logical and empirical criticisms of the hierarchical network model of conceptual 
organization lead to the introduction of a modified version, the spreading activation network 
model (Collins & Loftus 1975). This later version gives up the strict hierarchical structure of the 
network in favor of a more general notion of conceptual relatedness, which claims that 
connections between the nodes are either taxonomically related (also called IS-A relation, 
superset-relation, classified or paradigmatic relation) or associatively related (also called 
CAN/HAS-relation, property-relation, thematic relation or syntagmatic relation) (see also chapter 
2.4.4). Taxonomic categories or paradigmatically related concepts are organized in a hierarchical 
system based on similarities among their exemplars, e.g. basic-level categories, superordinate/ 
coordinate/ subordinate-level categories, part-whole categories etc. Both children and adults 
apply paradigmatic semantic relations to organize concepts (Markman, 1989; Osherson et al., 
1990). The basic-level categories are cognitively basic and this is the level at which most of the 
conceptual knowledge is organized, e.g. “ball”, “cup”‚ “house”, “eat”, “play”, “hot” or “cat”. The 
exemplars of basic-level categories are the ones first named and understood by children, have 
short lexemes, are more quickly identified in verification tasks, and are more similar and share 
more properties than categories of a super-ordinate level (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-
Braem, 1976).  
Associative or syntagmatically related categories are connected according to contiguities 
that have been experienced in real life and through language use (e.g. paper and pencil, bed and 
breakfast, dog and bark) (Lin and Murphy, 2001). The semantic relation between two categories 
becomes stronger the more the linguistic terms which refer to them are used or perceived 
together in speech/sign, auditory/visual comprehension, inner articulation, reading or writing 
processes. Associatively or syntagmatically related categories are action-related (The dog barks), 
attribute-related (The dog is big), location-related (The dog sleeps in the kennel), time-related 
(The dog barks every morning) etc. Nisbett and colleagues proposed that speakers of East Asian 
Languages and of Western Languages show a different preference for either of the two conceptual 
relations, i.e. Westerners categorize the world more hierarchically with taxonomic relations and 
East Asians more around thematic relations. (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett et 
al., 2001). Ji et al. (2004) empirically examined this thesis by testing four groups on a categorization 
task and found that both culture and language play a role in whether there is a preference for 
taxonomic or thematic relations. However, the results of the experiments might be influenced by 
another system of categorization, i.e. by the classifier grammar system, which is usually organized 
around semantic features. Classifier-related concepts are organized in terms of their semantic 
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properties such as color, size, shape, animacy, social importance, function etc. and status. They 
are not structured hierarchically. 
The process by which taxonomic/paradigmatically or associative/syntagmatically related 
information is retrieved is a function of spreading activation, which begins at a node and then 
spreads in parallel throughout the network. Whether the different related concepts have stronger 
or weaker semantic relations can be different for different people and is dependent on language 
use and knowledge. There has been considerable support for this assumption, and various models 
of conceptual organization have been developed in cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics 
(e.g. McClelland & Rumelhart 1981, 1986; Anderson 1983; Elman, 1991; Mc Namara, 1992; Dell & 
O'Seaghdha 1991; 1992; Bock & Levelt 1994; Elman et al., 1996; McRae & Boisvert, 1998; Cree, 
McRae & McNorgan, 1999; Roelofs, 1997; Churchland, 1998; Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer, 1999¸ 
Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001¸ Blaye & Bonthoux, 2001; Lin & Murphy, 2001; Borghi & 
Caramelli, 2003). The main idea of semantic network-based theories, that the conceptual system 
is set up as a network consisting of interconnected units represented as complex patterns of 
activity distributed across a relatively large number of processing units, has nowadays become 
widespread. For the connectionists the amount of activation of a concept depends on the 'weights 
of the links', i.e. ‘strong’ or ‘weak’, to other concepts in the system. The latter notion is taken to 
be only metaphorical and does not necessarily designate the actual ‘strength’ of a neuronal 
connection between several neurons in the brain. Theories of connections between concepts in 
the semantic system have been developed only recently. As previously outlined in section 1.1.2., 
Damasio assumes that conceptual meaning is generated by time-locked multiregional 
retroactivation of widespread fragment records (see Damasio 1989a; 1989b; 1989c; Singer 1995). 
‘Strong related’ in this sense means, that the activated neural assemblies very quickly form a 
spatio-temporal pattern of distributed neural activity. The brain is a highly distributed, self-
organizing system. However, connectionists believe, that 'strong' (or fast) related concepts are 
more likely to get activated than 'weak' related concepts. Some nodes are more accessible than 
others, because the degree of accessibility is related to factors such as frequency of usage and 
typicality. Only a fraction of the activation of a ‘node’ gets sent along a ‘link’. Thus, the amount of 
activation spreading from one node to another depends on the overall number of connected 
nodes. Most versions of spreading activation network models make several assumptions in 
addition to the hypothesis that activation spreads through a network along links. Mostly it is 
assumed that activation spreads in parallel in either direction along the links, that it fades rapidly 
in time and that the total activation at a unit is divided among the links that lead away from it. It 
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is believed that these cognitive-architectural structures are in principle uniform across all 
individuals. 
The spreading activation approach is flexible enough to account for multiple access routes 
to concepts and their features and to explain many of the empirical findings related to conceptual 
research (e.g. priming and context effects). There are many effects found in a variety of lexical 
experiments that reflect principles of conceptual organization. Research on semantic priming (see 
McNamara for a review, 2005) revealed that performance in word recognition is typically faster 
or more accurate when the target word is preceded by a semantically related prime word (Meyer 
& Schvaneveldt, 1971). In word production tasks semantic errors of two types occur, i.e. word 
substitutions and words blends (Hotopf 1980; Garrett 1993; Aitchison 1994). Moreover, in the so-
called picture-word interference paradigm, Schriefers et al. (1990) found that participants show 
higher response times in picture naming when a semantically related word is presented either 
shortly before or at the same time as the picture. When the word is semantically unrelated to the 
target, they need less time. Similar results could be replicated in other languages (Miozzo & 
Caramazza 1999; Roelofs 1992; Levelt et al. 1999). Another means of revealing the nature of 
semantic relations examines linguistic impairments caused through brain injury or illness, e.g. in 
cases of aphasia the lexical items of a particular semantic field may become inaccessible 
(Caramazza & Hillis, 1991; for a review see Vinson, Vigliocco, Cappa & Siri, 2003). Since these 
lexical errors occur within semantic fields, several theorists have argued that the conceptual 
system is organized along semantic relations. 
Connectionism provides an alternative to computationalism, i.e. the view that the mind is 
modular, operating like a computer and processing formal symbols, just as assumed by C-linguists. 
The latter cannot explain the learning of semantic relations and they are of the opinion that even 
novel concepts are inborn in some sense (see 1.2). Unlike them, connectionists can explain the 
development of new concepts and, moreover, issues such as metaphor, semantic change or 
ambiguity. However, exactly how and to what extent the connectionist theory contributes to an 
understanding of the organization of the conceptual system is still a matter of debate. 
1.3. Innate versus acquired concepts  
Besides the debate over modularity versus connectionism, there are two other conflicting 
assumptions, very much related to them, namely the issue of innate or acquired concepts. The 
supporters of the thesis that most of the conceptual system is innate are called ‘nativists’ and the 
adherents of the theory that it is mostly acquired concepts are called ‘empiricists’. Chomsky 
(1967), Fodor (1975, 2008), Jackendoff (1992) and Pinker (1994) and many others support the 
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nativist conceptions. Their studies pioneered the nativistic approach and their view has dominated 
the debate over the last decades. They proposed a universal innate grammar, which enables a 
child to understand and produce language. For Chomsky, the task of the linguist is to describe this 
universal human ability, known as language competence, with a grammar from which the 
grammars of all languages can be derived. The linguist’s task is to develop this universal grammar 
(UG) by looking at the rules children use in hearing and speaking their first language. This would 
explain the universality and rapidity of language acquisition. Knowing certain rules, a child can 
easily transfer them without having to learn them one by one. Exposure to specific samples of 
speech in infancy allows the child to determine the particular principles of the Universal Grammar 
(UG) that are relevant to the language being acquired. Fodor (1975, 1983) claims a position known 
as radical concept nativism, i.e. all lexical concepts are innate. To Fodor the medium of thought is 
an innate language (‘mentalese’) that is independent from all spoken or signed languages. 
Language must be treated as completely separate from other human cognitive abilities. No factors 
from outside the linguistic system can affect the rules of that system. For Chomsky (1975), 
language serves essentially for the expression of thought, and Jackendoff (1997, p.180) argues 
that thought is a mental function completely separate from language and that it can go on in the 
absence of language. “The picture that emerges [...] is that although language expresses thought, 
thought itself is a separate brain phenomenon” (1997, p. 185). “Language is just a vehicle for 
externalizing thoughts, it isn’t the thoughts themselves” (1997, p. 196). The Chomskyan linguistics 
propose that all natural languages have the same underlying cognitive structures and the language 
itself and each of its components, i.e. the lexicon, the phonology, the syntax, and the semantics, 
is autonomous of the others.  
The impact of these nativistic claims was strong. With this approach, linguists were 
‘allowed’ to consider each aspect of a language separately, without having first to understand how 
all the aspects fit together and how they are related to the rest of the cognitive system. Chomsky 
developed a modeling tool for describing each aspect of language and it seemed as if the problem 
of language was solvable. Based on the ‘universalists’ assumptions, decades of intense modeling 
efforts ensued. Unfortunately, as Levine and Postal (2004) criticize, the autonomy claim of the 
modular approach has been elevated to the status of a doctrine; and rather than seeing the 
‘nativists’ proposals as a set of simplifying assumptions that are intended to help analyze a 
complex system, they have been taken as truths about the nature of language. Chomskyan 
linguists routinely argue that language is a completely self-contained innate system, with 
genetically pre-programmed modules that interact with each other and other cognitive processes 
only through well-defined interfaces. Interlinguistic differences thus have no bearing on thought 
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itself. In the words of Jackendoff “[...] thinking is largely independent of what language one 
happens to think in. A French speaker or a Turkish speaker can have essentially the same thoughts 
as an English speaker can – they’re just in French or Turkish. The point of translation between 
languages is to preserve the thought behind the expression. If different languages can express the 
same thought, then thoughts cannot be embalmed in the form of any single language: they must 
be neutral with respect to what language they are expressed in” (1996, p. 6). “I say essential here 
in order to hedge on possible 'whorfian effects'” (1996, S.31). 
However, unlike the Chomskyan linguists the cognitive linguists have moved away from 
treating language as an innate rule-based formal system and are looking for external explanations 
for linguistic phenomena. Lakoff & Johnson (research on metaphor, categories and prototypes., 
see section 1.1.2), Langacker (cognitive grammar framework), Talmy (work on figure and ground), 
Fauconnier (mental spaces) and others attempt to describe linguistic phenomena in ways that are 
consistent with and motivated by what is known about the human brain. Today, there are many 
researchers, who work in accord with this neurological paradigm, and they produced a huge 
amount of published evidence which questions the theories of Chomskyan linguistic. The aim of 
'cognitive linguistics' is to build a theory of language that is consistent with current knowledge 
about the mind and the brain. It has not arisen fully-specified from a single source and it has no 
crystallized formalism as does the computational approach. There is a set of core concepts and 
goals, most of which are shared by most cognitive linguists, as well as by the philosophers, 
psychologists, and other scholars who have collaborated on  the development of this framework. 
These concepts are not the product of an imposed theory, but have instead emerged from 
empirical observations confirmed across languages and disciplines. Rather than inventing a new 
kind of rule-system for every aspect of language, cognitive linguists think that language and 
cognition are based on everyday experience and, at the same time, are a part of mental 
functioning. In the words of Langacker (2000): “Generative theory has always tried to minimize 
what a speaker has to learn and mentally represent in acquiring language. Its minimalism was 
originally based on economy: the best grammar was the one that did the job with the fewest 
symbols. In recent years, the emphasis has shifted to positing a richly specified universal grammar, 
so that the role of experience in learning a language involves little more than the setting of 
parameters. By contrast, Cognitive Grammar accepts that becoming a fluent speaker involves a 
prodigious amount of actual learning, and tries to minimize the postulation of innate structures 
specific to language. I consider this to be an empirical issue." (Langacker, 2000, p. 1-2). The main 
feature that distinguishes cognitive linguistics from generative grammar has to do with the place 
of language and meaning in the theory. As previously described in the generative model the 
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structure of linguistic expressions is seen to be determined by a formal rule system which is innate 
and largely independent of meaning. Cognitive linguists however argue that a particular linguistic 
expression is associated with a particular way of conceptualizing a given situation. This leads 
cognitivists to an ‘empiricist view’ regarding language and thought and thus they are very skeptical 
about the ‘nativist view’ that there is a specific organ in the human brain devoted exclusively to 
language. They assume that language is not autonomous from general cognition and the 
conceptual system is not seen as separated from language. Rather, all linguistic items and 
structures are conceived as meaningful. Conceptual categorization as treated by cognitive 
linguists does not focus on what is ‘true’ in the world; instead, it focuses on the conceptual system 
of the language user. A word or utterance triggers a piece of conceptual structure. Thus, the noun 
‘cat’ triggers the knowledge we have about domestic cats; in particular, it draws attention to our 
category of ‘cats’, and especially to a prototypical member of that category. ‘The cat is on the tree’ 
provides the conceptual cues we need to construct a mental image of a situation where ‘a cat’ 
and a ‘tree’, already salient in the discourse, exist in a particular prototypical spatial arrangement. 
To cognitivists, meaning is neither based on objective reality nor is it completely arbitrary and 
subjective. Instead, concepts are grounded in our experiences as embodied beings (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999). All humans share the same kind of sensory organs, neural structures, and bodily 
experiences. These experiences shape the kinds of concepts that one develops and that one 
attaches to linguistic items. Semantics, concepts connected with language, are not separable from 
all our kinds of knowledge. It incorporates many of the structures in the conceptual system. The 
most successful models of human knowledge group the knowledge into substructures, e.g., 
Schank and Abelson`s (1977) scripts, Fillmore`s frames (1982), Lakoff`s (1987) idealised cognitive 
models and Langacker`s (2000) schemata. All these terms refer to the fact that concepts tend to 
cluster together in related groups. Thus, cognitive linguists believe don’t believe in an innate 
autonomous linguistic faculty or module in the mind, which is autonomous from the rest of 
cognition. The generating of meaning is embodied and situated in a specific environment. It is a 
product of the interaction between language and experience/ knowledge, and thus language and 
thought mutually influence one another. Different language structures may lead to distinct 
conceptual structures, which is contradictory to the universality of conceptual structures. Since 
language is a cognitive device, it has a knowledge categorization function, and so it should 
influence human expectations. Meanings provide us with mental categories into which we order 
our experiences, or in other words, we are likely to experience the world in terms of categories 
supplied to us by the concepts in our language. This approach relates to the ‘Linguistic Relativity 
Principle’ also known as ‘Sapir-Whorf-Hypothesis’. It was Lakoff (1987), who renewed interest in 
40 
the relationship between language and thought, and meanwhile most of the embodied theories 
of mind adopted a moderate Whorfian approach. 
2. The Influence of Language on Categorization 
2.1. The Linguistic Relativity Principle 
How essential is language for thinking? This question was asked by Jäger (2004) in an article about 
the ‘Mediale Konstitutionsbedingungen des Mentalen’ (p. 15). He proposes that language is 
constitutive and essential for the development of mentality on different levels and that language 
can influence cognitive performances. The thesis that language influences the way a person 
behaves and thinks has been an important issue in linguistic tradition for several hundred years. 
How far back this view can be traced is largely a function of how one understands the terms 
language and thought and how explicit a hypothesis one requires. 
However, formulations begin to appear with the work of Herder and particularly in the 
work of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1836; for a review see Trabant 2000). In the twentieth century 
the idea is attributable to Franz Boas, Edward Sapir and especially to Benjamin Lee Whorf, who 
published a "new principle of relativity" in the paper "Science and Linguistics" (1940) (For an 
historical overview see Koerner, 2000). In several articles (in Carroll, 1956) about this issue, Whorf 
discussed the relationship between language, culture and thought. This resulted in a steady 
interest in linguistic relativity upheld throughout the second half of the twentieth century, and 
several researchers have tried to prove Whorf’s hypothesis.  
There are several researchers, who make linguistic relativity claims. They vary in the 
attributed degree of the influence of language on thought. An attempt to make the 'Linguistic 
Relativity Principle' more accessible was Miller and McNeil's (1969) proposal of a weak and a 
strong version based on a careful review of the results in literature. They concluded that - 
according to the strong version of this hypothesis - thoughts and behavior are determined by 
language (linguistic determinism), i.e. speakers of different languages experience different worlds, 
because the structures of their languages provide them with disparate world views. Thus, 
language would directly dictate thinking. This strong version of 'Linguistic Relativity' was not 
accepted among a wide range of researchers. Many researchers argue that it is possible to 
translate information from one language into another. It is quite possible that people with two 
different languages understand each other with an interpreter, although sometimes to some 
extent meaning is ‘lost in translation’. 
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However, as previously mentioned in chapter II, section 1 (concepts and categorization) 
of this thesis, contemporary scientists who ascribe themselves to the cognitive linguistic group (D-
Linguists) are quite content to accept a more moderate reading of the hypothesis. The weaker 
version of the theory is based on the premise that language merely influences thoughts. 
Categories of one’s native language have a predisposing influence on the way in which one deals 
with the world. Obligatory parts in languages may differ, so that speakers express different 
fragments of whatever they have in mind. This implies that speakers focus on different aspects 
from their concepts about each scene or event, depending on what language they are speaking.  
Whorf’s own position regarding the influence of language on thought is not as clear as 
some researchers imply (e.g. Pinker, 1994). He  did not actually present a fully developed, explicit 
theory of how the language we speak influences the way we think. Rather, based on the discussion 
and analysis of selected interrelated examples, his writings are more the outlines of an implicit 
theory. In his publications, Whorf sometimes seems to argue for the strong version of the 
hypothesis and then he supports the weaker version. Many statements of Whorf suggest that he 
probably holds the position that language influences unconscious habitual thought, rather than 
limiting thought potential (see Lucy, 1992; Kay & Kempton, 1984; Werlen 2002). Whorf claims that 
the system of categories which each language provides is an individual one, so that its speakers 
have their own `fashion of speaking' (Whorf 1939 [in Carroll 1956], 158). Whorf pointed out that 
every speaker of a certain language thinks that the concepts defined by their specific language are 
naturally existing in the external world. Moreover, speakers generalize by assuming that objects, 
which are grouped together based on a certain criterion, have even more aspects in common. 
Whorf claims that language does not determine a speaker’s thought, but rather the structure of 
the language implies certain associations which are not necessarily perceived and experienced 
before by the speaker or listener. 
Whorf tried to make his 'Linguistic Relativity Principle' plausible with several examples of 
the Hopi language, but since its publication it has evoked intense controversy. So far, the scholars 
still do not agree about whether Whorf’s hypothesis should be disputed or defended. Many 
researchers welcome the fact that the issue of linguistic relativity is again a subject that matters, 
because a long period of research has been marked by total rejection of a possible linguistic 
relativity effect. George Lakoff describes it as follows: "For the past few decades, most 
"responsible" scholars have steered clear of relativism. It has become a bète noire, identified with 
scholarly irresponsibility, fuzzy thinking, lack of rigor, and even immorality. Disavowals and 
disproofs are de rigueur - even I felt obliged to cite the standard disproof of "total relativism" in 
the previous chapter. In many circles, even the smell of relativism is tainted." (1987, 304). There 
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are several reasons for this. The first reason is mainly methodological. To test Whorf’s hypothesis, 
one needs to measure thought. In particular, it is necessary to assess non-linguistic cognitive 
processes independently of the linguistic features that are presumed to influence them. This is a 
quite difficult task because it is nearly impossible to suppress language in cognitive processes.  
Another problem some researchers have encountered is the small volume of empirical 
research which supports Whorf’s claims. Schlesinger (1991) claims that "...the mere existence of 
such linguistic diversities is insufficient evidence for the parallelist claims of a correspondence 
between language on the one hand and cognition and culture, on the other, and for the 
determinist claim of the latter being determined by the former" (1991, 18). "Whorf occasionally 
supplies the translations from a foreign language into English, and leaves it to the good faith of 
the reader to accept the conclusion that here must have been a corresponding cognitive or 
cultural phenomenon" (1991, 27). Finally, an argument suggested by Bloom (1981) claims that 
Whorf's views, because they emphasize cognitive structures, did not fit well with the behavioristic 
tradition in psychology prevalent at the time that Whorf was writing. Moreover the linguistic 
relativity principle that Whorf emphasized was in direct contrast to the computationalistic 
approach represented by Chomsky, Fodor, later also by Jackendoff and Pinker of mental activity, 
which argues that language is innate and universal. The Chomskyan representational theories, 
which were dominant at that time, prevented any research on the principle of Linguistic Relativity. 
Within cognitive psychology, there was a strong conviction that concepts come first and that 
language merely names them. In cognitive development, the Piagetian influence favored the same 
direction of influence, i.e. from thought to language. The position of cognitive psychologists in the 
last few decades has been that human conceptual structure is innate across cultures. This strong 
zeitgeist in Psychology and Linguistics as well as the lack of empirical evidence resulted in a period 
of extreme skepticism concerning the possibility of linguistic influences on thought (Clark & Clark, 
1977; Devitt & Sterelny, 1987; Pinker, 1994).  
However, currently most linguists maintain a moderate version of the ‚Linguistic Relativity 
Hypothesis’ holding that language influences higher-level categorization in non-trivial ways 
(Slobin, 1991; Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Papafragou et al., 2008; Boroditsky, 2009; Evans 
& Levinson, 2009; Malt & Wolff, 2010). Slobin (1991) for example proposed that language may 
influence thought during “thinking for speaking”, i.e. language-specific requirements affect the 
perception of objects or events because those that are relevant for linguistic encoding may 
become more salient in perceptual and conceptual categorization. Whether the effect is 
permanent or only a temporary cognitive process during a specific task is still the subject of 
controversial debate. 
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2.2. Influence of different Spoken Languages on Categorization 
As described in 2.1, Linguistic Relativity is an old and controversial claim. From the 1950s on, 
scholars of linguistic relativity carried out experiments to examine the effects of language on 
perceptual and conceptual categorization. 
2.2.1. The influence of spoken languages on perceptual categorization 
In research regarding categorical perception, which refers to the influence of category knowledge 
on perception, several authors questioned whether categories and their accompanying 
categorical perception processes are inborn, or whether they can be induced by learning and 
influenced by language and culture. Initially it was assumed that categorical perception is valid 
only for speech and dependent on motor theory (Liberman, 1957). However later experiments 
show that categorical perception is not restricted to low-level perceptual continua, but rather can 
occur in similar ways at higher levels of cognitive processing. Goldstone & Hendrickson (2010) 
have suggested that categorical perception makes it possible that people organize their world into 
categories and this, in turn alters the appearance of the perceived world. To them the connection 
between concepts and language is bidirectional and they claim that the languages people speak 
arguably influence the types of concepts that they form. In turn, the words people and especially 
children learn are mapped onto existing concepts that capture the correlated structure of the 
world (Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003). 
The subject was investigated in several studies concerned with colors, space, time, 
numbers, odors, faces and gender, in which stimuli from different categories were discriminated 
faster or more accurately than stimuli from the same category. Evidence was accumulated for 
both non-linguistic and language-driven categorical perception. In recent years, the finding that 
categorical perception in adults is lateralized to the left hemisphere in an area in the left prefrontal 
cortex, has been taken as evidence for categorical perception being influenced by language 
(Regier & Kay, 2009; Roberson & Hanley, 2010; Wolff & Holmes, 2011). Because other researchers 
failed to replicate the effects, the issue is still being discussed and there is no clarity so far. 
Color 
Throughout the 1950s and into the early 1970s, the majority of empirical studies was concerned 
with the categorization and perception of colors. The debate about color was framed according to 
the opposing approaches of cognitive scientists and cognitive linguists. The Universalists tried to 
prove, that the perception of colors has absolute universal constraints and that color terminology 
does not influence color perception, whereas the relativists claim that both biological and 
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linguistic aspects influence the categorization of color in the way that different languages have a 
different number of color terms, which influences people’s perception of colors. At that time, the 
color domain was viewed as an ideal example for testing the linguistic relativity principle, because 
color sensations can be described with a precise meta-language provided by a scientific color 
order system (MacEvoy, 2005) independent of the words of any natural language. This meta-
language allows describing and comparing the sameness or difference in meaning of color words 
in different languages. Studies involving color have a long tradition. The subject was investigated 
and discussed in the nineteenth century by Gladstone (1858) and Geiger (1871), but the first 
empirical color experiments were performed in the middle of the twentieth century and 
concerned the relationship between codability and ease of recognition and memorizing 
(Lenneberg & Roberts, 1953; Brown & Lenneberg, 1954; Lantz & Stefflre, 1964). The researchers 
discovered that colors which are less codable and have longer names were not as easy to be 
named, were named differently by different persons and at different times. Brown and Lenneberg 
(1954) interpreted the results of their codability experiments to the effect that the presence of a 
brief verbal expression for a certain color in a language influences the accuracy with which those 
colors were recognized and memorized and thus, that there is a link between language and 
thought. This line of work was criticized in the sense that codability and the target discriminability 
are factors which interact, and Berlin and Kay (1969) and also Heider (1972) / Rosch (1992) went 
on to prove language-independent saliency of ‘basic colors’. They found that although the number 
of color terms in a language varied considerably from language to language, there was an 
underlying order (basic color terms, hierarchy of terms) and that the perception of color is 
determined by the biology of human color perception and not by the language learned. These 
findings of universal structures in color terms were taken as evidence against Linguistic Relativity, 
and as a consequence, the idea became an unrespectable subject of research for quite a long 
period of time. 
In the nineties things changed and there was a whole series of new studies for the color 
domain. The old studies were criticized mainly with regard to methodological aspects. Lucy, 
Shweder (1979) and Saunders (2002) claim that the criteria used for naming basic color terms 
have been inconsistently applied, with the basic color terms of many languages also being possibly 
omitted. Roberson and colleagues replicated experiments of Brown & Lenneberg and of Rosch. 
On the basis of their results they suggest that there are cross-cultural differences in a number of 
perceptual and memory color tasks and that these differences might be systematically related to 
language differences in the color categories in each culture (Davidoff, Davies & Roberson, 1999; 
Roberson, Davies & Davidoff, 2000; Roberson & Hanley, 2007; Roberson, Davidoff, Davies & 
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Shapiro, 2006; Agrillo & Roberson, 2009). The researchers claim that language not only facilitates 
memory performance but also affects the perceived similarity of perceptual stimuli.  
Another color experiment was conducted by Winawer, Witthoft, Frank, Wu, Wade and 
Boroditsky (2007). They investigated the color terms of speakers of English and Russian, who 
divide the color spectrum differently. Whereas speakers of Russian differentiate obligatorily 
between lighter blues (goluboy) and darker blues (siniy), speaker of English do not. The authors 
conducted an experiment in order to prove whether this difference in language leads to 
differences in color discrimination. The findings they presented show that differences in language 
categories influence the performance on simple perceptual color tasks and moreover, the effect 
of language disappears through verbal interference. Both the data of Roberson et al. and the data 
of Winawer et al. show that the possession of color terms affects the way colors are organized 
into categories. Hence, both groups of researchers argue against an account of color 
categorization that is grounded in a set of innate principles. Roberson et al. propose that color 
categories are influenced by boundary demarcation based on language (2000). The results of 
Roberson et al. and Winaver et al. support the linguistic relativity proposal.  
A comparatively important experiment was conducted by Gilbert et al. (2006, 2008). They 
investigated color perception in terms of the functional organization of the cognitive system. The 
authors had the idea that because of the neural organization of the brain, an effect of language 
might appear more in the right visual field than in the left visual field. This is because language is 
processed in the left hemisphere, and the initial contralateral crossover in the processing of visual 
information results in visual signals from our right side being processed in the same half of the 
brain as language. Visual information on the left is processed in the right hemisphere and not 
influenced by linguistic categories. The researchers used this asymmetry to investigate the 
hypothesis that language might affect the visual processing of color in the left hemisphere more 
strongly than in the right. Gilbert et al. found support for their idea in lateralized color 
discrimination tasks. Participants showed faster response times to targets in the right visual field 
(the half that is primarily processed in the left hemisphere, i.e. the same as language) when the 
target and distracter colors belonged to different color categories (green vs. blue). Different 
shades of the same color (light green or dark green) were processed similarly whether they were 
presented in the left or right visual field. However, when presented in the left visual field response 
times were not affected by the names of the target and distractor colors. Performing a secondary 
verbal working memory task, the pattern of response times of the participants was different. It 
was the same when participants performed a non-verbal secondary task that involved spatial 
working memory. Gilbert et al. (2006) concluded that „people view the right (but not the left) half 
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of their visual world through the lens of their native language, providing an unexpected resolution 
to the language-and-thought debate” (2006, p. 489). Several researchers developed a series of 
subsequent adaptations of this experiment. They confirmed the basic conclusion of direct 
neurophysiological evidence, i.e. areas of the left hemisphere that are specifically responsible for 
name finding, are involved in the processing of purely visual color information (Drivonikou, Kay, 
Regier, Ivry, Gilbert, Franklin & Davies, 2007; Gilbert et al., 2007; Tan, Chan, Kay, Khong, Lawrance 
& Luke, 2008; Franklin, Drivonikou, Bevis, Davies, Kay & Regier 2008; Kay et al., 2009; Siok, Kay, 
Wang, Chan, Chen, Luke & Tan, 2009; Regier & Kay, 2009; Regier et al., 2010; Zhou, Mo, Kay, Kwok, 
Ip & Tan, 2010; Mo, Xua, Kay & Tan, 2011; Webster & Kay, 2012). Recently other researchers found 
no categorical effect at the green-blue color boundary and no categorical effect restricted to the 
right vision field, and failed to replicate left-laterized categorical perception for color (Brown, 
Lindsay & Guckes, 2011). It is not yet fully clear, how processing of colors in the right hemisphere 
is related to the left hemisphere. 
 
Space 
Many researchers considered the selection of the color domain to test the linguistic relativity 
hypothesis to be unfortunate, and they began to collect evidence in different fields of cognition. 
The publication of the book ‘Rethinking Linguistic Relativity’ (Gumperz & Levinson) in 1996 led to 
a shift away from the focus on color to the study of other domains, one of them being the domain 
of space. Several researchers investigated the general nature of the relation between spoken 
language and spatial cognition as well as the question whether differences in spatial language give 
rise to corresponding non-linguistic differences (Bowerman & Pederson, 1992; Brown & Levinson, 
1993; Levinson, 1996, 2003; Bowerman, 1996; Pederson, Danziger, Wilkins, Levinson, Kita & Senft, 
1998; Boroditsky, 2000; Munnich, Landau, and Dosher, 2001; Li & Gleitman, 2002; Boroditsky & 
Ramscar, 2002; Levinson, 2003; Levinson & Meira, 2003; Majid et al., 2004; Hespos & Spelke, 2004; 
Levinson & Wilkins, 2006; Papafragou, 2007; Ratliff & Newcombe, 2008; Landau, Meier & Keefer, 
2010; Papapfragou & Selimis, 2010; Khetarpal, Majid, Malt, Sloman and Regier, 2010; Boroditsky 
& Gaby, 2010,). In a remarkable set of experiments, the ‘Language and Cognition Group’ at the 
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen examined diversity in spatial cognition and 
linguistic frames of references used by speakers of familiar European Languages compared to 
speakers “of over forty, mostly unwritten languages spoken in small-scale, traditional societies” 
(Levinson, 2003 xix). One of the experiments involved speakers of Dutch and Tzeltal. In general 
there are three basic kinds of frames of reference used to identify the location of an object. Firstly 
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the intrinsic frame of reference, i.e. spatial regions can be expressed in terms of the inherent 
properties of the objects themselves (‚the cat is sitting at the front of the car’). Secondly the 
absolute frame of reference, i.e. spatial relations expressed in their cardinal or absolute positions 
(‚The cat is sitting north of the tree’). Thirdly the relative frame of reference, that is spatial 
orientation expressed relative to the position of the speaker or listener (‚The cat is sitting to the 
left of the car’). Different terms are used depending on what frame of reference is adopted by the 
speaker. While speakers of languages such as Dutch and German use combinations of the three 
frames of reference, speakers of Tzeltal, a Mayan language spoken in Chiapas, Mexico, exhibit 
only one frame of reference, i.e. the absolute one. Levinson (1996) found that the reliance of 
speakers of Tzeltal on absolute reference in spatial description affected their performance on non-
linguistic orientation tasks and constrained their spatial cognition. The findings show a correlation 
between the frames of reference used in language and frames of reference used in non-linguistic 
memory and reasoning. Thus, the internal categories accessed by and linked to language and 
cultural practices are in some way influenced and shaped by these linkages. Levinson suggests 
that the findings in the experiments constitute “central evidence for a co-evolutionary perspective 
on human cognition, wherein culture and the biological foundations for cognition have co-evolved 
and mutually adapted” (Levinson, 2003, p. xx). 
Time 
Another interesting domain related to space is time. When people talk about time they usually 
rely on space and express the space-time continuum by means of spatial metaphors. The 
metaphors vary across languages and depend on cultural artifacts and on individual disposition, 
age and experience. Several researchers found cross-linguistic differences in temporal reasoning 
and perception that stem from syntactic or lexical differences between languages (e.g. Gonzalez 
& Zimbardo, 1985; Tversky, Kugelmass & Winter, 1991; Boroditsky, 2000, 2001, 2011; Chan & 
Bergen, 2005; Núñez & Sweetser, 2006; Carstensen, 2006; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Ji, Guo, 
Zhang, & Messervey, 2009; Boroditsky & Gaby, 2010; Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 2010; Ouellet, 
Santiago, Israeli, & Gabay, 2010). Their studies revealed that  people in different cultures differ in 
whether they think of the concept of time “as horizontal or vertical, as stationary or moving, as 
limited or open-ended, as oriented from left-to-right, right-to-left, front-to-back, back-to- front, 
east-to-west, and so on” (Boroditsky et al., 2010, 123).  
Boroditsky (2001) performed a space-time priming tasks with English and Mandarin 
speakers, who besides horizontal/front-back metaphors also frequently use vertical metaphors. 
She could show that speakers of Mandarin were faster in judging sentences about temporal 
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succession (e.g., March comes earlier than April), when primed with a vertical spatial stimulus. 
Whereas English speakers were faster to judge sentences about temporal succession when primed 
with a horizontal spatial event.  
Casasanto & Boroditsky (2008) revealed in several experiments that participants cannot 
ignore spatial information that was irrelevant for the task, when they were asked to judge the 
duration of time. When they were making spatial judgments, information about time was not 
disturbing. This difference in spatial or temporal metaphorical descriptions occurs because the 
concept of time depends on the concept of space, more than vice versa (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 
Boroditsky, 2000; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Bottini & Casasanto, 2010; Casasanto, 
Fotakopoulou & Boroditsky, 2010; Merritt, Casasanto & Brannon, 2010). Casasanto & Boroditsky 
demonstrated this asymmetry in non-verbal tasks. In each task, participants sat in front of a 
computer screen and saw lines or dots. They were asked to indicate with mouse clicks the physical 
length they covered or the amount of time they stayed on the screen. All experiments showed 
that the longer the physical length of a stimulus, the longer participants judged the temporal 
duration of it. The converse, i.e. the temporal extent of stimuli influencing judgments of their 
spatial extent, was not the case. Casasanto & Boroditsky conclude that these experiments show 
that the asymmetry between spatial and temporal metaphorical descriptions in language is also 
valid for non-linguistic concepts of space and time. They suggest “that the metaphorical 
relationship between space and time observed in language also exists in our more basic 
representations of distance and duration and moreover that mental representations of abstract 
things may be built, in part, out of representations of physical experiences in perception and 
motor action” (2008, p. 591). 
 
Number 
The asymmetric metaphorical relationship between space and time might be similar to the one 
between space and number. The latter question of how space and number interact has been the 
focus of much research, which revealed that numerical cognition is intimately related to spatial 
cognition (see Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel and Dehaene, 2005 for a review). Number processing 
experiments show a close connection between numbers and space, in which small numbers are 
represented on the left side of space, and large numbers on the right. Dehaene, Bossini and Giraux 
(1993) revealed that in number processing three major mental representations must be assumed: 
1. A visual number form for Arabic digits, 2. phonological and lexical semantic representations for 
number words, and 3. a central quantitative representation of number magnitude, often 
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conceptualized as a left-to-right oriented mental number line obeying Weber-Fechner 
psychophysical laws. Well established effects in reaction-time paradigms, like the distance effect 
(longer responses for magnitude comparisons with small differences between numbers), the 
problem size effect (longer responses for problems with larger numbers) (Dehaene et al., 1990), 
and response congruency effects (SNARC-effect, see Dehaene, 1989; Dehaene & Cohen, 1991; 
Dehaene et al., 1993; Brysbaert, 1995; Dehaene & Akhavein, 1995; Fias et al., 2001¸Wood, Muerk 
& Willmes, 2006) are experimental indications of a quantitative magnitude representation. 
Functional imaging studies corroborated the anatomo-functional model of Dehaene and Cohen 
(1995), which identifies particular brain areas subserving the different mental number 
representations (Chochon, Cohen, van de Moortele & Dehaene, 1999; Pinel, LeClec`H,van de 
Moortele, Naccache, Le Bihan & Dehaene, 1999; Zago et al., 2001). However, some researchers 
have searched for another explanation than that in which the SNARC effect can be explained by 
an abstract and amodal magnitude representation and a directed, uni-dimensional mental 
number line. One alternative is proposed by Walsh (2003), who argues that space, time and 
number are part of a generalized analog magnitude system which is based on neural structures 
(see also Cantlon, Platt & Brannon, 2009¸ Merritt, Casasanto & Brannon, 2010). He proposes ‘A 
Theory of Magnitude’ (ATOM), a framework within which to re-interpret the cortical processing 
of time, space and number. According to ATOM, time, space, and number are three dimensions 
represented by a generalized mental magnitude system based on “overlapping brain regions” for 
space, time, and quantity (Walsh, 2003, p. 484). Walsh claims that the co-occurrence of time, 
space, and number should produce priming or interference across dimensions. Cohen Kadosh, 
Brodsky, Levin, & Henik (2008) argue that Walsh’s common cortical mechanism proposal could 
support “any comparison that can be classified as “more” or “less”” (2008, p. 475). For example, 
Marghetis, Walker and Núñez (2011) found that participants map number onto non-spatial 
responses, in terms of force and intensity of vocalizations. Although nothing in the theory suggests 
that representations in one dimension should depend on the other, Casasanto et al. (2010, 388) 
claim that Walsh’s theory implies that priming or interference across dimensions is symmetrical, 
because these dimensions are represented by a common metric. Nonetheless, the data from 
experiments with space and time reveal an asymmetric relationship between the two (Boroditsky, 
2000; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) explain the asymmetrical relation 
between space, time and quantity with the ‘Conceptual Metaphor Theory’, which claims that 
abstract concepts can only be understood  through the filter of directly experienced and concrete 
notions. Thus they are structured by cross-domain inference preserving mappings, often from a 
more concrete domain like space to a more abstract domain like number or time. Marghetis et al. 
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question “the privileged status of space as a representational substrate for number” (2011, p. 
1781) and claim that while  “number and space are certainly related in interesting and complex 
ways, the nature of this relationship may be best investigated by studying the relationships 
between number and other conceptual domains or response modalities […] (2011, p. 1786).  
However, the influence of language and culture on number processing is confirmed by 
several studies. Lucy (1992) examined the influence of different noun systems (English and 
Yucatec Maya) on nonverbal classification tasks. Morphological differences in number names 
between Asian languages (e.g. Chines, Korean, Japanese etc.) and English may influence children’s 
conceptualization of numbers and, ultimately, their mathematics achievement. Thus, 
mathematical thinking is influenced by the way languages represent numbers. The differences in 
mathematics achievement between Asian children and American children have been well 
documented (Stevenson, Chen & Lee, 1993; Miura, Okamoto, Kim, Steere & Fayol, 1993; Miller, 
Major, Shu & Zhang 2000; Ho & Fuson, 1998; Mullis, Martin, Gonzalez & Chrostowsk, 2004; Wang 
& Lin, 2005; Rasmussen, Ho, Nicoladis, Leung & Bisanz, 2006) and can be interpreted as evidence 
that the language one learns – besides general cultural influences - plays a role in the early 
conceptualization of numbers and in mathematics education. However, the differences in 
mathematical abilities between speakers of Asian and English languages disappear with 
progressive learning and education and might be a relatively recent phenomenon (Geary, 
Salthouse, Chen & Fan, 1996). 
Odor 
Besides the correlated domains of space, time and number several researchers investigated 
relationships between cultural experiences or habits and the perception of odors (Richardson & 
Zucco, 1989; Herz & Engen, 1996; Larsson, 1997; Ayabe-Kanamura et al., 1998; Herz & von Clef, 
2001; Distel & Hudson, 2001; Chrea, Valentin & Abdi, 2007). All the experiments show that the 
encoding, retrieval and perception of odors are influenced by the availability of names for it. Chrea 
et al. (2007) further examined the relationship between linguistic information, odor 
representation and culture. In a cross cultural study they investigated whether the “codability 
effect” found for colors also holds for odors. They explored the relationship between odor 
codability and odor memory representation in three cultural groups (French, American, and 
Vietnamese) and developed a study consisting of two experiments in which two independent 
groups of each culture participated. The codability scores of the French predicted recognition 
memory performance in all three cultures. American and Vietnamese codability scores predict 
none of the recognition performances. Thus there is a link between linguistic information and non-
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linguistic behavior at least in the French group. The authors further suggested that the 
nonexistence of recognition memory prediction based on the American and Vietnamese codability 
scores may be attributed to the distribution of the codability scores in these cultural groups. 
Because the codability scores for odors were more common in France than in the two other 
cultural groups, and a larger distribution allows for a better prediction, this might be the reason 
why the link between codability and recognition memory was observed only in the French group. 
The authors conclude that not the name itself is responsible for the organization of odors, as it is 
for colors. “Codability would thus measure in this context the consensus in the function associated 
to the odor rather than in the name itself (p. 41)”. Thus, the codability effect they observed is not 
due to the properties of language, but to perceptual properties of the odors themselves. 
Face and Emotion 
One last domain of interest is the perception of faces and emotional facial expressions. Smith, 
Cottrel, Gosselin & Schyns (2005) claim that the face encodes emotions in a consistent and 
unambiguous way which one can be read like language. There are a limited number of facial 
expressions for e.g. anger, sadness, fear, disgust, happiness etc., and these are perceived as 
categories and believed as natural, intrinsic and universally recognizable (Russel, 1994; Dailey, 
Cottrell, Padgett & Adolphs, 2002; Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin & Schyns, 2005; Susskind, Littlewort, 
Bartlett, Movellan & Anderson, 2007). Roberson et al. (1999) examined the sorting of facial 
expressions in a patient with no difficulties in recognizing objects and implicit understanding of 
perceptual categorization, but with problem in naming and understanding speech. The patient 
showed a significant difficulty in sorting facial expressions and in colors. Moreover, Roberson & 
Davidoff (2000) found that verbalizing words between the presentation of the target and the test 
items causes interference and leads to errors in categorizing facial expressions. They presume that 
the verbal coding interferes with the access to language that is necessary for a correct judgment. 
The authors suggest that the results imply experimental evidence for the language-as-context 
hypothesis. Lindquist et al. (2006) examined the relationship between language and emotion 
perception in different studies. The studies provided evidence that emotional language influences 
participants’ categorizations of faces depicting emotion. They were slower but more accurate to 
categorize facial behaviours after the meaning of the previously presented emotion word was 
made temporarily less accessible through satiation (i.e. repeating the word about 30 times). 
Barrett, Lindquist & Gendron (2007) suggest that “language contributes to the construction of the 
emotional percept by dynamically reconfiguring how structural information from the face is 
processed” (2007, p. 331). They claim that the perception of emotion is shaped by the internal 
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and external context. The emotion words support the perceiver in reducing the uncertainty of 
facial expressions in order to accelerate the perception of emotion. Landau et al. (2010) examined 
the effect of semantic processing on perceptual encoding of faces in a series of 
electrophysiological and behavioral studies. The results provide evidence that language about 
faces may be disruptive to systems associated with the perception of visually presented faces. 
Furthermore, Calabria, Cotelli, Adenzato, Zanetti & Miniussi (2009) found that people with 
semantic deficits have difficulties in emotion perception. Subsequently, the findings of Gendron, 
Lindquist, Barsalou & Barrett (2012) concur with the previously described. They found evidence 
for the role of emotion concepts in the formation of visual percepts of emotion. In related studies 
they demonstrated that the same faces were encoded differently dependent on the accessibility 
of an emotion word.  
The results reported here corroborate the theoretical approach which suggests that the 
conceptual categorization of emotions impacts the perception of emotion. Thus, emotion 
perception does not seem to be purely driven bottom-up but rather influenced by language 
processing. 
2.2.2. The influence of spoken languages on conceptual categorization 
Conceptual categorization (or semantic categorization) is based on perceptual categorization and 
generates knowledge at a more abstract level. Conceptual categories are usually named with 
words, which are often further categorized into grammatical categories. It is interesting to 
consider how and to what extent conceptual categorization gets affected by the language one 
speaks. This question was investigated in several experiments. In the following section, research 
will be described which shows the influence of linguistic categories on conceptual categorization, 
and how it is related to other underlying cognitive structures. 
Gender Marking Grammar 
Languages differ in how names of concepts are grouped into grammatical categories. Many 
languages have developed a broad variety of nominal classification systems and one of these is 
gender-marking grammar. Many languages have masculine, feminine and neuter genders, but 
some also assign animate, inanimate or vegetative, and some languages even have up to eight 
genders (Corbett, 1991). Speakers of a language with grammatical gender encode entities as 
gendered through articles, determiners, pronouns etc. One often asked question addresses 
whether referring to entities as if they were masculine or feminine lead people to think of them 
as having gender. Several studies (Jakobson, 1966; Konishi 1993; Sera, Berge & del Castillo Pintado 
1994; Martinez & Shatz, 1996) suggest that the grammatical gender of objects indeed influences 
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whether  people perceive them as more masculine or more feminine. Other researchers 
(Boroditsky & Schmidt, 2000; Flaherty, 2001; Boroditsky & Ramscar 2002; Boroditsky, Schmidt & 
Phillips 2003; Phillips & Boroditsky, 2003; Sera, Elieff, Forbes, Burch, Rodriguez & Dubois 2002; 
Ramos & Roberson, 2010) found effects of grammatical gender on people’s perception of 
similarity between objects and people. For example, in a series of studies Philips & Boroditsky 
(2003) asked Spanish-English and German-English speakers to rate similarities between pictures 
of male and female people and pictures of objects. The names of the objects had opposite genders 
in Spanish and German. Both groups of participants rated grammatically feminine objects being 
more female and grammatically masculine objects more male. The results were valid although the 
test was completely done with pictures and thus nonlinguistic, although the instruction was in 
English. Even when subjects performed the task during a verbal suppression manipulation, which 
disturbed their ability to name the objects in any language subvocally, the results were the same. 
In another experiment, Boroditsky et al. (2002) could show that Spanish and German speakers 
attribute more feminine or more masculine characteristics to objects depending on their 
grammatical gender. German speakers ascribed more feminine properties to objects (beautiful, 
elegant, fragile, pretty etc.), which were grammatically feminine (e.g. bridge), whereas Spanish 
speakers provided more masculine adjectives to the same objects (big, dangerous, long, strong 
etc.), which were grammatically masculine in Spanish. The results clearly show that the “thinking” 
about objects in different cultures is dependent on the grammatical gender of objects names in 
their native language. Astonishingly, it appears that even such an apparently insignificant aspect 
of grammar, i.e. as a noun being masculine or feminine, can have a significant influence on how 
humans perceive the world. 
Another study on gender concerns that of Vigliocco et al. (2005; see also Kousta, Vinson 
& Vigliocco 2008). They argue that effects of grammatical gender arise through linguistic 
processing and are restricted to animate categories for which gender is a relevant feature. The 
researchers investigated grammatical gender of Italian words and found that Italian words 
referring to animals sharing the same grammatical gender were judged semantically more similar; 
they were also more likely to replace one another in semantically related slips of the tongue than 
words with a different gender. When the same task was performed nonverbal, i.e. the participants 
had to judge the similarity of pictures rather than words, the language-specific effects of 
grammatical gender no longer had an effect. The authors conclude that the effect occurred 
temporarily during linguistic rather than conceptual processing. Consistent with the findings of 
Vigliocco et al. 2005, Ramos & Roberson (2010) found effects of gender in Portuguese speakers’ 
judgments of inanimate objects, but only when gender was task relevant or when the stimuli were 
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words rather than pictures. The authors suggest that such effects depend on linguistic processing 
or explicit reference to gender information, rather than directly influencing conceptual structures. 
Count-Mass Grammar 
Besides gender marking expansive research has been conducted in the area of count and mass in 
order to understand the relationship between grammar, categorization and the external world. A 
count noun is one that identifies a unit which may be counted (e.g one car, three lamps). A mass 
noun is one that names an entity that comes in mass form and therefore cannot be separated into 
countable units, at least not without a change in meaning (air, rice, water, salt etc.). Moreover, 
mass nouns are divisible (Cheng, 1973) and cumulative (Quine, 1960). To Gomeshi & Massam 
(2012, p. 1-2) divisibility means that “referents can generally be divided without loss of integrity” 
(half an amount of water) and cumulativity means that “mass nouns can also be accumulated 
without essential change” (two amounts of water). Another difference between mass and count 
nouns is the fact that “count nouns are those that can be pluralized” (the chairs, the glasses), 
whereas “mass nouns are those that cannot be pluralized (without a change in meaning)” (two 
waters). Langacker (2008) argues that count nouns represent conceptually bounded individuated 
things, whereas mass nouns represent them as undifferentiated. 
However, languages differ in applying count-mass-grammar. Indo-European languages 
refer to countable objects by using count nouns, whereas uncountable things are expressed as 
mass nouns. On the other hand, languages such as Mandarin Chinese refer to all things by mass 
nouns and use classifiers to quantify those (Li et al. 2011). The cross-linguistic variation in using 
count-mass grammar is of broad interest because it provides the chance to investigate the 
relationship between linguistic diversity and its effects on nonlinguistic thought. For example, 
Wierzbicka (1988) claims that an entity which is easy to be individuated conceptually, is classified 
by count nouns. Markman (1985) claims that mass nouns ease the learning of superordinate 
categories. Based on a series of studies with individuals who speak English and those who speak 
Yucatec, Lucy and colleagues (1992, 1996, 2001) were able to show that the English speakers with 
a mass-count distinction conceive a referent as an individual more likely than Yucatec Mayan 
speakers without such a distinction. Mazuka and Friedman (2000) tested Japanese speakers, who 
also do not have a mass-count distinction, but they could not replicate the results and found no 
difference between speakers of Japanese and English. Imai & Gentner (1997) and Imai & Mazuka 
(2007) presented research that examined whether mass-count grammar influences speakers’ 
ontological concepts and construal of novel physical entities. They compared Japanese to English 
speaking children and adults and found that mass-count grammar does not lead to fundamentally 
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different ontological concepts. It rather affects the attention to certain perceptual properties of 
the objects. Bale & Barner (2009), Li et al. (2009) and in further support Iwasaki et al. (2010) 
described a series of experimental studies that found no difference in object and non-linguistic 
perception, and they suggest that the reason for response differences in the conducted word 
learning tasks is online syntactic processing rather than conceptual representation. They conclude 
that the conceptual structure was not determined by whether or not one’s language encodes the 
mass-count distinction.  
In sum, the reported results suggest that differences in applying mass-count grammar 
neither evokes substantially different concepts about properties of objects in the real world, nor 
does it have an effect on the conceptual categorization of objects and substances at all. However, 
it seems there are some noteworthy cross-linguistic differences between language groups in a 
way that the mass-count grammar modifies the relative attention to the perceptual dimensions 
of a perceived referent. 
Classifier grammar 
Classifiers are considered to be a window into how people categorize the world through their 
languages (Lakoff, 1987; Aikhenvald, 2000). A classifier classifies the referent of a countable noun 
according to some salient perceived or imputed characteristics (Allan 1977, p. 285; Senft, 2000). 
Using classifiers as a typological criterion, world languages can be classified into classifier 
languages and non-classifier languages, which categorize the world very differently. German or 
English are non-classifier languages and they structure the conceptual systems around nouns 
more hierarchically around taxonomic relations. East Asian Languages and Sign Languages, which 
are classifier languages, use classifiers often when a noun is specified with respect to size, shape, 
animacy function, number, rigidity and social importance (Allan, 1977; Downing, 1996; 
Aikhenvald, 2000).  
The idea that the use of classifiers affects the structure of the conceptual system has been 
tested by Zhang and Schmitt (1998), who addressed the question of whether classifiers influence 
perception of similarity between pairs of everyday objects. They tested speakers of Chinese and 
English. The Chinese, i.e. the speakers of a classifier language, were more likely to place objects 
with common classifiers into a classifier-related schematic category such as long, flat or graspable 
objects. Moreover, Schmitt and Zhang (1998) found that classifiers affect consumer choice if the 
conceptual knowledge triggered by syntactic and semantic components provides relevant 
information. Thus, the authors concluded that classifier categories strongly affect conceptual  
organization. However, Saalbach and Imai (2007) investigated the influence of language and 
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culture on concepts of everyday objects. They examined whether the classifier system has an 
impact on the structure of the conceptual system and whether Westerners organize object 
concepts more hierarchically with taxonomic relations whereas Easterners organize them around 
thematic relations. The authors used different tasks to test their hypothesis, i.e. categorization, 
similarity judgment, property induction, and fast-speed word-picture matching. Chinese and 
German speakers were tested. For example, in an experiment with printed word primes and 
picture targets, participants were asked in an online task to determine as quickly as possible 
whether the printed word and the visual object matched. Saalbach und Imai revealed that 
classifier relations affected the response latencies of neither Mandarin speakers nor German 
speakers. In an offline task with the same materials, however, they found a language-specific 
effect. Speakers of Mandarin judged same-classifier items as more similar, and their assessments 
were significantly higher than those of the German control group. Although the authors found 
some support for the influence of language on cognition in the offline tasks, they claimed that the 
classifier categorization system does not organize speakers’ concepts of objects. The authors 
concluded that the general structure of the conceptual system, i.e. taxonomic and thematic 
relations, is strikingly similar across different cultures and languages.  
In contrast, in an experiment with shape classifiers, Kuo and Sera (2009) found that in 
classifying objects, Chinese speakers were influenced by shape more than English speakers. Imai 
et al. (2010) found similar results for Chinese and German children in a classification task. Gao and 
Malt (2009) had Chinese speakers memorize nouns in sentence contexts. Noun recall fell more 
into classifier-defined clusters (compared with English speakers), but only when nouns had 
appeared in sentences with semantically well-defined classifiers. Gao and Malt’s (2009) results 
were consistent with those of Zhang and Schmitt (1998). Srinivasan (2010) also used well-defined 
classifiers in a speeded visual counting task, in which participants were asked to count target 
objects while having to ignore intermixed distracter objects. The results show that the classifier 
membership predicted Mandarin speakers’ search performance more than it did the search 
performance of Russian and English speakers, who do not speak a language with classifiers. Thus, 
Srinivasan suggests that well-defined classifiers may influence cognitive processing, such that 
Mandarin speakers showed greater interference from distracters with the same classifier than did 
Russian or English speakers. Huang and Chen (2011) examined whether the organization of 
Chinese speakers’ object concepts reflected the classifier system of the language as opposed to 
the taxonomic system. Speakers of Mandarin were asked to study and then recall immediately 
two lists of nouns. One list was associated with four taxonomic categories and the other one with 
four classifiers. Their results are not consistent with those by Zhang and Schmitt, because they 
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found that participants detected taxonomic relations among the presented items, and accordingly 
clustered the items for effective recall, but they did not find the classifier relation among items 
sharing the same classifier. Huettig et al. (2010) investigated whether language-specific classifier 
categories influence Mandarin speakers’ online conceptual processing measured by tracking eye 
movements. The authors hypothesized that if the categories of language do direct attention to 
particular properties of the world, it can be measured by tracking eye movements over time. 
Mandarin speakers listened to pre-specified target nouns embedded in sentences through 
headphones, while their eye-movements to objects presented on a computer screen were 
monitored. The authors found that the participants shifted attention significantly more to objects  
which share the same classifier, when the classifier was auditorily presented in a sentence, than 
to distracter objects. But when there was no classifier heard by the participants, the data showed 
no difference in attention to either classifier-match objects and or distracter objects. The results 
of Huettig et al. are consistent with the results of Saalbach and Imai (2007) and of Tsang and 
Chambers (2011). The latter reported similar results in experiments with speakers of Cantonese. 
In one of three eye-tracking experiments in which referent objects lacked the prototypical 
features for their accompanying classifiers, an influence of shape semantics was found in 
participants' incidental fixations to non-target objects. Related to these results, Li et al. (2009) 
discovered that speakers of Mandarin grouped novel entities with same-material substances more 
often than English speakers, who tended to treat them as objects. Perniss et al. (2012) investigated 
the effect of linguistic encoding of object shape information in three spoken languages — Bora, 
English, and (Amazonian) Spanish. A speaker of a language like Bora systematically marks shape-
based contrasts more often than speakers of languages such as English and Spanish. The results 
support their prediction that shape is a more salient feature in semantic representations for 
speakers of Bora. The authors claim that the results are in line with previous studies regarding 
classifier languages that rely on shape (Kuo and Sera 2009; Saalbach and Imai 2007; Srinivasan 
2010; Zhang and Schmitt 1998).  
In summary, the majority of the empirical research described above reveal classifiers as 
categories which become activated mostly when speakers need to think for speaking, and which 
have a varying degree of influence on conceptualization processes. The question as to whether a 
classifier system has impact on a speaker’s conceptual structures, particularly when other general 
cognitive bases are available during conceptualization activities, has not yet been clearly answered 
and requires further investigation. 
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2.3. The Influence of different Signed Languages on Categorization 
The important finding that human languages can exist in (at least) two different modalities, i.e. 
the visual-gestural mode of sign language and the audio-vocal mode of spoken language, provides 
a significant research opportunity to explore the issue of linguistic relativity. However, research in 
sign language started about 50 years ago, whereas spoken languages have been studied for 
centuries. Though sign language researchers based their analyses on studies about spoken 
languages and thus they were able to describe many aspects of sign language structure, they could 
not explain all linguistic phenomena in sign languages. One goal of the following sections is to 
provide a brief sketch of what is known about the structure of sign languages, their differences to 
spoken languages and linguistic effects on cognition. The first section outlines the aspects of sign 
language structure that parallels those found in spoken language (commonalities) and the second 
section describes linguistic variation attributable to the visual-gestural modality (differences). The 
subsequent sections review and discuss recent major findings concerning modality effects on 
perceptual and conceptual categorization. 
2.3.1. Commonalities between Sign Language and Spoken Language 
In the past fifty years, several studies have extensively explored the structure of sign languages, 
which deaf and also hearing people use in their communities. Dispite the fact that no formal 
survey of the world’s signed languages has yet been conducted (Meyer, 2008), the number of 
signed languages studied by linguists is well into the hundreds. Signed languages are not invented 
languages like Esperanto. They are natural human languages which have developed in deaf 
communities and have always existed alongside spoken languages. Although signed languages 
have been permitted in education of the deaf only in the last few centuries, and the scientific 
study of these languages is much younger still, there is no reason to suspect that natural signed 
languages are young languages. Signed languages are not representations of spoken languages. 
Sign languages, such as German Sign Language (GSL; dt. Deutsche Gebärdensprache - DGS), 
American Sign Language (ASL), British Sign Language (BSL) etc., are fully autonomous languages 
with their own lexicons and grammars, which possess all the properties common to all natural 
languages (e.g. Stokoe, 1960; Klima & Bellugi, 1979; Boyes Braem, 1990; Lillo-Martin, 1991). The 
historical development of signed languages throughout the world has been different from that of 
spoken languages, and thus the genetic or family relations have evolved differently.  Deaf children 
acquire sign language in the same developmental stages and on the same timeline as hearing 
children acquire spoken language (Newport & Meier, 1986; Petitto, 1991, 1999). Furthermore, the 
underlying neural systems for language processing are the same for signed and spoken languages 
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(Emmorey & Corina, 1993; Grossi, Semenza, Corazza & Volterra 1996; Neville, Coffey, Lawson, 
Fischer, Emmorey & Bellugi 1997; Poizner, Klima & Bellugi, 1987; Petitto, 2000). Several 
researchers have demonstrated that signed and spoken languages share general underlying 
grammatical properties and linguistic principles (Sandler, 2005). For example, at the phonological 
level signed languages are surprisingly like spoken languages (for reviews Corina & Sandler, 1993; 
Zahwe, 1995; Sandler, 2006; Eccarius et al., 2008; Brentari, Coppola, Mazzoni & Goldin-Meadow, 
2012), supporting the view that there are phonological principles, regardless of language modality. 
Thus, an important similarity between signed and spoken languages is in the possession of a 
sublexical level of structure that is void of meaning, discrete, finite, and systematically organised. 
For example, the two modalities seem to share an irreducible level that can be characterized in 
terms of distinctive features that are hierarchically organised in articulatory terms (feature 
geometry, Clements 1985), though they are radically different in character across modalities. The 
phonological building blocks of words, the syllables, also exist in sign languages and can be 
analyzed separately from morpheme and sign. With respect to word structure, there are parallels 
between signed and spoken language with respect to the basic architecture of the system, i.e. like 
words, signs belong to lexical categories or basic form classes such as noun, verb, modal verb, 
adjective, pronoun and determiner. Sign languages have an extensive lexicon and new signs are 
created by combining morphemes (see for a review Becker, 2003; Meir, 2012). At the level of 
syntax, one can distinguish grammatical from ungrammatical combinations of words in sign 
language. As in many spoken languages, the basic word order in many sign languages is subject-
verb-object (Fischer 1975; Liddell 1980; Leeson & Saeed, 2012). Finally, at the level of discourse, 
both signed and spoken language exhibit rich narrative mechanisms, e.g. scene setting, plot 
development, complicating actions, and conflict resolutions (Gee & Kegl 1983; Bahan & S. Supalla 
1995; Roy, 2011).  
2.3.2. Differences between Sign Language and Spoken Language  
Numerous differences in organization at the grammatical and lexical level have also been 
described (Johnson & Liddell 1984). The medium of visual-gestural communication has 
characteristics which vary greatly from the auditory-vocal modality of speech. 
Articulation 
Spoken words are formed from vowel and consonant sounds, while signed languages are 
articulated with the hands, upper body and face. Simultaneous combinations of specific 
configurations of the hand together with non-manual bodily and facial expressions are used to 
create signs. The Modality differences affect the articulation process, i.e. the structure of spoken 
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languages is largely sequential in nature and the words always stay in a temporal relation to each 
other, whereas signed languages differ in that they are organized spatially more than temporally. 
Signs are not only expressed in a sequential order (like in spoken languages) but simultaneously 
in space as well. Space is directly used to linguistically express properties of a referent, such as 
shape, location, motion, manner, direction, feature or quality (see e.g. Supalla 1986, 1990; Schick 
1990; Collins-Ahlgren, 1990; Liddell 1990; Engberg-Pedersen 1993; Perniss, 2007, 2012). 
Moreover, whereas most spoken languages express relationships in space with prepositions (on, 
under) or locative suffixes, sign languages directly use space to linguistically express spatial 
locations, object orientation, and point of view. Spatial information is conveyed by using classifier 
constructions such that that there is a mapping between the location of the hand classifiers in 
signing space and the location of objects in real or imagined space (Emmorey, 2002). Classifier 
constructions appear to be universal to sign languages, and exhibit some properties which may 
turn out to be typologically unique and arise from the visual-gestural modality. A significant 
characteristic of sign languages is the merging of multiple morphemes denoting salient attributes 
of the noun-referent. It is inherently economical and an advantage of the visual-gestural mode. In 
order to produce in the same time-span a similar amount of information as in spoken languages, 
signs must be articulated in parallel. Research consistently shows that signs take longer to 
articulate than words (signs about 1000 ms; words about 500 ms) (Bellugi & Fischer, 1972; 
Grosjean, 1979ab; Klima & Bellugi, 1979) and short term memory span for signs is shorter than for 
words (e.g. Bellugi, Klima & Siple, 1975).  
Working Memory 
Simultaneity presumably occurs because sign-based working-memory is sensitive to the 
articulation time of signs (sign-length-effect) (Wilson & Emmorey (1997). Evidence for this 
hypothesis comes from Supalla (1990), who reported that when the sequential morphology of a 
spoken language is applied to the visual modality, deaf children exposed to this artificial language 
(signed English) do not adopt it, but rather alter it by creating simultaneous (spatial) morphological 
encoding. As Emmorey pointed out "The relatively slow articulators and the limit on processing 
time may conspire to pressure signed systems to avoid a great reliance on sequentially expressed 
linguistic distinctions" (1995, p. 43). Wilson and Emmorey (1997, 1998, 2003; 2004; 2006) 
developed several experiments on working memory of signers and nonsigners and analyzed the 
verbal and the visuo-spatial domains of working memory. The verbal domain contains the 
phonological loop (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) and consists of a short-term phonological store and 
an articulatory rehearsal loop. Visual-gestural languages like signed languages are a challenge to 
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this model of working memory. In experiments with deaf ASL signers, Wilson and Emmorey (1997, 
1998) explored the extent to which the structure of working memory is determined by the 
constraints of auditory and visual processing. Phonological similarity, word length, articulatory 
suppression, irrelevant sign input, and short term memory capacity were investigated. Their work 
found parallel effects for sign language, suggesting that working memory has a similar 
organization for the two language modalities. Bellugi et al. (1975) and other researchers (Hanson, 
1982; Wilson & Emmorey, 1997; Wilson & Emmorey, 2003) were able to show a phonological 
similarity effect for American Sign Language (ASL). In their experiments, performance of the 
participants was disturbed by the similarity of items regarding handshape or location. Wilson and 
Emmorey (1997, 1998) found a manual articulatory suppression effect, i.e. an inhibiting memory 
performance by signing a meaningless gesture while being presented with a signed item to 
remember. Furthermore, the researchers demonstrated that long signs were more difficult to 
remember than short signs (sign length effect). Therefore, they conclude that working memory 
for speakers or signers has largely the same architecture regardless of the modality of the 
language they use for communication. They suggest the existence of a sign-based rehearsal loop 
parallel to the speech-based loop, consisting of a phonological store and an articulatory 
mechanism which feeds information into the store.  
However, Wilson & Emmorey (1997) also discuss differences between speech and the sign 
loop. They performed forward and backward digit span tasks with deaf and hearing participants. 
The differences between working memory for signs and working memory for speech are probably 
due to the difference between the speech loop and the sign loop. Whereas the speech loop is 
specialized for exact repetition of a sequence in the order given, the authors hypothesize that the 
sign loop is less proficient at exact retention but more flexible with respect to ordering (Wilson et 
al., 1997; Wilson & Emmorey, 2003). However, research in sign recognition (Grosjean, 1981: Clark 
& Grosjean, 1982) revealed that overall sign identification is faster than spoken word 
identification. Emmorey & Corina (1990) assume that this is because phonological information in 
signs is simultaneously available. They reported faster recognition of mono-componential signs 
compared to recognition of matched morphologically complex signs. These results indicate that 
lexical items in the visual and auditory modality are differently processed and organized in 
accordance with the attributes of language modality (Meier, 2002). Wilson & Emmorey (2003) do 
not suggest amodal representations, but rather modality-specific representations of language 
within working memory. Wilson & Fox (2007) go further in suggesting that “it seems likely that 
working memory for signs and gestures shares resources with more general visual working 
memory, and working memory for speech shares resources with more general auditory working 
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memory (2007, p. 473).” They conclude that working memory does not consist of hard-wired and 
dedicated components, but rather is a flexible entity.  
Short-term Memory 
Boutla, Supalla, Newport & Bavelier (2004) investigated the the short term memory by showing 
that the memory span in users of American Sign Language (ASL) for letters is limited to about 4±1 
items even when the test stimuli in sign and speech were carefully matched in articulation length 
and complexity. This finding suggests that the dichotomy between linguistic and visuospatial Short 
Term Memory (Baddeley & Logie, 1999) is not necessarily true across all moalities. Wilson and 
Emmorey (2006) interpreted the results of Boutla et al. differently. They suggested that the 
difference Boutla et al. discovered might have been influenced by stimulus selection rather than 
language modality. Bavelier, Newport, Hall, Supalla & Boutla (2006) reexamined the investigation 
of short-term memory span in English speakers using letters and analysed the outcome by 
comparing results of several studies (meta-analysis) and the results which were obtained by 
Wilson and Emmorey (2006). They found that signers still show a lower span in finger-spelled 
letters than speakers in spoken letters or digits. This outcome was consistent with the meta-
analysis, but not with the results of Wilson & Emmory. Gozzi, Geraci, Cecchetto, Perugini, Papagno 
(2011) claimed that the internal structure of signs is different from spoken words in that they often 
contain more simultaneous and sequential components and thus the working memory load is 
higher in sign (see also Mann, Marshall, Mason & Morgan, 2010). Hirshorn et al. (2012) argue that 
deaf signers’ decreased short term memory span occurred only in serial order recall of linguistic 
material. They conducted two experiments which determined that deaf signers could perform 
equally or even more efficiently in serial span tasks than hearing speakers, and thus  deaf signers 
are not generally worse in their performances. Meyer (2011) claims that each of the short- term 
memory span experiments included some methodological flaws. To avoid such mistakes he 
suggests two experiments, i.e. a serial-recall experiment using hearing nonsigners, deaf signers, 
and hearing signers, and a brain imaging experiment performed on hearing signers alone. It 
remains to be seen whether these experiments will actually yield the desired breakthrough 
concerning the issue of short- term memory.  
Semantic Lexicon 
Besides the difference in articulation, working memory and short-term memory, the visually based 
linguistic system shows differences in creating new signs in the so called semantic lexicon. For 
instance, English or German creates new words by adding prefixes or suffixes, or by making 
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compounds from two existing words, or by extending the meaning of a word to give it a new 
meaning. It also can borrow words from another language (for a review see Becker, 2002). Though 
on the whole, these productive processes are seldom used, as English and German have a fairly 
large and stable lexicon. The lexicon of a sign language is different. In sign languages, new signs 
are most often produced through simultaneous processes, in which a lexicalized sign is 
‘incorporated’ within various movements in space (Fischer, 1973; Klima & Bellugi, 1979). The signs 
in a sign based lexicon can (basically) be divided into those that are part of the 'established' lexicon 
(core lexicon), and those that are part of the 'productive' lexicon. There are far fewer 'basic signs' 
fixed in the lexicon, but the process of using signs which are not in the established lexicon is much 
more important. The core lexicon of a signed language is relatively small when compared with the 
corresponding spoken language. But this does not mean that a sign language has a small lexicon. 
There are many ways to expand the lexicon, yet there are no limitations on signing. However, sign 
languages most often create morphologically complex words and thus they differ from spoken 
languages in the type of combinatorial processes (Emmorey, 2007). The structure of the lexicon 
of signs is complex, exhibiting some properties that may be unique to signed languages, as well as 
properties found in spoken languages. Padden & Brentari (2001) and Padden (1998) distinguish 
between a native and a non-native lexicon in ASL. The non-native lexicon contains English words 
that are finger-spelled, and these forms may be considered on the periphery of the ASL lexicon 
(Padden, 1998). Emmorey (2002, 2003) claims that the finger-spelled alphabet is a set of signs of 
the English alphabet and consists of a set of handshapes that can be specified for orientation, 
orientation change, or movement. Although fingerspelling is not a direct representation of English, 
the handshapes correspond with written letter sequences. Padden (1998) argues that the native 
sign lexicon has a core-periphery structure and the finger-spelled forms are at the periphery, 
because they obey some but not all of the formational constraints that were proposed for native 
signs, which are at the core of the lexicon. Classifier predicates according to Padden (1998) belong 
to a separate category within the sign lexicon because they violate some of the formational 
constraints of the core lexicon. The handshape of a classifier is morphemic, whereas the other 
phonological parameters may specify properties of a referent such as  movement, location size 
and shape. Many researchers claim that most of the native signs have an origin in the classifier 
system (Brennan, 1990; McDonald, 1982; Shepard-Kegl, 1985). Although classifiers are subject to 
the same linguistic constrains which shape word formation in spoken languages, these 
constructions differ from spoken language classifiers, and some aspects of their structure are 
greatly influenced by the visual-spatial modality (Emmorey & Herzig 2003). 
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Another interesting aspect of the semantic lexicon is ‘concept ambiguity’, i.e. when a 
word/sign has more than one meaning. While spoken languages have relatively many ambiguous 
words, sign languages have surprisingly few ambiguous signs. Emmorey (2003) conducted a small 
study using dictionaries from four different languages and found, that 20% of the English words, 
but only 6% of the ASL signs were clearly ambiguous. She claims that “sign languages may be 
unique in their ability to minimize lexical ambiguity by presenting distinguishing information on a 
separate channel” (2003, p. 131). 
The representation of morphologically complex words and signs is another issue regarding 
the semantic lexicon. Poizner, Bellugi & Tweney (1981) showed in a serial recall experiment that 
morphologically complex signs were organized in the conceptual system not as holistic forms, but 
in terms of a base form and an inflection. Emmorey (1991) investigated the organization of 
morphologically complex signs in the lexicon by using the repetition priming technique. Two 
separate experiments showed that verbs inflected with aspect morphology produced strong 
facilitation, whereas agreeing verbs did not facilitate recognition of the base form of the verb. 
However, Emmorey claims that it is not clear why there is a difference in morphological priming 
for the two verb types. Hanson & Feldmann (1989) found that for bilingual signers, the lexical 
organization of ASL reflects the morphological relationships of ASL signs, not English words.  
Also unique to sign languages is the much greater disposition for iconic signs compared to 
speech (Armstrong, Stokoe & Wilcox, 1995, 192). There is a predominance of visual over auditory 
perception in the interaction with objects or subjects in the external world and thus, there are 
many more possibilities to create visual than acoustic linguistic signs. In other words, it is 'easier' 
to produce a visual correspondence between an external referent and the linguistic properties of 
visual-gestural signs than an acoustic correspondence between a referent and vocal signs. As a 
direct consequence, all lexicons of signed languages possess many more signs of high imagic-
iconicity (Fischer & Nänny, 1999, xxif.) in comparison to the limited number of onomatopoeic 
words found in spoken languages. In the history of sign language research the high degree of iconic 
signs has scarcely been attributed to the visual-gestural modality and it has long been denied that 
sign languages are fully natural languages. Before Stokoe (1960) could show that sign languages 
are natural languages, it was widely believed that they were a kind of pantomime, purely iconic 
with no formal linguistic structure and iconic signs were considered to be ‘primitive’ and not able 
to fulfill the linguistic functions of arbitrary words. With new research on the topic of iconicity in 
spoken languages, it is clear that iconicity works on all levels of language and therefore cannot 
serve as counter-evidence against the language status of sign languages. Now it is widely 
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accepted, that established sign languages throughout the world display the full array of linguistic 
properties found in spoken languages (Sandler & Lillo-Martin, 2006).    
2.3.3. The influence of signed languages on perceptual categorization 
As shown in section 2.2. the influence of different spoken languages on the perception of color, 
space, time etc. is well documented. The results of diverse experiments show that linguistic 
processes influence fundamental domains of cognition, and that language is central to perceptual 
categorization. But what about the influence of languages in a different modality? Can the same 
results be found in experiments with signed languages as in experiments with spoken languages? 
Does the habitual use of a visual-gestural sign language have an impact on perception and 
cognitive processes? McCullough et al. (2000) and Emmorey et al. (2003) investigated categorical 
perception of signs (ASL) in deaf signers. Similar to experiments with speech (Liberman, Cooper, 
Shankweiler & Studdert-Kennedy, 1967) they presented computer generated sign stimuli which 
varied continuously in either place of articulation, or hand configuration. They found perceptual 
grouping similar to that  in speech experiments, and suggested that categorical perception is not 
unique to the auditory modality or to speech. Signers categorize non-identical sign stimuli into 
linguistically relevant categories. Regarding place of articulation, they performed similar to 
hearing nonsigners, but regarding hand configuration they performed differently. Thus, the results 
indicate that some linguistic categories in Sign Languages take advantage of naturally occurring 
perceptual groupings, but in other categories experience does appear to affect perceptual 
categorization, such that discrimination is finer. In the following section, a review of experiments 
regarding modality effects on the categorization of color, space, image generation, face and 
emotion as well as number is reported. 
Color 
There is little research regarding the question of whether deaf signers have a different perception 
of color. Although signs exist for many basic colors in nearly all sign languages, there are fewer for 
more specific or detailed colors. For example, in DGS no sign exists for e.g. the color ‚magenta’ or 
‚taupe’. Instead the signer uses the sign for red or brown, or fingerspells the word. Often the color 
sign is iconic and relates to a referent, either to a body part as in the case of ‚white’ (sign referring 
to teeth), red (referring to red lips) or to an object in the world, like for ‚green’ (the grass growing) 
or ‚blue’ (coloring the sky). Thus, one could ask several questions, e.g. does the iconic aspect have 
an influence on perception of the specific color? Do deaf people perceive colors the same or 
differently compared to hearing people? If there is a difference, is it due to their deafness or due 
to the use of sign language?  
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Suchman (1964, 1966) tested color-form preference and color-form discrimination ability 
of deaf and hearing children. He found that color was preferred and was more accurately 
discriminated by the deaf, whereas form was preferred and was more accurately discriminated by 
hearing children. Thus, deaf and hearing children perceive and order visual stimuli differently and 
their preference for either color or form relates positively to their ability to discriminate within 
stimulus dimensions. Gaines suggests further study of the linkage between perceptual style and 
perceptual skills. Ostroga-Parker & Wilsoncroft (1979) investigated the performance of deaf 
students, normal-hearing students, and hearing art students on nine tests including form sorting, 
form pointing, word meaning, paired preferences and word interference. They found no 
differences in color perception between the deaf and the hearing groups. Both groups differed 
only on tests involving verbal material. Gilliland & Stone (2007) reported that deaf and hearing 
persons make contrasting dream experiences regarding color. In their study, the findings of deaf 
persons with hearing loss, who use American Sign Language (ASL) were compared with a sample 
of hearing persons regarding colors and communication occurring in their dreams. Both groups 
communicated in their dreams as they did in life, i.e. deaf persons by signing, and hearing persons 
by speech. The deaf persons experienced more color and more vividness. Taken together, the 
results so far indicate perceptual differences of color for deaf and hearing persons, although it is 
not clear whether the differences are due to language use, iconicity or to deafness. This subject 
requires further research. 
Space 
Since sign languages directly use space to linguistically express spatial locations, object orientation 
etc. it is interesting to investigate whether knowing a signed language has any impact on spatial 
perception. Studies investigating changes in the visual system of deaf signers report an 
enhancement of neural activity in response to spatial information. Neville & Lawson (1987) found 
that signers show faster reaction times and larger visually evoked potentials than nonsigners 
during the processing of brief peripheral stimuli, whereas the behavioral measures and potentials 
evoked by central stimuli were comparable across populations. Loke and Song (1991) reported 
similar results. They also found more rapid detection times in signers only for peripheral visual 
stimuli. In an investigation, Emmorey et al. (1993) examined the relation between processing ASL 
and the use of visual mental imagery. Specifically, they examined the ability of deaf and hearing 
subjects to rotate images mentally, to generate mental images, and to maintain images in 
memory. They hypothesized that these imagery abilities are essential to the production and 
comprehension of ASL and their constant use may lead to an enhancement of imagery skills within 
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a non-linguistic domain. In order to distinguish the effects of using ASL from the effects of being 
deaf from birth, they also tested a group of hearing participants who were born to deaf parents. 
These latter subjects learned ASL as their first language and continued to use ASL in their daily 
lives. Emmorey et al. supposed that if these hearing native signers have visual-spatial skills similar 
to those found for deaf signers, this would suggest that differences in spatial cognition arise from 
the use of a visual-spatial language. On the other hand, if these signers have visual-spatial skills 
similar to those found in hearing persons, this would suggest that differences in spatial cognition 
might be due to auditory deprivation from birth. To test this hypothesis, they used a task similar 
to the one devised by Shepard & Metzler (1971), in which subjects were shown two forms created 
by juxtaposing cubes to form angular shapes. Subjects were asked to decide whether the two 
shapes were the same or mirror images, regardless of orientation. The results support the 
hypothesis that the use of ASL can enhance mental rotation skills. Both deaf and hearing signers 
had faster reaction times compared to nonsigners for all degrees of rotation. The slopes for the 
angle of rotation did not differ between signing and non-signing groups, indicating that signers do 
not actually rotate images faster than non-signing participants. Emmorey et al. (1993) claimed 
that signers are faster in detecting mirror reversals, particularly because they were faster even 
when no rotation was required. Ilan and Miller (1994) suggested that signers show faster response 
times in mental rotation tasks because they might be capable of more rapidly initiating mental 
rotation, or generating a mental image. Enhanced mental rotation is not due to auditory 
deprivation, but rather to experience with a language in the visual-gestural modality (see also 
Talbot & Haude, 1993; Emmorey et al., 1998; Martin & Sera, 2006; Halper, 2009). Finally, to test 
whether language supports spatial cognition, Pyers, Shusterman, Senghas, Spelke & Emmorey 
(2010) compared first- and second-cohorts of Nicaraguan signers’ performance on two spatial 
tasks. They found that second-cohort signers used more consistent spatial language than first-
cohort signers and  performed more effectively in both spatially guided searches. These 
differences between cohorts reveal that specific domains of spatial cognition might depend on 
specific linguistic properties. The authors suggested that human spatial cognition becomes 
modulated through the acquisition of a rich language. Perniss, Zwitserlood & Ozyurek (2011) 
investigated another question regarding the linguistic encoding of space in signed languages. The 
researchers asked whether spatial language in signed languages is shaped by affordances of the 
visual-spatial modality and thus similar across sign languages. Their results showed that different 
sign languages implement the structure of locative expressions in different ways. Furthermore, 
they claim that the use of space to express spatial relations is not the same and not predictable 
within different signed languages. Perniss et al. (2011) suggest that the visual-spatial modality may 
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provide a stock of iconic affordances leading to more similarities between sign languages, but that 
the exploitation and integration of these affordances into linguistic structure cannot be easily 
generalized. 
Image Generation 
Another visual imagery skill investigated is the ability to generate mental images, that is, the ability 
to create an image (i.e. a short-term memory visual memory representation) based on information 
stored in long-term memory (see Kosslyn et al., 1985). Several studies showed that signers, 
whether they are deaf or hearing, have greater mental imagery abilities than non-signers 
(Emmorey et al., 1993; Talbot & Haude, 1993; Murray, 2007). Wilson & Emmorey (1997) examined 
spatial working memory in children aged 8 to 10 years, who were either native deaf signers or 
hearing English speakers. Subjects were administered the Corsi block-tapping task (Milner, 1971), 
in which they had to remember and reproduce a sequence of spatial locations. The Deaf signers 
had a significantly larger spatial memory span than hearing non-signers. The finding of Parasnis et 
al. (1996), who showed that deaf children without exposure to sign language performed as well 
as hearing children on the Corsi block-tapping task, complements those findings. One possible 
source for this advantage is an enhanced ability to maintain spatial images of locations. Emmorey 
et al. (1993) supposed that during discourse signers generate mental images and then transform 
these images in various ways. Liddell (1990) claimed that when making a referential shift, signers 
visualize the referent, and this is relevant for the expression of verb agreement morphology. 
Emmorey & Kosslyn (1996) pointed out that signers generate images frequently and such practice 
should lead signers to become adept at generating images. Emmorey et al. (1993) investigated 
whether signers could generate visual mental images faster than non-signers. Participants in this 
task had to memorize uppercase block letters. The response times reflected the time to generate 
the image of the uppercase letter. Emmorey et al. (1993) found that both deaf and hearing native 
signers were significantly faster in generating images of complex letters than non-signers, and 
they concluded that experience with sign language improves the ability to generate visual mental 
images. The fact that hearing signers performed similarly to deaf signers implies again that it is 
experience with sign language, rather than auditory deprivation that underlies the enhanced 
ability to generate visual mental images. 
Face and Emotion 
Bettger, Emmorey, McCullough & Bellugi (1997) revealed enhanced facial discrimination as an 
effect of experience with American Sign Language. Online comprehension of sign language 
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requires rapid discrimination of linguistic facial expressions, therefore they hypothesized that ASL 
signers' experience with discriminating linguistic facial expressions might lead to enhanced 
performance in discriminating among different faces. Five experiments were conducted which 
investigated signers' and non-signers' ability to discriminate human faces photographed under 
various conditions of orientation and lighting using the Benton Test of Facial Recognition (Benton, 
Sivan, Hamsher, Varney & Spreen, 1994). The results showed that deaf signers performed 
significantly better than hearing non-signers. Hearing native signers also performed better than 
hearing non-signers, suggesting that the enhanced performance of deaf signers was linked to 
experience with ASL rather than to auditory deprivation. Deaf signers who acquired ASL in early 
adulthood did not differ from native signers, suggesting that there is no "critical period" during 
which signers must be exposed to ASL in order to exhibit enhanced face discrimination abilities. 
When faces were inverted, signing and non-signing groups did not differ in performance. Arnold 
& Murray (1998) found that signers, both deaf and hearing, performed significantly better than 
non-signers when memorizing faces, and McCullough & Emmorey (1999) found greater 
performance for signers in discriminating local facial features. This pattern of results in the 
perceptual and cognitive processing of faces suggests that experience with sign language affects 
mechanisms specific to face processing. However, Campbell et al. (1999) developed an experiment 
to investigate whether deaf signers, hearing signers, and hearing nonsigners exhibited categorical 
perception effects for syntactic facial expressions marking questions in British Sign Language (BSL) 
and, at the same time, affective facial expressions. They found no statistically significant effects 
for these BSL facial expressions for any group. Kolod (2004) investigated whether learning a sign 
language has an effect on visual discrimination. He tested deaf signers, hearing signers and hearing 
non-signers with three groups of faces: emotional facial expressions, linguistic facial expressions 
and faces of different people. The deaf observers performed half as well as hearing signers for all 
stimuli and the hearing signers performed better than hearing non-signers. Kolod concluded that 
learning a sign language improves visual discrimination and being deaf impairs it. McCullough, 
Emmorey & Sereno (2005) used fMRI to investigate the neural systems underlying recognition of 
emotional facial expressions and certain non-affective facial expressions such as linguistic 
markers. They compared deaf ASL signers to hearing non-signers. The fMRI-activation data 
showed that the activation for emotional facial expressions was right lateralized for the hearing 
group. It was bilateral lateralized for the deaf group. In contrast, activation for linguistic facial 
expressions was left lateralized only for signers and only when linguistic facial expressions co-
occurred with verbs. The authors propose that left lateralization is caused by a continuous analysis 
of local facial features during on-line sign language processing. The results indicate that function 
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in part drives the lateralization of neural systems that process human facial expressions. In two 
experiments Mc Cullough & Emmory (2009) investigated categorical perception effects for 
affective facial expressions and linguistic facial expressions from Sign Language for deaf native 
signers and hearing non-signers. In both experiments hearing non-signers were more effective in 
discriminating items across category boundaries than within categories. The authors replicated 
former results with affective expressions and showed categorical perception effects for non-
canonical facial expressions. However, deaf signers showed significant categorical perception 
effects only for linguistic facial expressions. The authors concluded that categorical perception 
effects for affective facial expressions could be influenced by language experience.  
Number 
As discussed in 2.2.1 different lines of research suggest that language properties seem to influence 
several aspects of numerical processing. For example, the reading direction in a given language 
(left-to-right or right-to-left) seems to influence different numerical processes and 
representations such as the orientation of the mental number line, spatial ordering processes and 
even finger counting. Another example is the inversion property of multi-digit numbers, i.e. that 
certain components of number words are inverted as compared to their place value (in German 
45 = “fünfundvierzig, i.e. five and forty). Inversion influences almost any kind of numerical 
processing and development such as transcoding, magnitude comparison and even spatial 
magnitude processing in a number line task (Miura, Okamoto, Kim, Steere, & Fayol, 1993); Comrie, 
2005; Nuerk, Weger & Willmes, 2005; Zuber et al., 2009). Thus, the question regarding sign 
language concerns whether the specific properties of a language in a visual-gestural modality 
influence numerical processing in deaf signers. Namely, there is evidence that the specific 
structure of the finger counting system of German Sign Language influences the how numbers are 
processed in such a way that a sub-base-5 representation in signed numbers also influences 
numerical performance with Arabic numbers or written number words. The only exception found 
so far is an investigation with German deaf signers by Iversen (2004, 2009) and Iversen et al. (2004, 
2006). These authors investigated the question whether the sub-base-five system of German Sign 
Language influences performance in a parity judgment task. The numbers in German Sign 
Language differ from those in spoken German in their basic language structure. Iversen et al. 
tested a group of 20 deaf German signers in a number parity judgement task with German Sign 
Language and printed German number words. According to the authors the results of the study 
indicate that two-handed DGS number signs were processed in a decomposed way. This language 
specific effect also generalizes to other linguistic number notations such as German number words 
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but not to the Arabic digit notation. The DGS sub-base-5 number system has an impact on parity 
retrieval of DGS numbers and a similar impact on written German number words as a sub-base-5- 
independent input notation. However, there is no impact of the base-5-system on the mental 
number line for any notation and also no impact on parity retrieval in the Arabic notation. The 
results are in line with the general assumption of two different mental number systems in number 
cognition. Since the pattern of results for linguistic numbers differed from the Arabic digit 
notation, the authors suggested that there might be two different routes to parity retrieval: a 
lexical- and a semantic route. The language-specific counting sequence of DGS differs from the 
one in spoken German. Both deaf and hearing persons use all other number symbol systems. Thus, 
the two routes to parity retrieval might also be valid for the hearing population. Iversen et al. 
suggested that, up to now, influences of the external symbol system on mental number processes 
may have been underestimated, since virtually all number systems studied share the base-10 
structure with the Arabic notation. In that case, similarity of the pattern of results might rather be 
related to the similarity of the structure of the external symbol systems than to the similarity of 
mental structures. New evidence concerning numerical representations in deaf signers was found 
in a study by Korvorst et al. (2007). They examined a wide range of numerical representations in 
adult deaf signers and used a modified version of the number bisection task, with sequential 
stimulus presentation. This task allows for a systematic examination of mathematical performance 
in deaf individuals in different modalities. The results imply that deaf signers make use of 
equivalent number representations as do hearing individuals when bisecting numbers. Moreover, 
the lag in math performance frequently found in deaf individuals should not always be attributed 
to differences in their way of number processing. Rather they suggest that mathematical abilities 
in deaf signers should be assessed in their native sign language. Domahs et al. (2012) investigated 
Korean deaf signers performing in an experiment with a number comparison task on pairs of 
Arabic digits. In their response times profiles, the expected magnitude effect was systematically 
modulated by properties of number signs in Korean sign language. Hearing and deaf Germans or 
hearing Chinese (Domahs et al., 2010) did not show such a culture specific magnitude effect. They 
concluded that finger-based quantity representations were automatically activated, whether they 
are relevant or irrelevant for the performance in the given task. Moreover, they are accessed 
together with a more basic quantity system that is evidenced by the magnitude effect. The authors 
claim that the results are opposed to models assuming only one single amodal representation of 
numerical quantity. 
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2.3.1. The influence of signed languages on conceptual categorization 
Beyond the influence of language modality on perceptual categorization, studies on conceptual 
categorization have revealed several important differences in the way that deaf individuals 
organize and utilize concepts. However, the fundamental organizing principle within the 
conceptual system, which appears to be semantic association or semantic relations between 
words, is the same regardless of whether someone uses signs or spoken words to communicate. 
Meyer & Schvanefeldt (1971) were the first to discover that words are recognized more quickly 
when preceded by semantic associates. Similarly, Corina & Emmorey (1993) found that when a 
sign such as DOG is preceded by a semantically related sign such as CAT, lexical decision times 
were faster than when DOG was preceded by an unrelated sign, such as TABLE (see also Bosworth 
& Emmorey (1999). 
As previously discussed in 1.2.2 one hypothesized mechanism for semantic priming 
involves ‘spreading activation’ through the links connecting closely associated words, which then 
facilitates (primes) recognition of the associated words (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Neely, 1991; 
Roediger, Balota & Watson, 2001). Together, the studies of Emmorey and her colleagues indicate 
that the conceptual system of both signers and non-signers exhibit a semantic organization that 
is basically similar. But there were also differences. Word association tasks have revealed that 
deaf individuals might have weaker associations or semantic relations between concepts, 
asymmetrical category-exemplar relations, smaller set sizes, and much more variable associative 
structures relative to hearing peers (McEvoy, Marscharck & Nelson, 1999; Marschark, Convertino, 
McEvoy & Masteller, 2004). Deaf adults and children seem to tend toward item-specific processing 
and they focus on single item information rather than relations between them (Marschark, De 
Beni, Polazzo, & Cornoldi, 1993; Ottem, 1980; Richardson, McLeod-Gallinger, McKenn, & Long, 
1999; see Marschark, 2003, for a review). In the following section research will be described which 
shows the influence of the visual-gestural modality of sign languages (especially the aspects of 
simultaneity and iconicity) on conceptual categorization, and how they are related to other major 
conceptual relations underlying conceptual structure. 
Classifier Grammar and Simultaneity 
The data from studies of numerous signed languages indicate that a marked preference 
for non-concatenative morphological processes, which is a simultaneous expression of a base 
form and its morphological markings, is the preferred linguistic way of encoding (Wilbur 1987; 
Aronoff, Meir, Padden & Sandler 2003; Sutton-Spence & Woll 1999). This encoding is similar to 
the use of classifiers in spoken languages and signers of all sign languages (thus far investigated) 
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make use of classifiers to a much greater extent than speakers in spoken languages. This is likely 
because the phonetic resources of a visual-gestural language can be exploited to a greater degree 
than they can in auditory-vocal languages to build up classifier expressions that express various 
characteristics of entities such as dimensions, shape, texture, position, and path and manner of 
motion. Although many East Asian Languages use classifiers, simultaneous affixation is relatively 
rare. In spoken languages, linguistic affixation is the preferred linguistic encoding for 
morphological processes. As  discussed earlier in 2.3.2, the reason for the non-concatenative poly-
componential structures in sign languages lies in the fact that the visual modality affords parallel 
processing due to universal constraints on working memory. However, the visual-gestural 
modality is well suited for simultaneously perceiving a large amount of information. Different 
studies (e.g. Engberg-Pedersen, 1993; Miller, 1991; Veermeerbergen et al., 2007) showed that the 
possibility of simultaneous coding of distinct lexical information of various types is often realized 
by using classifier predicates. Thus, a remarkable difference between spoken and signed 
languages is the degree to which classifier verbs are used. Before discussing the influence of the 
sign language classifier system on categorization, the different types of classifiers (or what I also 
refer to as poly-componential signs) found in signed languages will be described.  
DGS signs that denote actions performed with an implement are generally expressed by 
handling classifier verbs in which the hand configuration depicts how the human hand holds and 
manipulates an instrument. For example, the sign WATERING-FLOWERS (Figure II.1) is made with 
a grasping-thumb-down handshape and a “watering” motion above imagined flowers. Such verbs 
are referred to as classifier verbs (see also 2.3.2) because the handshape is morphemic and refers 
to a property of the referent object (e.g., the handle of a watering pot) (see papers in Emmorey 
(2003) for a discussion of classifier constructions in signed languages). 
 
FigureII.1:Example of a handling-classifier, i.e. WATERING-FLOWERS (A) and a whole-entity 
classifier CAR-MOVE-RIGHTWARD (B) 
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Handling classifier verbs are distinct from other classifier verb types because the handshape 
depicts how someone holds the referent object, rather than representing the referent entity itself. 
For whole entity classifier verbs, such as CAR-MOVE- RIGHTWARD (Figure II.1), the handshape 
represents the referent object (the car), and the movement of the hand represents the referent’s 
motion (the rightward motion of the car). In contrast, the movement of handling classifier verbs 
refers to the motion produced by an implied animate agent (e.g., a person watering flowers), 
rather than to the motion of the referent entity itself (in WATERING-FLOWERS, the watering pot 
is not understood as moving on its own accord). The form of handling classifier verbs is quite 
iconic, depicting the hand configuration used to manipulate an object and the movement that is 
typically associated with the object’s manipulation (e.g., watering flowers, bouncing a ball, or 
erasing a blackboard).  
 
Figure II.2: Example of a instrument-classifier, i.e. SCISSORS (C) and an ambiguous classifier i.e. 
CUP 
In addition, GSL nouns denoting tools or manipulable objects are often derived from instrument 
classifier verbs. For instrument classifier verbs the object itself is represented by the articulator, 
and the movement of the sign reflects the stylized movement of the tool or implement. For 
example, the sign SCISSORS shown in Figure II.2 is made with a "cutting" motion, and the “V” 
handshape (fist with index and middle fingers extended) depicts the scissors themselves, rather 
than how the hand would hold scissors. In general, the movement of a noun in sign language 
reduplicates and shortens the movement of the related verb (Supalla & Newport, 1978). Thus, the 
"cutting" motion of the sign SCISSORS is repeated and relatively short. For some nouns however, 
such as CUP shown in Figure 2.2, it is ambiguous whether the handshape depicts the object itself 
(a round cylinder) or how the hand grasps the object (Figure II.2). 
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FigureII.3: Example of a limb classifier, i.e. eagle and an extension classifier i.e. BUS 
Other types of classifiers are limb classifiers (Figure II.3) and extension/surface classifiers. Limb 
classifiers represent limbs of humans or animals (e.g. legs, feet, or beak etc.). For example, the 
sign EAGLE is a limb classifier, because it reflects the beak of an eagle or of another bird. It is 
produced with the “hooked” index finger (finger extended and curved) moving downwards at the 
position of the nose in the face. As an extension classifier, the handshapes represent the depth or 
width of an object (see Figure 3 the sign for BUS). For surface classifiers, the handshape reflects 
thin, narrow, or wide surfaces (e.g. a wire, the top of a board, or roof of a car). These classifiers 
are used to predicate the state of an entity or mass. 
Experiments of Emmorey & Herzig (2003) indicated that some aspects of classifier 
constructions, e.g. polycomponential signs, are clearly categorical morphemes, specifically whole 
entity handshapes, but other components, specifically locations within signing space, are gradient 
and analogue representations. Thus, spatial language in signed languages is very different from 
spoken languages. As Emmorey & Herzig (2003) pointed out, spoken languages do not have a way 
of phonologically altering a preposition or affix to mean "upward and left" versus "upward and 
slightly to the left" versus "upward and to the far left". In ASL or DGS, such spatial information is 
indicated in an analogue manner by where the hands are located in signing space. Emmorey et al. 
conclude that gradient and analogue descriptions of spatial locations that can be produced by 
signers stand in contrast to the categorical nature of spatial descriptions produced by speakers. It 
is clear, however, that poly-componential signs do much more than simply depict the physical 
characteristics of an entity. For instance, Schembri (2003) suggests that polycomponential verbs 
tend to be characterized by the highly productive combination of a range of meaningful units 
denoting figure, ground, motion, location, orientation, direction, manner, aspect, extent, shape, 
and distribution.  
However, an interesting question regarding the extensive use of classifiers in sign 
languages concerns classifiers’ impact. One might speculate that signers prefer using productive 
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poly-morphemic forms to using non-polycomponential frozen signs, and thus they classify and 
define objects or subjects by highlighting one or another of their aspects. The latter might have 
an influence on conceptual structures and relations.  
Conceptual structures and relations in deaf and hearing participants were investigated by 
Rosch et al. (1976). They found a primacy of lexical items for basic level categories in both signed 
and spoken languages. In addition, they revealed that ASL has lexicalized significantly fewer 
superordinate and subordinate terms than American English. Studies with deaf and hearing 
children (Tweney & Hoemann 1973) using the word association technique demonstrated a 
significant tendency of hearing children to produce a greater proportion of paradigmatic (dog-cat) 
than syntagmatic (dog-bark) responses. Qualitatively, the performance of deaf and hearing 
subjects was similar. Several explanations can be offered for these findings. Some investigators 
argued that the associations of older deaf children resembled those of younger children in the 
number of paradigmatic responses, and this would mean that deaf children show linguistic and 
conceptual deficits, probably caused by deprivation of linguistic experience in general (Anglin 
1970; Hoemann 1972). However, there was also research showing that a shift of syntagmatic to 
paradigmatic responding occurred in deaf children (Tweney & Hoemann 1973) and that deaf 
adolescents manifested a hierarchical organization of their lexicon which is similar to that of 
hearing adolescents (Tweney, Hoemann & Andrews 1975; Hoemann & Tweney 1991). An 
interesting fact in these studies is the tendency of deaf subjects to fingerspell more paradigmatic 
responses than when signing. Although paradigmatic responses could be found in both language 
channels, there were more subjects (23 vs. 15) who made paradigmatic responses when 
fingerspelling. This finding might show a different organization of the lexicon for ASL than for 
English (Grote & Willmes, 2001) (see also 2.3.1). McEvoy et al. (1999) found evidence that 
conceptual concepts may not be as distinctly interconnected for deaf readers as for hearing 
readers. Their study involved a single-word association task in which there were 80 words, 40 
words normally associated with sound (like guitar and train) and 40 words not normally associated 
with sound (like closet and lamp). In fact, the sound versus non-sound variable made no 
difference. Furthermore, they examined the associations given by 136 deaf college students and 
an equal number of hearing students. The responses from the two groups were remarkably 
consistent, yielding correlations of about .77, but they also found significant and consistent 
differences in their lexicons, with all differences going in the same direction. Regarding set size, 
i.e. the number of different responses given by a least two subjects in each group, the results show 
that there was greater consistency (a smaller set size) among hearing as compared to  deaf 
students. Moreover, there was more consistency regarding idiosyncratic responses (fewer 
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idiosyncratic responses) among hearing than deaf students, and the deaf more frequently could 
not think of any associate. Regarding the consistency and number of responses, they were greater 
for hearing than for deaf students. Taken together, the results suggest that despite the similarities 
in the conceptual system of deaf and hearing students, there are consistent differences in the 
organization of knowledge, which might, at least to some extent, influence cognitive processes 
and are due to language modality (Grote, 2001, 2004). 
Iconicity 
Another difference between spoken and signed languages is the degree of iconicity of signs in 
general. Sign languages offer a very interesting field for the study of iconicity because the visually 
based linguistic system shows a much greater disposition to iconic signs than the auditory system 
(Armstrong et al. 1995; McNeill, 2005.). The difference in iconicity between signed and spoken 
languages can be argued to be one of degree, rather than one of substance. The auditory-vocal 
modality is an unsuitable medium for creating iconic forms, because many objects and actions 
cannot be described by an associated auditory 
imagery. Thus, the vocal tract is very limited in 
terms of producing onomatopoetic words. It is 
'easier' to create a visual correspondence between 
an external referent and linguistic properties of 
visual-gestural signs than an acoustic 
correspondence between a referent and vocal 
signs. For example, naming living objects with signs 
is quite easy and often involves the production of iconic forms which reflect some salient 
characteristics of the objects. The sign for EAGLE (see Figure II.4) involves iconic representations 
of the dominant physical features of the animal (i.e., the curved beak is depicted by a tracing 
motion out from the nose). Thus, arbitrariness of form does not appear to be a basic or necessary 
characteristic of human language; rather, iconically motivated word forms may be preferred for 
human language, but the articulatory and perceptual resources of spoken languages limit the 
iconicity of spoken words. As a direct consequence, all sign languages possess many more iconic 
signs in comparison to the limited number of onomatopoetic words found in spoken languages. 
Wilcox (2004) points out that during the 1970s and 1980s iconicity was neglected because of the 
historical and linguistic debate which has surrounded signed languages. Therefore the researchers 
concluded at that time that iconicity erodes over time (Frishberg 1975), that it plays no role in 
Figure II.4: Sign for EAGLE 
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children’s language development and that the grammars of signed languages override and 
submerge iconicity (Klima and Bellugi 1979).  
Another point of interest has to do with the focus of classical iconicity definitions on the 
criterion of 'similarity' or 'likeness' between the sign vehicle and its object. Since the relation of 
likeness can only refer to single qualities, never to distinct concepts, it is impossible to identify the 
object which an icon stands for without additional information. Icons can only be interpreted 
precisely when supplemented by indexical and symbolic specifications. Note that iconicity is not 
self-explanatory but that the perception of iconic features in language and literature depends on 
an interpreter who is capable of connecting meaning with its formal expression. With respect to 
signed languages the thesis was confirmed by various international studies. It was shown that non-
signers interpret at most five to ten percent of even highly iconic signs adequately (Bellugi & 
Fischer 1972; Bellugi & Klima 1976; Klima & Bellugi 1979; Hoemann 1975). Moreover, Pizzuto and 
Volterra (2000) found that the ability to guess the meanings of signs depends on (1) competence 
in identifying iconic-transparent features of signs, (2) experience with a sign language system, and 
(3) cultural-specific factors. In all instances, perceived iconicity is not an objective likeness 
between a referent and a linguistic form but a mentally constructed correspondence between two 
cognitive products. This theoretical assumption has been investigated by several sign language 
researchers. 
Taub (2001) proposed an analogue-building model to account for the nature of iconicity 
in both signed and spoken languages. She proposes that when a concept requires linguistic 
encoding, a sensory image is initially selected to stand for the entire concept. For example, a 
prototypical visual image of a canonical house lies behind the DGS sign for a house. This sign is 
made with flat hands, to show the roof and walls of a house. Taub proposes that after an image is 
selected to represent a concept, this image must be schematized according to the resources of 
the language. Thus, details about windows or doors are eliminated from the image of a canonical 
house, but the notion of a vertical wall and a sloping roof remain. This schematic image is then 
encoded into linguistic form. In DGS, an inclined flat hand can represent a sloping roof and the 
hand is moved vertically down, which can represent an upstanding wall. Taub is not proposing 
that this image schematisation and encoding process occurs on-line during language production. 
Rather, Taub’s model accounts for the creation of iconic forms; and the study of such forms reveal 
a lot about the relation between embodied imagery and linguistic encoding. Wilcox (2004) 
expresses an idea based on the theory of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991, 2000) and 
calls it ‘cognitive iconicity’. He does not define cognitive iconicity as a relation between the form 
of a sign and what it refers to in the real world, but as a relation between two conceptual spaces. 
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Cognitive iconicity is a distance relation between two locations in multidimensional conceptual 
space, one in the phonological domain and the other in the semantic domain. When the 
phonological pole and the semantic pole of a linguistic unit are close in conceptual space, the unit 
is seen as more iconic, when they are more distant, the relation between its form and meaning is 
perceived as more arbitrary. 
However, the question whether iconicity plays a significant role in the processing of sign 
languages or whether it has an influence on cognition was discussed and investigated by several 
researchers. In the eighties, Poizner, Bellugi, & Tweney (1981) examined in one of three 
experiments short-term encoding processes of deaf signers for iconic aspects of signs from 
American Sign Language. They found no effect of iconicity on short-term recall. Orlansky & 
Bonvillian (1984) investigated whether iconicity influences the acquisition of sign. The children's 
sign language lexicons were examined for their percentages of iconic signs at two early stages of 
vocabulary development. The authors found that a majority of signs in the children’s early 
vocabularies were not iconic and they claimed that iconicity played a subordinated role in young 
children's acquisition of signs. However, Vinson et al. (2008) analyzed data on 300 signs in Bristish 
Sign Language and concluded that because children acquire more iconic signs earlier in life there 
is at least some sort of relationship between age of acquisition and iconicity. But although 
children’s iconic gesture production predicts their vocabulary development (Rowe, Özçalışkan, & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2006), several researchers confirmed the assertion that iconicity has neither a 
facilitating nor an interfering effect on first or second language acquisition in children and in adults 
(Anderson & Reilly, 1997; Anderson & Reilly, 2002; Namy et al. 2004; Morrett, 2012). The brain 
areas involved in sign production are the same as in speech production, i.e. in the left superior 
parietal lobule (SPL) (Corina et al., 2003; Emmorey et al., 2003; Petitto et al., 2000; San Jose-
Robertson, Corina, Ackerman, Guillemin, & Braun, 2004, Emmorey et al. 2007). Several 
researchers found no evidence to indicate that the iconicity of signs altered the neural systems 
involved in their production (Damasio et al. 1996; Emmorey et al. 2003, 2004), or that iconicity 
enhanced lexical access (Bosworth & Emmorey, 2010). Moreover, the production of iconic signs 
of aphasic signers with lesions in the left hemisphere was as impaired as the production of non-
iconic signs (Marshall et al. 2004). Thus, iconicity does not have an influence on language driven 
lexical access processes.  
However, other researchers found evidence for an influence of iconicity on conceptual 
categorization processes. Grote & Linz (2003) examined in an experiment (see chapter III, 3.1), 
whether deaf and hearing signers of German Sign Language and hearing speakers of German 
Spoken Language showed different response times in a sign-picture verification task. The 
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participants had to judge the presence or absence of a semantic relation between a reference 
item (sign vs. spoken word) and a target item (picture). The signed reference items were iconic 
and highlighted a certain aspect of the referent they refered to. In contrast, their translational 
equivalents in spoken language were arbitrary. The combined target items (3 different pictures: 
e.g. window / door / roof) were all semantically related to the reference item (e.g. house), but only 
one of the pictures actually resembled the earlier presented sign in German Sign Language. In this 
example it is the target picture roof, because the reference item house is signed with flat hands to 
show the roof of a house. Thus, between the picture of a roof and the corresponding sign for 
house one might recognize likeliness. In the second study it was examined whether deaf and 
hearing subjects show different choices in a task asking them to decide which of two presented 
pictures has a stronger semantic relation to a target item (sign vs. spoken word). The relative 
frequency of choices in favor of a specific picture was measured. The results of both studies 
supported the hypothesis that the iconicity of a sign has an influence on the structure and 
organization of the semantic relations between signs and words of deaf and hearing signers. Grote 
& Linz argued that the features and properties of a certain object, which were highlighted by 
physical and spatial aspects of the sign, are more central in the semantic network in which the 
meaning of the sign is embedded. The fact that bilinguals showed an accelerated response even 
in the vocal modality, where no iconic signs were presented, demonstrates an effect of iconicity 
not restricted to the generation of situational meaning in the actual use of an iconic sign (Linz & 
Grote, 2003). Vigliocco et al. (2005), too, investigated the relationship between language and 
iconicity and found in similarity judgment tasks that native BSL signers grouped signs referring to 
tools based on shared iconic properties of the signs. The authors concluded that mental images 
were triggered by the overlapping iconicity encoded in the signs. Ormel (2008) tested deaf 
children using Sign Language of the Netherlands. In a picture-sign matching experiment the author 
investigated the influence of iconicity during word recognition and found that responses were 
processed faster and more accurately for highly iconic signs than for weakly iconic signs (Ormel et 
al. 2009). Thomson et al. (2009) conducted similar experiments for adult users of American Sign 
Language (ASL) and British Sign Language (BSL); they also found that verification is facilitated when 
iconic properties of signs are salient in a corresponding picture and that iconicity affects 
phonological decisions. The authors suggested that stronger links may exist between phonological 
and semantic levels of representation, and that iconicity effects occur automatically during 
language processing. To ensure that the results were not task-dependent, Thompson et al. (2010) 
investigated the extent of iconicity effects with a phonological decision task in which the meaning 
of the sign is irrelevant. The participants simply had to decide whether a presented sign involves 
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straight or curved fingers. The results showed that iconicity leads to slower responses and more 
errors. Thus, the authors claimed that highly iconic signs automatically activate meaning, which 
leads to interference in making form-based decisions. 
In sum, the empirical findings provide evidence for the thesis that linguistic iconicity might 
have an influence on the activation and structure of semantic concepts. Such effects are not easy 
to explain with cognitive theories claiming that most of the properties of language are 
fundamentally universal and innate, that language is a separate system from general cognition, 
and that cognitive concepts come first and language merely names them. One major challenge for 
sign language research is thus to investigate and describe the underlying cognitive processes 
which lead to the empirical results regarding iconicity. 
2.4. Conclusion and Research Questions 
2.4.1. The Influence of Simultaneity vs. Linearity of Language on Conceptual and 
Perceptual Categorization 
A difference between spoken words and signs lies their articulation (see 2.3.2). Whereas all related 
words articulated one after another in a sequential form, in sign languages this is true only for 
paradigmatically related signs. Syntagmatically related sign-concepts may also be expressed 
simultaneously in space. Notably action- and attribute-predicates often contain extra 
morphological information of a noun-referent, and by manipulating the phonological parameters 
(handshape, location, movement, orientation and non-manual markers), i.e. making a larger or 
faster movement, bending the fingers more strongly etc., the signer can add additional action- 
and attribute-information simultaneously. In this context the question to ask is whether the 
sytagmatically related signs are more strongly related compared to those paradigmatically related 
. 
Signs are called polycomponential, polysynthetic or multimorphemic when they use a 
particular handshape to express additional information. The handshape functions as a classifier 
and refers to some salient characteristics of the object. Thus, it is interesting to investigate 
whether polycomponential signs are systematically more strongly semantically related to a certain 
sign than nonpolycomponential signs. 
Another highly interesting aspect regarding the influence of language on semantic 
relations in the conceptual system is the question to what extent two language systems, which 
vary in modality (cross-modal bilingualism), have a different and modality specific impact on the 
strengths of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations and how these two systems influence each 
other. Testing cross-modal bilinguals would either confirm the claim that on the lexical level 
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languages there are only reflections of the conceptual level, or would rather lend support to the 
assumption of a constant shaping influence of two languages differing in modalities on the 
formation of network-relations in semantic memory. 
Apart from the paradigmatic and syntagmatic organization of concepts, the cognitive 
system itself might be separated into distinct components. Many researchers discuss whether the 
mind can be seen as a modular system with qualitatively different types of modality-specific 
semantic information formats (visual, verbal, etc.) represented in separate neuronal systems, or 
as a homogeneous whole, where seemingly different types of information are reducible to a 
common amodal format accessed through modality-specific recognition systems (see chapter 
1.2.1). This particular point of view has important implications for the relationship between 
language and thought and for the modularity of mind hypothesis. Based on these considerations 
the following research questions were derived: 
 Does the preference for simultaneous structures in the visual-gestural modality lead 
to stronger relations between syntagmatically related concepts compared to 
paradigmatically related signs?  
 Are polycomponential signs, using particular handshapes which refer to some salient 
characteristics of referents, more strongly semantically related to a certain sign than 
those which are nonpolycomponential? 
 Do cross-modal bilinguals (proficient speakers of German Sign Language (DGS) and 
German Spoken Language (DLS)) have different syntagmatic or paradigmatic semantic 
relations in two different language related mental structures which operate as 
separate systems, or do both languages influence one mental structure in an 
interactive manner? 
 If the semantic relations in the conceptual system based on signs are different from 
the ones based on words, does this influence visual categorization? 
These hypotheses will be tested empirically in four separate experiments with three different 
groups of participants. Whether deaf, bilingual and hearing subjects show different responses in 
verifying, judging and memorizing semantically related signs/words and pictures, respectively, will 
be examined. 
2.4.2. Influence of Iconicity of Sign Language on Categorization 
As previously discussed in section 2.3.4 of this thesis, iconicity is an element at all linguistic levels 
in signed languages as well as in spoken languages, but the visually based linguistic system shows 
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a much greater disposition for iconic signs than the auditory system. Numerous iconic devices are 
available in sign languages and their interrelationship is complex. This makes it particularly 
interesting for the study of the underlying semantic concepts, especially regarding the question 
whether iconicity has an impact on concept formation. Grote & Linz (2003) proposed the concept 
of ‘arbitrary’ iconicity. They claim that the understanding of the Saussurean notion of arbitrariness 
is often misleading, because L'arbitraire du signe does not refer to the common idea that the 
signifiant is independent of the signifié and that the relationship between sign form and sign 
meaning is a conventionalized one. Rather, both the signifier and the signified are arbitrary in the 
sense that they do not exist independently of the sign creation process (see also Jäger 1978, 1986, 
2007; Fehrmann & Linz 2002; Adam et al., 2007). In contrast to the common equation of arbitrary 
and unmotivated signs, Grote & Linz pointed out that the Saussurean notion in its original version 
does not contradict motivated sign formation. Similarly, the Peircean subdivision of signs into 
icons, indices and symbols up to now has often been misinterpreted as an exclusive classification, 
such  that a sign is thought to be either iconic or symbolic. Referring to several authors, in his later 
work Peirce emphasized that symbols may be in part iconic and in part indexical (see also Elgin 
1996; Nöth 2001). Symbol and icon do not designate mutually exclusive classes; and likewise 
iconicity and symbolism do not refer to disjunctive properties of a sign, but rather are functionally 
guided and context-dependent characterizations of signs. When applied to the example of sign 
language it follows that the potentially iconic dimension of signs does not interfere with their 
linguistic function. An iconic sign can work both as an imagic-icon and a linguistic sign. Whether it 
acts primarily as an icon or as a symbol is determined by its actual use. The onset of either one of 
these sign 'transcription' processes (Jäger, 2002) is to some extent dependent on the linguistic 
context. Grote & Linz (2003) call the process in which the focus of attention shifts from the 
symbolic meaning of the linguistic sign to the iconic meaning of the linguistic properties of the sign 
'Iconization of a Symbol'. The reverse process, when the iconicity of the sign is ignored and the 
recipient 'sees through' the material form of the sign directly onto the semantic meaning is called 
'Symbolization of an Icon'. In discourse, the interpretation of linguistic signs – even those which 
are highly iconic – is predominately guided by the systematic structures. Thus, iconic signs behave 
mainly as symbols integration into the language system. Nevertheless, the linguistically governed 
symbolization of an iconic sign does not generally exclude its renewed use as an icon. In fact, the 
iconic dimension of a sign can be reactivated when the sign is not recognized as a linguistic item, 
but rather as an iconic sign. In this case the semantic aspects recede and the focus of attention 
draws mainly on the material form of the sign. Such a re-iconization process of linguistic signs can 
often be found in aesthetical or advertising contexts as well as in disturbed communication. It also 
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happens when children acquire sign language through native input. First, they are exposed to and 
acquire the signs as arbitrary symbols and ignore pictorial aspects (Siple, Caccamise, & Brewer, 
1982). In a second step they learn through the re-iconization process that there is a similarity 
between the sign and the referent. For example, in German Sign Language the sign for milk is 
iconic, because it resembles the action of ‚milking’. Young children who never saw the action 
“milking a cow” can still use the sign in communication correctly, regardless of whether they 
recognize the iconicity. Later, when someone explains the interrelation to them, they  realize the 
resemblance. Thus, an individual very often needs certain knowledge to even recognize iconicity. 
Only with such knowledge can the re-iconization process be activated.  
However, in the reverse process of linguistically driven symbolization of iconic signs the 
question of whether the iconic aspect of the sign still retains an effect on conceptual structures 
remains unsettled. More precisely, is the influence of imagic iconicity limited to a motivational 
aspect in the process of sign creation or does the iconic dimension maintain an impact on the 
conceptual structure of the sign after being lexicalized? If the process of re-iconisation has an 
impact on conceptual categorization processes, then it might change the structure of the concept 
in the way that it has a stronger semantic relation to the referent.  
In other words, when a sign of German Sign Language (DGS) like 'eagle' provides an image 
of a prototypical beak of an eagle in the way that the articulators (the hands) sign the trace of the 
shape of the beak, then the beak of the eagle might play a special role in the semantic concept of 
the eagle, i.e. it is central to the concept and has strong semantic relations to other parts of the 
concept. But the latter will only occur when the signer recognizes the iconicity of the sign through 
the process of re-iconisation. Based on these considerations the following research questions 
were derived: 
 Does the iconicity of a sign (because of re-iconization processes) affect the structure 
of the semantic network of deaf and hearing signers in the way that certain 
characteristics, which are highlighted by the iconic aspect of a sign, play a central role 
in the corresponding semantic concept, i.e. have a stronger semantic relation to the 
referent?  
 Does the sign language system influence the vocal language system of cross-modal 
bilinguals (proficient speakers of German Sign Language (DGS) and German Spoken 
Language (DLS))? Do bilinguals show the same or different responses compared to 
deaf or hearing participants in tasks with words and signs, respectively?  
 Is the recognition of iconicity, i.e. the resemblance between sign and referent, 
dependent on specific linguistic knowledge? 
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These hypotheses will be tested empirically in three different experiments with three different 
groups of participants. The first and second experiment will examine whether deaf, bilingual and 
hearing subjects show different responses in verifying and judging semantically related 
signs/words and pictures, respectively. The third experiment will investigate whether the ratings 
of iconic signs are similar between hearing and deaf participants. 
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III. Empirical Studies1 
1. General Method 
1.1. Selected Tasks 
Within the field of semantic cognition, there are several methods to investigate semantic relations 
among concepts. As stated above the main underlying idea is that units in the conceptual system 
are organized and activated according to an associative network. An important goal of the 
research described in this dissertation is to investigate whether the strengths of semantic relations 
between paradigmatically and syntagmatically related concepts are different in subjects who use 
sign language as a significant means of communication. Thus, it was important to employ tasks, 
which measure the strength of semantic relations of a specific type in detail.  
It was decided to use comprehension tasks rather than production tasks, because the 
responses of the participants can be registered on-line in terms of reaction times and choices of 
preference. A simple comprehension task is to ask subjects to decide whether a declarative 
statement is true or false with respect either to general knowledge or whether it fits to a specific 
visual display. The starting point for this kind of research was the sentence verification task 
developed by Landauer & Freedman (1968) and Collins & Quillian (1969). In this task a person is 
presented with simple propositions like "a bird has feathers" or "a fish can swim" and asked to 
determine as quickly as possible whether a sentence is true or false. For the purpose of this thesis 
a variant of the sentence verification task - the category verification task – was selected. In this 
task subjects are given particular signs or words such as ‘Rose’, ‘Apfel’ or 'Taube', and asked to 
decide whether or not they are related in a certain way to other signs or words (Rosch 1973; 
McCloskey & Glucksberg 1978). The underlying idea is that when two concepts are stimulated, 
activation from each spreads throughout the network until the two concepts get linked. Since 
normally few errors are made on this task, the response time taken to answer is usually what is 
measured. This time is thought to reflect the strength of semantic relations between concepts in 
the semantic lexicon. That is, even though decisions are made very rapidly, the time it takes might 
be a measure of the strength between different concepts in the semantic system.  
                                                             
 
1  The studies were part of an interdisciplinary research project at the 'Center for Cultural 
Research' (University of Cologne) on the 'Mediality of linguistic signs'.  
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 A second class of comprehension tasks is not based on the measurement of response 
time but rather on the subjective judgment of the degree of semantic relatedness between words 
or signs. Studies within this approach have taken as a point of departure ratings of similarity in 
meaning for subsets of the lexicon that form specific semantic domains such as cooking, animal 
names etc. (Rosch 1973). The basic assumption is that the structure of the internal representation 
is reflected in this intuitive judgment. In this thesis a variant of the similarity-rating-task – the triad-
comparison-task - is used, in which subjects have to decide which one of two instances of a 
category is more semantically related to a third one, e.g. ‘apple’ and ‘fruit’ are stronger 
semantically related than ‘banana’. The number of choices (%) are applied to define the strength 
of relatedness.  
Another paradigm in semantic relation studies investigates memory errors in word 
recognition tasks. In the single-item task, a conventional recognition memory task, participants 
study a list of words or signs and are tested for their ability to recognize the individual items as 
previously presented, i.e. as old. There are two types of recognition memory errors, i.e. false hits 
(or false alarms) and misses. A false hit is the recognition of an item as old when it is in fact new. 
A miss is the failure to identify a previously presented item as old. This task can be used to measure 
semantic relatedness because the two types of errors give an indication of the strength of the 
relation between two items. For example, Underwood (1965) and others used a continuous 
recognition memory paradigm and found that subjects made false recognition of words (false hits) 
that were semantic associates of previously presented words. This false recognition effect was 
influenced by the semantic relatedness between words, with the highest false memory frequency 
reported for the words with the strongest semantic relations to the previously studied words.  
The described on-line psycholinguistic experiments are very sensitive to experimental 
variables. Thus, all types of methods, i.e. verification task, triad-comparison-task and memory-
recognition task, are utilized in this thesis, in order to study the influence of language modality on 
conceptual structures. 
  
88 
In Table III.1 an overview about all experiments and methods is given: 
Table III.1: Selected tasks 
Experiment Method 
Verification Task with Signs/Words and Pictures Verifying the semantic relatedness of two single 
signs/words or pictures 
Triad-Comparison Task with Signs/Words and 
Pictures 
Choosing which item out of two is more 
semantically related to a specific item  
Verification Task with non-polycomponential and 
polycomponential signs 
Verifying the semantic relatedness of two single 
signs 
Triad-Comparison Task with non-
polycomponential and polycomponential signs 
Choosing which item out of two is more 
semantically related to a specific item  
Recognition Memory Task with 
Nonpolycomponential and polycomponential 
signs 
Memory-recognition: Present different signs in a 
first trial and ask for recognition in a second one. 
Verification Task with iconic Signs/non-iconic 
Words and Pictures 
Verifying the semantic relatedness of a sign/word 
and a picture 
Triad-Comparison Task with iconic Signs/non-
iconic Words and Pictures 
Choose which picture out of two is more 
semantically related to a sign/word  
Rating task Sign-Iconicity Rating  
1.2. Participants 
Participants were deaf, bilingual and hearing volunteers who were paid for participation in the 
experiments. All of the deaf participants were prelingually and profoundly deaf, and they came 
from hearing families. They were skilled signers and reported German Sign Language (GSL) to be 
their preferred means of communication with deaf and hearing friends. The bilingual participants 
were hearing native cross-modal bilingual signers. They learned both German Sign Language and 
German Spoken Language as a first-native language from their profoundly deaf parents and 
hearing relatives (CODAS- Children of deaf Adults). Since the bilinguals were all working as sign-
language interpreters they used both languages regularly as a means of communication (balanced 
speech-sign bilinguals). The hearing participants were native speaker of German and had never 
had any contact with German Sign Language. 
All participants had equally high linguistic proficiency in each of their languages and came 
from the same area in Germany (Nordrhein-Westfalen). Linguistic proficiency of the deaf and the 
bilingual group in German Sign Language was assessed by a trained deaf sign language lecturer 
using a subtest of the ATG (Gebärdensprachsinnverständnistest (GSV) of the Aachener Test zur 
Deutschen Gebärdensprache, Fehrmann, Huber, Jäger, Sieprath & Werth, 1997). Linguistic 
proficiency of the bilingual and the hearing group in German spoken language was tested by a 
hearing psychologist with a standardized interview. 
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1.3. Materials 
The material of the experiments consisted of signs, words and pictures, respectively. These stimuli 
fulfilled the following criteria:  
 The signs were performed by a deaf native speaker of German Sign Language (GSL), 
the words were spoken by a native speaker of German Spoken Language (GSpL), and 
the pictures were drawn by the same artist in order to insure similarity in art and style. 
 The German signs were required to correspond to German spoken words and thus to 
be easily translatable (the signs used were all commonly accepted single signs of 
German Sign Language). It was essential that signs and words were well-known to the 
participants (subjective frequency of occurrence of signs and words, respectively, was 
estimated with the computerized procedure VEIP; Grote, 1999). An attempt was made 
to keep familiarity, iconicity, number of syllables, phonological and morphological 
similarity as comparable as possible. 
 A recorded sign was considered to begin when the hand(s) entered signing space and 
to end when the hand(s) began to move out of the sign configuration and back down 
to the resting position. The signs were gated at frame intervals of 33 ms.  
 The spoken words were digitized at a sampling rate of 22 kHz. They were presented 
acoustically together with a visual marker. 
 The pictures were black and white line drawings, with the exception of pictures for 
color-words and -signs (e.g. green, blue, red etc.), which were colored. The pictures 
were digitized using a Hewlett-Packard scan application, and refined with the editing 
facilities of MS-Paint. The pictures` objects had a canonical orientation and were 
presented in black on a white background. The complexity of the pictures differed and 
since this difference had an impact on recognition and response times, picture-
complexity was judged by the participants with the VEIP. (See Appendix for detailed 
information about videos, audios and pictures). 
1.4. General Procedure 
All subjects were tested individually in an experimental laboratory at the University of Cologne. 
The participants were seated directly in front of the monitor at a distance of about 60 cm with the 
two index fingers resting on two response buttons of a so-called 'Game Port Checker'. They were 
informed that they would see several pairs of items. The pairs of items were grouped in different 
series consisting of a certain number of trials and rest periods. The signs and pictures were 
displayed one at a time on a computer monitor, whereas the spoken words were presented via 
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two loudspeakers attached to the computer. In addition to the acoustic presentation of the word, 
a visual marker (icon of a loudspeaker) appeared on the screen indicating to the subject, which 
item was the target and which was the stimulus item. The outlines of the sign video, the visual 
marker and the picture were the same (approximately 12 cm wide and 9 cm high). In order to 
prevent visual masking, the first item was centered at the top of the monitor, the second one at 
the bottom. Each item was followed by a grey, blank screen. Reaction times were measured from 
the onset of the stimulus item. The participants were told to perform the task as accurately and 
quickly as possible. They could respond anytime from the start of the target item, but fast 
responses did not alter the inter stimulus interval (ISI). The subjects were instructed by using a 
computer-based explanation (signed and written vs. spoken and written) and were given practice 
trials. 
The experiment was conducted by a program developed at the University Cologne2 and 
allows measurement of the speed of a human subject's responses to stimuli flashed on the 
computer screen. Number of trials, inter-trial intervals, ready signal, and randomized foreperiods 
can be selected from an interactive display (Ini-Data) prior to beginning the experiment. The 
program does not record premature responses or excessively long latencies. In such cases the 
program records a non-response. At the end of the selected number of trials, the available data 
analysis options include type of reaction (yes/no or left/right) and Reaction Time (RT). Raw data 
can be displayed and a data file is stored automatically. More trials may be added to existing data 
and the starting point of the experiment can be varied.  
All analysis of variance (ANOVA) were carried out as repeated measure ANOVA with task 
related factors (Semantic Relations, Experimental Condition), as repeated factor and groups as 
nonrepeated measure factor if not stated otherwise. For all analysis reported, outliers were 
removed prior to the ANOVA. An outlier was defined as a response time that was two standard 
deviations from the mean in a given cell for a given subject. Two separate ANOVAs were 
conducted on subjects and items. Based on these two analysis, min F' was calculated if both 
subject and item analysis were significant. 
                                                             
 
2 The experiments were carried out on a PC with Intel Pentium II Processor, Intel MMX™ Technology (256 MB RAM). 
The software was written in Visual Basics 6.0 with additional High Speed Timer programmed on the basis of Visual C 6.0 and 
implemented in the Visual Basic program. The control elements for the AVIS (sign-videos), i.e. MS ActiveMovie controls and for 
sounds (word-audios), i.e. MS Multimedia Sound Controls delivered the responses of the subjects in real time (measurement 
accuracy = 5 ms) to the High Speed Timer. All controls used DirectX Library. This meets the demands of a Real Time System. The 
stimuli were displayed on a high-resolution CRT-screen (Iyama Vision Master Pro 510, 21'') with a screen update frequency of 
60 Hz and Standard-VAG-Resolution. Responses were recorded via an external manipulandum. A Game Port Checker initialises 
direct input so that the polling happens with the highest possible frequency. 
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2. The Influence of Simultaneity vs. Linearity on Categorization 
2.1. Measurement of Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic Semantic Relation in Deaf, 
Hearing and Bilinguals with a Verification Task 
The main question addressed in Experiment 1 was whether the structure of the conceptual system 
based on sign language is different from the one based on spoken language. i.e. whether the use 
of a specific language modality, either visual-gestural or audio-vocal, has an impact on the strength 
of paradigmatic (superordinate, coordinate) and syntagmatic (action, attribute) semantic 
relations. Furthermore, it was investigated, whether the use of a specific language leads to 
response differences in a non-linguistic task, i.e. pictorial categorization (for more details see 
section 2.4.1.). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 22 deaf (group 1), 20 hearing participants (group 2) and 20 hearing native cross-
modal bilingual (group 3). The subjects in the deaf group and the hearing group were matched 
with respect to schooling and age: 6 out of each group graduated from high-school (Abitur) and 
obtained a college degree, 6 went to high school and got a secondary school certificate 
(Realschulabschluß) and 8/10 subjects completed junior high school (Hauptschulabschluß). The 
deaf group was made up of ten male and 12 female participants with an average of thirty-one 
years of age. In the hearing group were 9 male and 11 female with an average age of thirty two. 
The bilingual group was made up of three male and seventeen female participants with an average 
age of thirty one. Twelve graduated from high-school (Abitur) and obtained a college degree, six 
went to high school but did not graduate (Realschulabschluß) and two participants completed 
junior high school (Hauptschulabschluß). All participants were right-handed. 
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Table III.2: Characteristics of deaf, hearing and bilingual participants 
Language 
Status 
n Gender Age Education 
Deaf 22 10 F / 12 M 
M = 31,72 
(SD = 9,65) 6 Abitur / 6 Realschule / 10 Hauptschule 
Hearing 20 11 F / 9 M 
M = 32,40  
(SD = 0,66) 6 Abitur / 6 Realschule / 8 Hauptschule 
Bilingual 20 17 F / 3 M 
M = 31,65  
SD = (7,72) 12 Abitur / 6 Realschule / 2 Hauptschule 
Materials 
The experimental material consisted of 160 pairs of signs/words/pictures (three different 
randomly ordered experimental conditions) composed of 20 repeatedly presented basic level 
category items (stimulus 1) and 80 semantically related and unrelated item (stimulus 2). The 
stimulus 2-items had a specific semantic relation to stimulus 1: superordinate-, coordinate-, 
action-, and attribute-relationship. Thus, there were 20 items of each type of semantic relation. 
Equal numbers of related and non-related items were assigned to the test list randomly. No more 
than three truly or falsely related items appeared successively. For detailed information about the 
testitems see Appendix A. 
Table III.3: Example of a basic level item and a pair of related and unrelated items per type of semantic 
relation 
Taxonomy Stimulus 1 Related Stimulus 2 Unrelated Stimulus 2 
Basic Level shirt (Hemd)   
1 Superordinate  clothing (Kleidung) fruit (Obst) 
2 Coordinate  trousers (Hose) lamp (Lampe) 
3 Action  iron (bügeln) eat (essen) 
4 Attribute  light (dünn) fast (schnell) 
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20 object names were selected belonging to a basic level category and for each category 4 
related and 4 unrelated items were chosen, namely two paradigmatic relations, i.e. 
superordination and coordination, and two syntagmatic relations, i.e. action and attributes. These 
stimuli were chosen systematically according to the following criteria:  
 the German signs are required to correspond to German spoken words and thus to be 
easily translatable,  
 signs and words are well-known to the bilingual participants (subjective frequency of 
occurrence/familiarity of signs and words, respectively, was estimated with a visual 
analog scale with range 1-100 (VEIP Grote, 1999).  
 the signs are all commonly accepted single signs of German Sign Language.  
 The semantically related test items had to be specific and typical for the category of 
the target item.  
 The items were selected from several sets of association norms and typicality scales, 
published in Hager and Hasselhorn (1994). Since there are no association norms for 
signs, association data were collected prior to the testing from seven deaf participants 
who were asked to sign the words they could think of when they perceived a stimulus 
sign performed by a deaf person.  
 number of syllables, phonological and morphological similarity of signs and words are 
comparable. 
 the pictures should represent the meaning of the signs and spoken words as precisely 
as possible. Thus, a group of hearing and deaf people were asked to judge the pictures 
with regard to the appropriateness of matching the meanings of signs and words. Only 
those pictures which fell within the 80-100 % match-meaning-range were selected. 
The stimulus-pictures did not include the object like it was presented in the target 
picture.  
 the picture-complexity was judged by the group of deaf and hearing with the VEIP (see 
Appendix A for detailed information). 
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Figure III.1: Example Picture-Stimulus-Set 
Since any similarities and differences between items might affect the ease of accessing and 
processing test items, further checks were performed. Linguistically important dimensions are 
'familiarity' and 'imageability'. These data were also obtained with the help of the VEIP. The deaf 
and hearing participants judged the related items (stimulus 2 – related) according to the aspects 
mentioned. Based on these data a correlation between reaction time (over all related items) and 
the control variables was computed. In general no significant correlation between response time 
and 'familiarity' and 'imageability' was obtained for deaf participants (all p > .10 (see Table III.4 
below). Phonological and Morphological Similarity between the Stimulus and the Stimulus 2-
related item existed only in exceptional cases and did not correlate with response time (see 
Appendix A). 
Table III.4: Correlation (Pearson) between response times (RT) in the verification task with signs /spoken 
words and linguistically relevant dimensions (by-items analysis) 
 Deaf (N=20) Hearing (N=20) 
Imageability Ratings (0-100) -.18 .10 
Familiarity (subjective)Ratings (0-100) -.34 -.01 
Procedure 
Deaf, hearing and bilingual participants had to judge the presence or absence of a semantic 
relation (paradigmatic or syntagmatic) between two signs/two spoken words (Experiment 1) and 
two pictures (Experiment 2), respectively (see Appendix A). Before the experimental session, each 
subject was shown a computer-based explanation about experimental procedure and material in 
German Sign/Spoken and Written Language. In addition they received a practice session consisting 
of 12 item-pairs. The structure of the practice block was the same as the experimental blocks. The 
Basic-Level-Item 
Superordinate 
 
Coordinate Action Attribute 
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practice items and distracters were not repeated in the experimental session and were not 
semantically related to any of the experimental stimuli. 
The experimental session started with an START-Button which appeared in the centre of 
the screen as the ready signal. After a button pressed by the subject, the first item appeared. After 
an interval of 1 sec. the second item was presented. The signs and words remained on the screen 
corresponding to the video/audio-length. The pictures were shown each for 1500 ms. The item-
pairs were grouped in three series of 60 + 50 + 50 trials (160 trials), with 2 rest periods. Each pair 
of items was followed by a blank screen for 2 sec before the next pair appeared. The participants 
were instructed to press the right button if there was a semantic relation (yes) between the two 
presented items and the left button if there was none (No). A complete session lasted 
approximately a half hour. Reaction times (RT) were measured from the start of the secondly 
presented stimulus item. 
Results 
Results for deaf, hearing and bilingual participants in the linguistic and pictorial condition 
For all analyses reported, incorrect responses and outliers were removed prior to the ANOVA. Two 
deaf participants and 22 items were excluded from the analysis because of an error rate higher 
than 20 %. (see Appendix A). Although it was hypothesized that effects would be evident in both 
the accuracy rate and RTs, participants across all groups (except of two) were highly accurate on 
experimental items (error rate = 3-6%) and the analyses conducted upon accuracy rates revealed 
no significant differences. Correct RTs were averaged by participants and by items for each of the 
experimental condition (see Table III.5). 
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Table III.5: Average correct Response Latencies (in Milliseconds) and Standard Deviations (in parenthesis) as 
a Function of Experimental Condition (linguistic with words/signs and pictorial with pictures), Class of 
Semantic Relations' (Superordinate, Coordinate, Action and Attribute) and Language Status (Deaf and 
Hearing; Deaf and Bilingual; Hearing and Bilingual) 
  Deaf (n=20) Hearing (n=20) Bilinguals (n=20) 
 
Linguistic 
(Signs) 
Pictorial 
Linguistic 
(Words) 
Pictorial 
Linguistic 
(Signs) 
Linguistic 
(Words) 
Pictorial 
Super-
ordinate 
1843 (186) 1422 (293) 865 (214) 710 (150) 1711 (215) 1092 (204) 1031 (199) 
Coordinate  1931 (238) 1519 (282) 998 (294) 898 (195) 1838 (225) 1186 (219) 1151 (212) 
Action 1488 (192) 1389 (223) 965 (269) 970 (211) 1532 (206) 933 (213) 1038 (183) 
Attribute 1630 (178) 1441 (234) 1110 (324) 988 (229) 1721 (203) 1097 (208) 1109 (172) 
Total 1732 (198) 1443 (258) 985 (275) 891 (196) 1700 (212) 1077 (211) 1082 (191) 
(see Appendix B for detailed data) 
 
Separate 2 x 4 x 2 analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted, using subjects (F1) and items (F2) 
as random factors, upon correct response latencies3. Distractor-items were not analyzed and are 
not reported. The results of the repeated measures three-way analysis of variance for the pair 
wise comparisons of deaf, hearing and bilingual participants are shown in Table III.6 and Table 
III.7. 
Table III.6: 2 x 4 x 2 ANOVA/minF' (Clark, 1973): Interactions 
Interactions Deaf + Hearing Deaf + Bilingual Hearing + Bilingual 
Lang. Stat. x Sem. 
Rel. 
minF'(3,88) = 36.66 
p = .0001 
minF'(3,91) = 3.23 
p = .0261 
minF'(3,92) = 13.01 
p = .0001 
Lang. Stat. x Exp. 
Cond. 
minF'(1,47) = 9.0 
p = .0044 
minF'(1,46) = 23.54 
p = .0001 
minF' (1,47) = 1.335 
p = .2537, n.s. 
Sem. Rel. x Exp. 
Cond. 
minF'(3,92) = 14.22 
p = .0001 
minF'(3,79) = 14.03 
p = .0001 
minF' (3,92) = 6.346 
p = .0001 
Stat. x  Rel. x Cond. minF' (3,91) = 4.95 
p = .0032 
F1(3,38) = 4.668, p = .037 
F2(3,57) = 3.690, p = .017 
minF'(3,92) = 2.222, p = .0909, n.s. 
minF' (3,87)= 0.185 
p = .0943, n.s. 
 
  
                                                             
 
3 Although it was hypothesized that effects would be evident in both the accuracy rate and RTs, 
participants across all groups (except of two) were highly accurate on experimental items (error rate = 
3-6%) and the analyses conducted upon accuracy rates revealed no significant differences.  
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The analysis revealed for 1. deaf and hearing participants and 2. deaf and bilingual participants 
significant main effects and interactions. Analysis for 3. hearing and bilingual participants revealed 
significant main effects of 'Language Status' and 'Class of Semantic Relation' and their interactions. 
Importantly there was no main effect of 'Experimental Condition' and of the two-way-interaction 
'Language Status x Experimental condition'. The three-way-interaction was also non-significant. 
These non-significant effects indicate that the bilingual participants responded similar to the 
hearing participants in the pictorial condition.  
To explore these results in more detail the linguistic and pictorial conditions were 
examined separately. 
Results for deaf and hearing subjects in the linguistic condition 
A 2 x 4 ANOVA was performed on the mean latency per relation category of deaf and hearing 
subjects. Separate analysis of variance, using participants (F1) and items (F2) as random factors, 
were conducted and based on the two analysis, minF’ was calculated (see Table III.8). 
Table III.7: 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interaction 
Effects Deaf & Hearing 
Language Status minF'(1,42) = 99.87, p = .0001 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,137) = 14.34, p = .0001 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,136)= 31.87, p = .0001 
 
Since the mean RTs in the visual-gestural condition were much higher than in the auditory-vocal 
condition, the main effect of the variable 'language status' was significant. The main effect for the 
variable 'class of semantic relations' was also significant; the interaction of the two factors was 
significant as well. For the deaf subjects the differences between mean RTs of the paradigmatic 
relations and the syntagmatic relations was significant (t-test for paired samples, t(19) = 11.455; 
p = .0001). Mean RTs for syntagmatic relations were 328 ms faster than the ones for paradigmatic 
relations. The differences between individual relations from both types of relations were also 
significant (all p =.001).  
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Figure III.2: Mean RT of deaf and hearing participants in the verification task with signs and 
words for items of the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
For the hearing subjects the differences between RTs for the paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
semantic relations (106 ms) were also significant (t(19)= -3,861, p=.001), but in the opposite 
direction from the deaf group. The pattern of responses of the hearing subjects was significantly 
different from the responses of the deaf subjects (see Figure III.2). The RTs for superordinate items 
were low, followed by somewhat longer RTs for actions and coordinates. Compared to these, the 
RTs for attributes were quite high. Post hoc paired samples t-tests revealed a significant difference 
between the mean RTs of all classes of semantic relations except for coordinates and actions (all 
p= .008). The ratios of the RTs for the paradigmatic relations and the syntagmatic relations were 
different for the deaf and hearing group. A t-test revealed a significant effect on the difference of 
these ratios (t(38)= 10.938, p =.001).  
At the first glance it seems as if the deaf group is much slower in verifying semantic 
relations than the hearing group, because their reaction times are much higher. This is not quite 
right when we compare the results more directly to each other. As mentioned before, the overall 
response times of the deaf participants in the verification task with signs is about 750 Milliseconds 
higher than the RT for the hearing participants in the verification task with spoken words. This 
result is somewhat surprising because in general the overall identification time for signs is faster 
than the identification time for words (Emmorey & Corina, 1990). The results are rather a direct 
consequence of the sign/word-length effect, i.e. the range of the articulatory loop in the working 
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memory for signs is smaller than the range for spoken words (Wilson & Emmorey, 1997), because 
the sign articulation (noticeable by the mean duration of the sign-videos) is longer than the 
articulation of the spoken words (audio-length). By subtracting the time which the videos are 
longer than the audios from the response times for every single class of semantic relation, it is 
possible to compare the two groups of participants more directly (see Figure III.3). 
 
Figure III.3: Corrected Mean Response Times of deaf and hearing participants in the verification 
task with signs and words for items of the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' 
and 'attribute' 
Table III.8: 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interaction (corrected Mean RT) 
Effects Deaf (corrected) & Hearing 
Language Status minF'(1,53)= 0,086, p = .7692, n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,65)= 6,543, p = .0007 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,75)= 15,39, p = .0001 
 
After this procedure the main effect of the variable 'language status' was not significant, whereas 
for the variable "class of semantic relations" it was significant; the interaction of the two factors 
was significant as well.  
A t-test for independent samples revealed a difference in judging all types of semantic 
relations between the two groups of participants. In judging superordinates (t(38)= 4.726; p 
=.0001) and coordinates (t(38)= 3.444; p =.003) the hearing participants were significantly faster 
than the deaf participant. The results for judging actions (t(38)= -4.407; p =.0001) and attributes 
(t(38)= -2.912; p =.010) were the other way around, i.e. the deaf were significantly faster than the 
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hearing (p =.0127, with Bonferroni correction). With this outcome the author of this thesis found 
first evidence for the hypothesis that the strength of semantic relations between concepts in the 
mental lexicon of deaf and hearing subjects is different for paradigmatic and for syntagmatic 
semantic relations. It seems as if the organization of sign-concepts relies mainly on associative 
connections, whereas the concepts based on spoken German rely on categorical links. 
Results for bilinguals compared to deaf signers in the linguistic condition 
The performance of the deaf and bilingual participants in the verification task with signs is 
depicted in Figure III.4. Inspection of the graphs suggests that also deaf and bilinguals responded 
differently to paradigmatic and syntagmatic semantic relations. 
 
Figure III.4: Response Times of deaf and bilingual participants in the verification task with signs 
for items of the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
Table III.9: 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interaction 
Main Effects Deaf & Bilingual 
Language Status minF'(1,43)= 0,159, p = .6918, n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,158)= 39,31, p = .0001 
Language Status x Semantic Relation minF'(3,166)= 4,997, p = .0025 
 
A two-way repeated measures 4 x 2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for the factor 'class 
of semantic relations' and the interaction of the two factors. The factor 'language status' was not 
significant. Post hoc t-tests for independent samples revealed significant differences between 
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deaf and bilingual participants in judging all classes of semantic relations. Compared to the deaf, 
the bilinguals responded significantly faster to superordinates (t(38) =-9.409, p=.0001) and 
coordinates (t(38) = -8.634, p=.0001), i.e. the paradigmatic semantic relations. In contrast, 
bilinguals responded slower to actions (t(38) = -14.306, p=.0001) and attributes (t(38) = -14.185, 
p=.0001).  
The interpretation of the results has to be done considering that the latency in word/sign 
recognition and lexical decision for bilinguals is longer than for monolinguals (Ransdell & Fischer, 
1987). Taking this into account, the ‘corrected RTs’ of the bilinguals were generally smaller for 
each class of semantic relation and one could speculate that the responses of the bilinguals to 
syntagmatic relations were not different compared to the deaf and thus, not significant. Since 
there is no detailed information about recognition latency and lexical decision in bilinguals, it’s 
not possible to verify the speculative thesis. 
However, the results can be interpreted as first evidence that the strength of semantic 
relations between signs in the conceptual system of the deaf4 is different from the strength of 
related signs in the cross-modal conceptual system of sign-speech bilinguals. As previous research 
indicated, the use of sign language leads to strong syntagmatic semantic relations, whereas a 
lexicon based on spoken words shows a preference for taxonomic, i.e. paradigmatic semantic 
relations.  
Results for bilinguals compared to hearing non-signers in the linguistic condition 
In the verification task with words, the bilinguals showed a different pattern of results as in the 
task with signs (illustrated in Figure III.5).  
                                                             
 
4 Strictly speaking the deaf participants are sign-text bilinguals, i.e. deaf signers who acquire a sign 
language and learn (to some extent) the written form of a spoken language (Dufour, 1997, p.306). They differ from 
speech-sign bilinguals (CODAS) in that their access to written language starts very late and they use only sign 
language regularly as a means of communication (unbalanced late bilingualism). They have unequally linguistic 
proficiency in each of their languages. Thus, in the overall interpretation of the results, the deaf were not 
considered to be pure monolinguals, but rather to some extent sign-written bilinguals. 
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Figure III.5: Mean Response Times of hearing and bilingual participants in the verification task 
with words for items of the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
Table III.10:2 x 4 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interaction 
Main Effects Hearing & Bilinguals  
Language Status minF'(1,45)= 1,538, p = .2214 n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,136)= 8,575, p = .0001 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,126)= 5,716,p = .0011 
 
The 4 x 2 ANOVA verified a significant main effect for the factor 'class of semantic relations' and 
the interaction 'language status x class of semantic relation' (minF'(1,90)= 9,352, p = .003). The 
main effect for the factor ‘language status’ was not significant. T-tests for independent samples 
revealed a significant difference between hearing and bilinguals in judging the paradigmatic 
semantic relations (superordinates/coordinates) (t(38) = -2.856; p=.007), but no difference in 
judging the syntagmatic semantic relations (actions and attributes). Compared to the hearing, the 
bilinguals responded significantly slower to superordinates (t(38) =-3.447; p=.001) and also to 
coordinates (the latter was marginally significant after Bonferroni correction) (t(38) = -2.299; 
p=.027). The RTs for actions and attributes did not differ. 
Again, the interpretation of the results has to be done under consideration of longer 
recognition and lexical decision latencies for bilinguals. The responses of bilinguals for 
paradigmatic semantic relations are probably slightly slower as the responses of the hearing, but 
faster for syntagmatic relations. If so, the results indicate that semantic relations between signs 
in the sign-lexicon influence the strength of syntagmatic semantic relations in the word lexicon. 
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Whereas the monolingual word-lexicon does not show specifically strong syntagmatic relations, 
the word-network in the cross-modal bilingual lexicon seems to be influenced by the connected 
sign-network and therefore holds somewhat stronger syntagmatic relations.  
Results for deaf and hearing subjects in the pictorial condition 
For analyzing the data of the verification task with pictures, the same method were used as for 
the task with words/signs. In general the 2x4 ANOVA showed a significant main effect on the 
'language status', the factor ‘class of semantic relation’ and the interaction was also significant. 
Table III.11: 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interaction 
Main Effects Deaf & Hearing 
Language Status minF'(1,41)= 62,230, p = .0.0001 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,105)= 7,214, p = .0002 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,157)= 12,850,p = .0001 
 
For the deaf subjects the difference between mean RTs of the paradigmatic relations and the 
syntagmatic relations was not significant (t(19) = 1.545, p>.10). In contrast, for the hearing 
subjects this difference was significant (t(19) = -13.651, p= .0001). Significant differences (with 
Bonferroni correction) were found between superordinates-coordinates and coordinates-actions 
for the deaf subjects. The differences between pairs of semantic relations for hearing subjects 
were all significant except for the action-attribute pair. 
The ratios of the RTs for the paradigmatic relations and the syntagmatic relations were 
different for the deaf and hearing group. A t-test revealed a significant effect for the difference of 
these ratios (t (38) = 7.544, p=0.001). 
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Figure III.6: Mean Response Times of deaf and hearing participants in the verification task with 
pictures for items of the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
The performance of the deaf and hearing participants in the verification task with pictures is 
depicted in Figure III.6. Inspection of the graphs suggests that deaf and hearing responded 
differently to paradigmatic and syntagmatic semantic relations. 
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Results for deaf subjects in the linguistic and pictorial condition 
A two-way repeated measures 4x2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for the factor 'class 
of semantic relations' and the interaction of the two factors ‘experimental condition x class of 
semantic relation’ in both groups of subjects (see Table III.13). The main factor ‘experimental 
condition’ was significant only in the group of the Deaf. 
Table III.12: Two separate 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interaction 
Main Effects Deaf (Signs & Pictures) Hearing (Words & Pictures) 
Experimental Condition minF'(1,41)= 16,54, 
p = .0.0003 
minF'(1,41)= 1,551, 
p = .0.2201 n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,119)= 21,33, 
p = .0001 
minF'(3,101)= 22,28, 
p = .0001 
Exp. Condition x Class of 
Semantic Relation 
minF'(3,162)= 14,09, 
p = .0001 
minF'(3,124)= 2,961, 
p = .0349 
 
The averaged RTs of the linguistic and pictorial task with deaf (Figure III.7) and the averaged RTs 
of the linguistic and pictorial task with hearing subjects (Figure III.8) are presented below.  
 
Figure III.7: Mean Response Times of deaf participants in the verification task with signs and 
pictures for items of the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
The mean response time of deaf subjects was 280 ms faster in the task with pictures than in the 
task with signs. The superiority of picture recognition and memorization has been observed in 
several experiments with pictures and words (Carr, Pollatsek & Posner 1981; Stenberg, Radeberg 
& Hedman 1995). Thus, the common picture-advantage effect showed up for deaf signers too. 
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The picture-advantage effect suggests a parallel recognition process, which is based on perceptual 
familiarity and uses semantic links for a retrieval search. The pictures are relatively easier to 
discriminate compared to words and signs that probably require an extra phonemic decoding step. 
In presenting the semantic relations graphically, the deaf subjects rapidly scan the visual display 
similar to hearing subjects and thus quickly discover patterns of elements within the picture that 
are meaningful. This rapid parallel scanning leads to faster responses in the pictorial condition 
within the group of the deaf compared to the responses in the linguistic condition. 
 
Figure III.8: Mean Response Times of hearing participants in the verification task with signs and 
pictures for items of the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
The improvement in response time of hearing subjects (93 ms) was smaller compared to deaf 
subjects (280 ms). In both groups, the picture-advantage effect is smallest for the action-related 
items. On first glance, the patterns of results in the picture-presentation-mode are somewhat 
similar to the one in the sign/word-presentation mode for both groups. In the verification task 
with pictures the deaf participants again responded fastest to action- and attribute related items, 
followed by coordinates and finally by superordinates, whereas the hearing group responded 
fastest to superordinates and coordinates, followed by actions and attributes. 
However, the results indicate that the patterns of results in study 1 and study 2 are 
significantly different for both groups of participants. However, at least for the hearing group this 
might be because the improvement for the action-words is somewhat smaller than for the words 
of the other classes: The RTs for superordinates coordinates and attributes in the picture task are 
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about 120 msec faster than in the verbal task, the RTs for actions are about the same. The greater 
complexity of the action-pictures might be responsible for this divergence. A significant 
correlation of r=.57 (p =.05) between RT and complexity of the items can be found. Ignoring the 
response times for action-words, the interaction between ‘experimental condition’ and 'class of 
semantic relations' is no longer significant, which means that the pattern of RT-responses in the 
linguistic vs. the picture task are the same.  
Thus, the results for the deaf participants are different from those of the hearing group. 
The improvement in RTs of the deaf for actions and attributes is much lower (145 ms) than for 
superordinates and coordinates (417 ms). One explanation could be that deaf signers tend to be 
more associative than hearing speakers, which tend to label and classify. When recognizing a 
complex picture showing actions or attributes, deaf signers might activate several perceptual 
associations, which slows down the verification process. In contrast, verifying pictures with 
superordinated and coordinated objects might be faster, because they are less complex and easier 
to discriminate.  
Nevertheless, why are the deaf participants in general slower in responding to the pictures 
than the hearing participants, although they perform the same test with the same test items as 
the hearing group? One explanation could be that the perceptual categorization of pictures 
activates internal articulation of signs or words. The activation of an internal articulatory sign-
rehearsal-loop parallel to the visuo-spatial sketchpad in the working memory slows down the 
rapid processing of pictorial information to a larger extent than the word-rehearsal-loop because 
– as Wilson & Fox (2007) suggest - the working memory for signs share resources with the more 
general visual working memory. Working memory for speech only shares resources with the 
general auditory working memory. Also, the inner sign-articulation might activate the sensory-
motor system, which interferes with the task to press the answer button. 
For the experiment with pictures our prediction was that, the pattern of responses would 
be similar to the one in study 1 for each group of participants. The results are not quite compatible 
with this prediction. On the one hand, the patterns of results in the linguistic and pictorial task are 
significantly different from each other within both groups of participants. Though when ignoring 
the RTs for action-related items, within the hearing group of participants the pattern of results in 
the linguistic and pictorial condition are the same and thus it seems as if their spoken language 
system has an influence on the perceptual categorization of pictures. On the other hand, the 
differences in response pattern between the groups of deaf and hearing subjects are significant 
too, which indicates that also the sign-language system might have an influence on the perceptual 
categorization of pictures within the group a signers. However, the question whether language 
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modality influences the perceptual categorization of pictures cannot be answered clearly from 
this experiment. This issue needs further investigation. 
Results for bilinguals compared to deaf signers and hearing non-signers  
Since we found a significantly different pattern of results in judging semantic relations between 
bilinguals and deaf in the verification task with signs and between bilingual and hearing 
participants in the verification task with words, it is interesting to investigate whether the 
bilinguals will also perform differently from deaf and hearing participants in a task with pictures. 
Because in this task the procedure and test items were exactly the same for all three groups of 
participants, a difference in RTs between cross-modal bilinguals and monolinguals would indicate 
a difference in categorizing visual concepts.  
Table III.13: 4 x 2 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interactions 
Main Effects Bilingual & Deaf  Bilingual & Hearing 
Experimental Condition minF'(1,44)= 26,66, 
p = .00001 
minF'(1,44)= 9,654, 
p = .0034  
Class of Sem. Relation minF'(3,138)= 5,807, 
p = .0010 
minF'(3,91)= 16,05, 
p = .00001 
Mode x Sem. Relation minF'(3,120)= 0,247, 
p = .8632  n.s.  
minF'(3,96)= 9.561, 
p = .00001 
 
Comparing the bilinguals with the hearing group (4x2 ANOVA) significant main effects and a 
significant interaction was found. In contrast, the comparison of the bilingual with the deaf group 
revealed no significant interaction, which means that the overall patterns of results in the picture 
task did not differ. The latter result is somewhat surprising, because the overall RTs of the 
bilinguals are more similar to the ones of the hearing subjects. They respond faster than the deaf, 
but show a similar pattern, whereas they respond lower than the hearing, but with a different 
pattern. On account of this surprising result, it was assumed that the bilinguals recognition of a 
semantic relation between two pictures might be influenced by the structure of both, the sign 
language system and the word system.  
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Figure III.9: Mean RTs for each class of semantic relation (superordinate, coordinate, action and 
attribute) for each group of participants (deaf, hearing and bilingual) in the pictorial condition 
The most noticeable effect in Figure 2.9 is the difference in mean response times among the three 
groups. The RTs for deaf were the longest, followed by the RTs for the bilinguals. The hearing 
participants showed the shortest RTs in this task. As already mentioned, this can be explained by 
assuming that the participants tend to activate internal articulation of the connected sign or word 
when recognizing a complex picture (see above). Furthermore, the pattern of results differ in their 
characteristics only between bilingual and hearing participants. This presumption was confirmed 
by the statistical data analysis.  
Results for bilingual subjects in the linguistic (words and signs) and pictorial condition 
To evaluate the differences in RTs for correct judgments of semantically related items, a repeated 
measures 3 x 4 ANOVA was conducted.  
Table III.14: 3 x 4 ANOVA/minF’: Main effects and interaction 
Main Effects Bilinguals (Signs/Words/Pictures) 
Experimental Condition minF'(2,68)= 73,84, p = .0001 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,161)= 18,12, p = .0001 
Experimental Condition x Class of Semantic 
Relation 
minF'(6,273)= 1,759, p = .1076  n.s. 
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The main effect of the variable ‘experimental condition’ and of the variable 'class of semantic 
relations' was significant. The interaction of the two factors was not significant which means that 
the overall patterns of results in the different tasks did not differ. 
 
Figure III.10. Mean RTs for each class of semantic relation (superordinate, coordinate, action and 
attribute) for each task condition (signs, word and pictures) 
After Bonferroni correction (alpha level = .0085) post hoc dependent samples t-tests (two-tailed) 
revealed that within every condition the mean RTs for most classes of semantic relations were 
significantly different. Exceptions were found in all three conditions of the pair of classes 
'superordinate-attribute' and in addition in the pair 'superordinate-action' in the picture-
condition. Thus, the mean RTs of the cross-modal bilinguals were significantly different between 
conditions. At least the difference in mean RTs in the sign- compared to the word-condition is not 
surprising, because the results are a direct consequence of the sign/word-length, i.e. the sign 
articulation (noticeable by the mean duration of the sign-videos) is longer than the articulation of 
the spoken words (audio-length).  
By neglecting the modality effect that the long sign-videos lead to longer RTs in the sign-
condition, one can recognize a correspondence among the overall patterns of responses for the 
classes of semantic relations in all three experimental conditions (sign/word/picture). The 3x4 
ANOVA confirmed this impression: the interaction of the two factors ‘Experimental Condition x 
Class of Semantic Relation’ was not significant, and thus the overall patterns of results in the 
different tasks do not differ 
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This latter result indicates that the structure of semantic relations within the conceptual 
system based on signs is similar to the lexicon based on words for cross-modal bilinguals. 
Moreover, when we compare the pattern of results in the linguistic task (signs and words) with 
the pattern of results in the picture task, we find a similar pattern again, i.e. the fastest RTs for 
actions, followed by superordinates and attributes, with the slowest being the class of 
coordinates. The only deviation among the patterns in each condition could be found in the 
picture-condition for the RTs in the action-class. The participants responded somewhat slower 
than expected to actions presented as pictures compared to actions presented as signs or words. 
This can be explained by the high complexity of the pictures which slows down RTs. However, 
although the mean RTs are different in each condition, the overall pattern of results did not differ, 
which indicates a shaping influence of both language systems (sign and word) on the structure of 
semantic relations between visual concepts  
2.2. Measurement of Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic Semantic Relation in Deaf, 
Hearing and Bilinguals with a Triad-Comparison Task 
In Experiment 2 – a triad-comparison-task - the same research questions were addressed as in the 
first task. Whereas the verification is a more objective method to measure the strength between 
concepts in the lexicon on the basis of reaction times, the triad-comparison task relies on the 
subjective judgment of the strength of a semantic relation between test items. Since participants 
who use sign language show short response times in judging syntagmatic relations in the 
verification task, it is hypothesized that they show a high number of choices in % for syntagmatic 
relations in the triad comparison task. If the responses in experiment 1 correspond with the results 
in experiment 2, there is some evidence for the correctness of the introduced hypothesis.  
Thus, the second study examined whether deaf, hearing and bilingual subjects show 
different choices in a task where they were asked to decide which of two presented items had a 
stronger semantic relation to another presented target item. The number of choices in favor to a 
specific semantic relation was measured for each group of participants. It was expected that the 
responses in the triad-comparison would correspond to the responses in the verification task for 
each group of participants, i.e. the higher the relative number of choices for superordinates, 
coordinates, actions and attributes, respectively, the lower the mean response time for these 
groups of items. The prediction was, that in the deaf group the relative number of choices for 
syntagmatic relations would be higher than the relative number of choices for paradigmatic 
relations. The relative number of choices for the hearing participants was assumed to be the other 
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way around and for the bilinguals it was expected to find a response pattern somewhat in 
between. 
Method 
Participants  
The participants were the same 20 deaf signers, 20 hearing non-signers and 20 hearing 
native cross-modal bilinguals and who performed experiment 1, i.e. the verification task with 
signs/words and pictures.  
Stimulus Materials  
The experimental materials overlapped those of Experiment 1. By removing the unrelated 
items (distractors), the test list contained 20 basic level target items (stimulus 1) combined 
randomly with 2 (stimulus 2+3) of 4 related items (superordinates, coordinates, actions and 
attributes), i.e. 6 combinations within one set. Every possible combination of the items within a 
taxonomy was realized. Thus, there were 120 combinations of a target item with two related 
items. The presentation position was completely counterbalanced.  
Table III.15: Example stimulus set (1 out of 20) of a basic level item in combination with two related items 
Taxonomy Stimulus 1 Stimulus 2 Stimulus 3 
Basic Level shirt (Hemd)   
Superordinate + 
Coordinate 
 clothing (Kleidung) trousers (Hose) 
Superordinate + 
Attribute 
 clothing (Kleidung) light (dünn) 
Action + Superordinate  to iron (bügeln) clothing (Kleidung) 
Action + Attribute  to iron (bügeln) light (dünn) 
Coordinate + Action  trousers (Hose) to iron (bügeln) 
Attribute + Coordinate   light (dünn) trousers (Hose) 
(see Appendix A for the whole list of items) 
Procedure  
The experimental sequence in study two was the same as in study one, i.e. the participants were 
tested in two (deaf and hearing) / three (bilinguals) different sessions at regular intervals of 
approximately two weeks. The only difference to study one was the presentation of three instead 
of two test-items and the measurement of 'number of choices' instead of ‘reaction times’. For the 
deaf and bilingual participants the signs and pictures were displayed one at a time on a computer 
monitor. Again, in order to prevent visual masking the sign-video/picture was centered at the top 
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of the monitor, the first related sign/picture at the left bottom and the second one at the right 
bottom. For the hearing and bilingual subjects the spoken words were connected with a visual 
marker presented one by one in correspondence to the spoken words (see Appendix C for a 
visualized example). 
The experimental session started with a button pressed by the subject. The first item 
appeared at the top of the screen and after an interval of one second the second item appeared 
at the left bottom and after another one second the third item was presented at the right bottom 
of the screen. The signs and words remained corresponding to the video/audio-length. The 
pictures were shown each for 1500 ms.. The item-pairs were grouped in three series of 40 + 40 + 
40 trials (120 trials), with 2 rest periods. Each triad of items was followed by a blank screen for 2 
sec before the next triad appeared. The participant were instructed to press the right button if he 
or she thought the sign/word or picture on the right bottom of the screen had the strongest 
relation to the first presented sign/word or picture and the left button if he/she thought the 
sign/word or picture on the left bottom of the screen was the strongest related. The participants 
were told to do so as accurately and as quickly as possible at any time from the start of the third 
test item, but fast responses did not alter the timing. Each subject was instructed by a 
standardised explanation (signed/written vs. spoken/written) and was given a practice of 10 runs. 
A complete session lasted approximately half an hour. The experimental variables in Experiment 
2 were the same as in Experiment 1, except for the dependent variable. Instead of measuring 
response times, Number of Choices (NC) were collected.  
Results 
The pre-analysis of the data is similar to that of the previous experiment. Each participant's mean 
error rates (missings) and number of choices in % for correct trials were determined for each 
condition. There were no items with an error rate above 4% and the error rates of all participants 
were under 3%. However, since the development of Experiment 2 based on Experiment 1, the 
same items were excluded from the data analysation as in the verification task. In addition, the 
two deaf participants with high error rates in Experiment 1 were excluded too. An overview of the 
mean number of choices of deaf, hearing and bilingual participants in the linguistic and pictorial 
condition is given in Table III.17 below. 
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Table III.16: Mean Number of Choices in % and Standard Deviations (in brackets) for deaf, hearing and 
bilingual participants in the linguistic and pictorial triad-comparison-task 
  Deaf Hearing Bilinguals 
  
Linguistic 
(Signs) 
Pictorial 
Linguistic 
(Words) 
Pictorial 
Linguistic 
(Signs) 
Linguistic 
(Words) 
Pictorial 
Super-
ordinate 
22,88 
(7,69) 
25,79 
(6,86) 
33,31 
(6,15) 
36,18 
(6,98) 
27,89 
(7,37) 
26,14 
(5,15) 
29,29 
(8,23) 
Coordinate 
9,39 
(5,43) 
6,56 
(3,98) 
19,46 
(7,45) 
18,06 
(5,02) 
9,31 
(5,10) 
13,95 
(9,15) 
14,83 
(7,69) 
Action 
43,34 
(4,28) 
39,41 
(4,40) 
29,83 
(5,07) 
27,66 
(6,36) 
38,15 
(4,17) 
36,95 
(4,86) 
31,41 
(7,32) 
Attribute 
24,39 
(5,12) 
28,27 
(6,46) 
17,39 
(3,75) 
18,10 
(6,98) 
24,65 
(4,71) 
22,97 
(6,37) 
24,47 
(6,91) 
Total 
25,00 
(5,63) 
25,00 
(5,43) 
25,00 
(5,69) 
25,00 
(5,69) 
25,00 
(5,34) 
25,00 
(6,38) 
25,00 
(7,54) 
(see Appendix C for detailed data) 
 
The results of the 2 x 4 x 2 analysis of variance for the pairwise comparisons of deaf, hearing and 
bilingual participants can be seen in Table III.18: 
Table III.17: 2 x 4 x 2 ANOVA: Main effects and interactions 
Main Effects Deaf + Hearing Deaf + Bilingual Hearing + Bilingual 
Language Status minF'(1,41)= 0.530, 
p = .4706   n.s. 
minF’(1,40)= 0.973, p = 
.329   n.s. 
minF’(1,90)= 0.529, p = 
.4687   n.s. 
Class of Sem. Relation minF'(3,75)= 16.13, p = 
.0001 
minF'(3,82)= 33.84, p = 
.0001 
minF'(3,96)= 19.92, p = 
.0001 
Experimental Condition minF'(1,51)= 1.248, p = 
.2602   n.s. 
minF'(1,93)= 0.484, p = 
.512   n.s. 
minF'(1,56)= 0.842, p = 
.3628   n.s. 
 
Interactions Deaf + Hearing Deaf + Bilingual Hearing + Bilingual 
Lang. Stat. x Sem. Rel. minF'(3,15)= 45.64, p = 
.0001 
minF'(3,82)= 1.712, 
p = .1708   n.s. 
minF'(3,16)= 5.701,  
p = .0001 
Lang. Stat. x Exp. Cond. minF'(1,43)= 0.518, 
p = .4756   n.s. 
minF'(1,96)= 0.415, p = 
.5208   n.s. 
minF'(1,77)= 0.641,  
p = .4256   n.s. 
Sem. Rel. x Exp. Cond. minF'(3,17)= 3.440, p = 
.0182 
minF'(3,17)= 3.740, p = 
.0123 
minF'(3,12)= 1.767, 
p = .1569   n.s. 
Stat.  x  Rel.  x  Cond. minF'(3,13)= 0.649 
p = .4151   n.s. 
minF'(3,61)= 0.095, 
p = .9625   n.s. 
minF'(3,13)= 0.778,  
p = .4918   n.s. 
 
Analyses of variance shows for the pair wise comparison of the deaf, hearing and bilingual 
participants a non-significant effect of the main factor 'language status' and 'Experimental 
Condition' as well as of the 2-way interaction between 'Language Status' x 'Experimental 
Condition' and the third-way interaction between 'Language Status x 'Semantic Relation' x 
Experimental Condition. This result is not surprising, because the dependent variable is' number 
of choices in %', which means that the responses for each semantic relation will always add up to 
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100 %. Thus, there can’t be a main effect of 'language status', experimental Condition' and their 
interactions.  
Furthermore the analysis revealed for the deaf, hearing and bilingual participants 
significant main effects of 'class of semantic relation' and for the deaf and bilingual significant 
effects of the two-way interactions between 'Language Status' x 'Semantic Relation'. For the deaf 
and hearing participants we found for the interaction between 'Semantic Relation' x Experimental 
Condition a significant effect. The responses of deaf, hearing and bilingual participants are 
significantly different for all classes of semantic relation. 
These results will be explored and discussed in more detail below by examining the 
linguistic and pictorial conditions separately:  
Results for deaf and hearing subjects in the linguistic condition 
As in study one, the two-way analyses of variance (4x2 ANOVA) on the mean number of choices 
in % yielded a significant main effect of the variable 'Class of Semantic Relation' and the interaction 
of the two factors was significant as well.  
Table III.18: 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interaction 
Effects Deaf & Hearing 
Language Status minF'(1,61)= 0.072, p = .7894   n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,83)= 14.41, p = .0001 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,51)= 28.44, p = .0001 
 
Again, the pattern of responses of the hearing subjects was significantly different from the 
responses of the deaf subjects (see Figure III.11). As expected, there was no significant main effect 
of the variable 'Language Status'. 
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Figure III.11: Mean number of choices in % for each class of semantic relation (superordinate, 
coordinate, action and attribute) for deaf and hearing participants in the linguistic condition 
For the deaf subjects the differences between mean number of choices in % of the paradigmatic 
relations and the syntagmatic relations were significant (t-test for paired samples, t(19)=-10,720; 
p= .0001). The deaf participants chose 68% syntagmatic relations compared to 32% paradigmatic 
relations. Pair wise comparisons of superordinates, coordinates, actions and attributes revealed 
significant differences for all pairs (p=.0001), except for 'superordinates' and 'attributes'. Although 
deaf participants chose more often 'attributes' than 'superordinates' (50% compared to 45%), the 
t-test revealed no significant difference. 
For the hearing subjects the differences between mean number of choices in % of the 
paradigmatic relations and the syntagmatic relations were not significant. The deaf participants 
chose nearly as much syntagmatic relations (47%) as paradigmatic relations (53 %). The number 
of choices for superordinate items were high, followed by actions, coordinates and finally 
attributes. Post hoc paired samples t-tests revealed a significant difference between the number 
of choices for all classes of semantic relations except for superordinates and actions and 
coordinates and attributes. The most important semantic relations for hearing participants are 
'superordinates' (33%) and in the same extent 'actions' (30%). 
The ratios of the RTs for the paradigmatic relations and the syntagmatic relations were 
different for the deaf and hearing group. A t-test revealed a significant effect on the difference of 
these ratios (t(38)= -7,549, p=.0001).  
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A t-test for independent samples revealed a difference between the two groups of 
participants in rating all types of semantic relations. The hearing participants chose significantly 
more superordinates (t(38)= -4,742; p=.0001) and coordinates (t(38)= -4,886; p=.0001) than the 
deaf participant. The results for actions (t(38)= 9,111; p=.0001) and attributes (t(38)= 4,936; 
p=.0001) were the other way around, i.e. the deaf chose significantly more actions and attributes 
than the hearing (Bonferroni correction was taken into account, i.e. p=.0127).  
This outcome matches the results in Experiment 1, the verification task with signs. In the 
first study the deaf participants were faster in judging syntagmatic semantic relations than 
paradigmatic ones and consequently in study two they chose syntagmatic semantic relations more 
often than paradigmatic ones. For the hearing subjects the responses were the other way around. 
The overall pattern of results in Experiment two is similar to the one obtained in the first 
experiment.  
However, there were also some differences found. In experiment one the t-test for paired 
samples revealed significant differences between all types of semantic relations for the deaf 
group. In the second experiment no significant difference between superordinates and attributes 
was found. It seems as if for the deaf subjects the subjective value of superordinates (indicated in 
the triad-comparison-task) is weightier compared to the more objective one (indicated in the 
verification task). For the hearing, we found a higher subjective value for 'actions' in the second 
experiment compared to the first. This suggests that the subjective value for superordinates as 
well as for actions, is relatively high for both groups of participants. Importantly, the more 
'objective' data of experiment 1 point in a similar direction, but reveal a stronger 'modality effect'. 
Results for bilinguals compared to deaf signers in the linguistic condition 
Table III.20 shows the results of the deaf and bilingual participants in the triad-comparison- task 
with signs. Whereas the two-way repeated measures analysis of variance (4x2 ANOVA) revealed 
that - as expected- the main effect of 'Language Status' is not significant, a significant main effect 
of 'class of semantic relations' (F(3,38)= 156,027, p=.0001) was found. Surprisingly the interaction 
of the two factors was not significant, although the F1- and F2-values were significant. 
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Table III.19: 2 x 4 ANOVA: Main effects and interaction 
Effects Deaf & Bilinguals 
Language Status minF'(1,38)= 0.052, p = .8195   n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,83)= 32.12, p = .0001 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation F1(3,114)= 4.122, p = .008 
F2 (3,58)= 5.006, p = .004 
minF'(3,162)= 2.260, p = .0835   n.s. 
 
A more detailed analysis shows that the difference between deaf and bilinguals is not as big as 
between deaf and hearing. Similar to the deaf (68% to 32%) the bilingual subjects chose 63% 
syntagmatic relations compared to 37% paradigmatic relations and this difference was significant 
(t-test for paired samples, t(19)=-8,493; p=.0001). The number of choices for action items were 
high, followed by superordinates, attributes and finally coordinates. For the bilinguals post hoc 
paired samples t-tests revealed a significant difference between the number of choices for all 
classes of semantic relations (Bonferroni correction), except for superordinates and attributes.  
Despite of the response similarities between deaf and bilinguals the ratios of the RTs for 
the paradigmatic relations and the syntagmatic relations were different for the two groups. A t-
test revealed a significant effect on the difference of these ratios (t(38)= -2,147 p=.038).  
 
Figure III.12: Response Times of deaf and bilingual participants in the verification task with signs 
for items of the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
At the first glance it seemed as if the bilinguals chose more superordinates and less actions 
compared to the deaf participants. Nonetheless the t-test for independent samples revealed a 
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significant effect for actions (t(38)= 3,886; p=.0001), but not for superordinates. The responses for 
superordinates, coordinates and attributes were not significantly different (Bonferroni correction 
was taken into account, i.e. p=.0127). However, there was a trend for a significant difference 
between deaf and bilinguals in rating superordinates (t(38)= -2,104; p=.042), i.e. bilinguals chose 
more superordinates than deaf (28% to 23%). 
This outcome goes partly along with the results in Experiment 1. Compared to the deaf in 
the verification task the bilinguals were faster in judging superordinates and slower in judging 
actions. Likewise, in the triad-rating task the bilinguals chose less actions compared to the deaf 
and there was a tendency for choosing more superordinates. Although there was no difference in 
choosing coordinates and attributes, the results can be interpreted as some evidence for the 
difference of semantic relations in a the conceptual system relying mainly on signs and a 
conceptual system relying on both, signs and words. Similar to the deaf, the central type of 
semantic relation for the bilinguals is 'action'. Nonetheless, bilinguals also favorite as deaf 
participants attributes and as hearing superordinates and coordinates. The result supports the 
interpretation of the outcome in Experiment 1, i.e. that the bilingual semantic network is bounded 
to two linguistic systems, which influence each other. The results of the bilinguals in the triad-
comparison task with words point in the same direction.  
Results for bilinguals compared to hearing non-signers in the linguistic condition 
As in Experiment 1, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for the factor 'class of semantic 
relations' and its interaction with the factor 'group of participants'.  
Table III.20: 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF’: Main effects and interaction 
Effects Hearing & Bilingual 
Language Status minF'(1,38)= 9.999, p = 1.0   n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,90)= 12.95, p = .0001 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,136)= 4.473, p = .0050 
 
T-tests for independent samples revealed a significant difference between deaf and bilinguals for 
judging paradigmatic semantic relations (superordinates/coordinates) (t(38) = 5,169; p=.0001), as 
well as for syntagmatic semantic relations (actions and attributes) (t(38) = -5,169; p=.0001). 
Compared to the hearing participants the bilinguals chose less superordinates (significant 
difference: t(38) 4,002; p=.0001) and coordinates (the latter was marginally non-significant after 
Bonferroni correction: t(38) = 2.091; p=.043). The results for actions and attributes were the other 
way around, i.e. the bilinguals chose significantly more actions (t(38) = -4,531; p=.0001) and 
attributes (t(38) = -3,374; p=.002). 
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Figure III.13. Response Times of hearing and bilingual participants in the verification task with 
words for the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
The results of the bilinguals and hearing participants in the Triad-Comparison task are similar to 
the ones in the Verification Task. Considering a processing latency for bilinguals in Experiment 1, 
the higher number of choices for syntagmatic semantic relations in Experiment 2 corresponds with 
the faster RTs in Experiment 1 and the lower number of choices for paradigmatic semantic 
relations corresponds with the slower RTs.  
Thus, the outcome in the triad comparison task supports the speculative interpretation of 
the RTs in the verification task, i.e. in cross-modal bilinguals semantic categorization seems to be 
influenced by the by the sign as well as by the word lexicon. This thesis is supported by the fact, 
that the pattern of results of the bilinguals in the triad-comparison task with signs and with words 
is not significantly different (see Table III.22). 
Table III.21: 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF’: Main effects and interaction 
Effects Bilingual (Signs &Words) 
Experimental Condition minF'(1,65)= 0.181, p = .6719   n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,93)= 28.02 , p = .0001 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,136)= 0.824, p = .4836   n.s. 
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Figure III.14. Response Times of bilingual participants in the verification task with signs and 
words for the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 'Class of Semantic Relation', but no significant 
interaction. The bilinguals show the same pattern of results in both tasks, i.e. with signs and words. 
Results for deaf and hearing subjects in the pictorial condition 
For analyzing the data of the triad-comparison task with pictures, the same methods were used 
as for the task with words/signs.  
On the first glance, for the deaf and hearing group of participants the patterns of results 
in the pictorial task are similar to the ones in the linguistic task. The ANOVA for each group of 
participants confirmed this impression (see Table III.23).  
Table III.22. 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF’: Main effects and interaction 
Effects Deaf (Linguistic & Pictorial) Hearing (Linguistic & Pictorial) 
Experimental Condition minF'(1,58)= 0.003, 
p = .9499   n.s. 
minF'(1,22)= 0.956, 
p = .3386   n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,77)= 22.82, 
p = .0001 
minF'(3,104)= 13.82, 
p = .0001 
Language Status x Class of 
Semantic Relation 
minF'(3,78)= 3.396, 
p = .0220   n.s. 
minF'(3,63)= 1.400, 
p = .2509   n.s. 
 
The average number of choices in % of the deaf and hearing in the linguistic and pictorial task are 
presented in Figures III.15 and III.16.  
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Figure III.15. Response Times of deaf participants in the triad-cpmparison task with signs and 
words for the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
 
Figure III.16: Response Times of deaf participants in the triad-cpmparison task with signs and 
words for the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
It revealed for the deaf a significant main effect of 'class of semantic relation'. The factor 
'experimental condition' and the interaction were not significant. Post hoc paired samples t-tests 
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(after Bonferroni correction) revealed no significant differences between the number of choices 
for all classes of semantic relations in the linguistic and pictorial condition. The same result was 
conceived for the hearing: a significant effect of 'class of semantic relation' and non-significant 
effects of 'experimental condition' and the interaction. Thus, the responses of the deaf and 
hearing in the triad-comparison task are the same, whether the items are signs or pictures. 
Since the responses of the deaf and hearing in the linguistic task are the same as in the 
pictorial task, the differences between deaf and hearing in the pictorial experimental condition 
are the same too. The 4x2 ANOVA on the mean number of choices in % yielded a significant main 
effect of the variable 'Class of Semantic Relation'; the interaction of the two factors was significant 
as well. As expected there was no significant main effect of the variable 'Language Status' (see 
Table III.24). 
Table III.23: 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interaction 
Effects Deaf & Hearing (Pictorial) 
Language Status minF'(1,49)= 2.35, p = .1317   n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,86)= 15.52, p = .0001 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,171)= 23.44, p = .0001 
 
 
Figure III.17: Response Times of deaf and hearing participants in the triad-comparison task with 
pictures for the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
For the deaf subjects the differences between mean number of choices in % of the paradigmatic 
relations and the syntagmatic relations were significant (t-test for paired samples, t(19)=-10,783; 
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p= .0001). The deaf participants chose 68% syntagmatic relations compared to 32% paradigmatic 
relations. Pairwise comparisons of superordinates, coordinates, actions and attributes revealed 
significant differences for all pairs (p= .0001), except for 'superordinates' and 'attributes'. Although 
deaf participants chose more often 'attributes' than 'superordinates' (28% compared to 26%), the 
t-test revealed no significant difference.  
For the hearing subjects the differences between mean number of choices in % of the 
paradigmatic relations and the syntagmatic relations were not significant. The hearing participants 
chose nearly as much syntagmatic relations (46%) as paradigmatic relations (54 %). The number 
of choices for superordinate items were high, followed by actions, coordinates and finally 
attributes. Post hoc paired samples t-tests revealed a significant difference between the number 
of choices for all classes of semantic relations (p=.0001) except for coordinates and attributes. The 
most important semantic relations for hearing participants are 'superordinates' (36%) and in the 
same extent 'actions' (28%). 
The ratios of the RTs for the paradigmatic relations and the syntagmatic relations were 
different for the deaf and hearing group. A t-test revealed a significant effect on the difference of 
these ratios (t(38)= -6,627, p=.0001).  
A t-test for independent samples revealed a difference between the two groups of 
participants in rating all types of semantic relations. The hearing participants chose significantly 
more superordinates (t(38)= -4,749; p=.0001) and coordinates (t(38)= -8,023; p=.0001) than the 
deaf participant. The results for actions (t(38)= 6,794; p=.0001) and attributes (t(38)= 4,784; 
p=.0001) were the other way around, i.e. the deaf chose significantly more actions and attributes 
than the hearing.  
This outcome matches partly the results in Experiment 1, the verification task with signs. 
In the first study the deaf participants showed significantly different responses in the linguistic 
and pictorial task. This was explained by taking into account, that the responses for action-related 
picture might have been slow, because of their complexity. Furthermore the deaf might internally 
articulate sign-phrases as a respond to action and attribute-pictures. Thus, we found a significant 
interaction, i.e. a difference between linguistic and pictorial task. For the hearing the difference 
only disappeared by ignoring the data for action-related items. Taken together, the results in the 
verification task were not clearly to interpret whether the responses in the linguistic vs. pictorial 
mode were the same or different. Since we found in the triad-comparison task no differences 
between the two types of experimental conditions, it is hypothesized, that the differences in the 
verification task are actually due to inner articulation and picture complexity. The more subjective 
judgment in the triad-comparison supports this interpretation. 
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To sum up, for the triad-comparison task with pictures our prediction was that the pattern 
of responses would be similar to the one in the linguistic mode for each group of participants. The 
results are compatible with this prediction. The patterns of results in the linguistic and pictorial 
task are not different from each other in both groups of participants. Hence, the semantics of 
pictures might be influenced by the language system one uses. 
Results for bilinguals compared to deaf signers and hearing non-signers in the linguistic condition 
A repeated measures two-way analysis of variance (4x3 ANOVA) was performed on the mean 
latency per ‘class of semantic relation’ (4) and ‘language status’ (3). The ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect on the factor 'class of semantic relation' and a significant interaction 
between the two factors 'class of semantic relation' and ‘language status’. As expected, there was 
no main effect for ‘language status’. 
Table III.24: 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF’: Main effects and interaction 
Effects Deaf & Hearing & Bilingual 
Language Status minF'(2,81)= 0.645, p = .473   n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,106)= 22.72, p = .0001 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(6,265)= 6.625, p = .0001 
 
The results for deaf, hearing and bilingual participants in the pictorial condition are illustrated in 
Figure III.18. The most noticeable effect is that the responses of the bilinguals seem to lie exactly 
between the ones of the deaf and hearing. The mean number of choices for paradigmatic semantic 
relations is lower compared to hearing and higher compared to deaf. For syntagmatic semantic 
relations it is the other way around. 
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Figure III.18: Response Times of deaf, hearing and bilingual participants in the Triad-Comparison 
Task with pictures for the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
Comparing the bilinguals with the deaf group (4x2 ANOVA) a significant main effect for the factor 
‘class of semantic relation’ was found, but no significant interaction. The overall pattern of result 
for deaf and bilinguals in the pictorial condition do not differ in their characteristics. 
Table III.25: 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interaction 
Effects Deaf & Bilingual 
Language Status minF'(1,39)= 0.052, p = .8204   n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,83)= 22.57, p = .0001 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,80)= 0.640, p = .4092   n.s. 
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Figure III.19: Response Times of deaf and bilingual participants in the Triad-Comparison Task 
with pictures for the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
A t-test for independent samples revealed a difference between the two groups of participants in 
rating all types of semantic relations. The deaf participants chose significantly more actions (t(38)= 
4,187; p=.0001) and less coordinates (t(38)= -4,267; p=.0001) than the bilingual participant. The 
results for superordinates (t(38)= 6,794; p=.0001) and attributes (t(38)= 4,784; p=.0001) were not 
significantly different, but there was a trend for bilinguals to choose somewhat more 
superordinates and less attributes. 
The comparison of the bilingual with the hearing group revealed a significant main effect 
for the factor 'class of semantic relations' and the interaction, but no main effect for the factor 
‘Language status’. 
Table III.26: 2 x 4 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interaction 
Effects Hearing & Bilingual 
Language Status minF'(1,39)= 0.052, p = .473   n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,153)= 23.94, p = .0001 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,165)= 6.041, p = .0007 
 
T-tests for independent samples showed a significant difference between hearing and bilinguals 
in judging the superordinates (t(38) = 2.857; p=.007) and attributes (t(38) = -2.902; p=.006), but 
no difference in judging coordinates and actions.  
 
Triad-Comparison Task (Pictorial Condition)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Superordinate Coordinate Action Attribute
Class of Semantic Relations
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
c
h
o
ic
e
s
 i
n
 %
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
Deaf Bilingual
128 
 
Figure III.20: Response Times of hearing and bilingual participants in the Triad-Comparison Task 
with pictures for the semantic classes 'superordinate', 'coordinate', 'action' and 'attribute' 
In summary, the bilinguals responded significantly different to coordinates and actions compared 
to the deaf, and significantly different to superordinates and attributes compared to the hearing. 
Comparing the bilinguals with the hearing group significant main effects and a significant 
interaction was found. In contrast, the comparison of the bilingual with the deaf group revealed 
no significant interaction, which means that the overall patterns of results in the picture task did 
not differ. The latter result goes confirm with the results in Experiment 1, i.e. the Verification Task 
with linguistic signs and pictures. As in Experiment 1 the overall pattern of results in the pictorial 
task differed between bilinguals and hearing but not between bilinguals and deaf. In contrast, the 
overall RTs of the bilinguals in Experiment 1 with pictures are more similar to the ones of the 
hearing group. Therefore, it was assumed that the bilinguals performed the verification task with 
pictures by relying primarily on their word-lexicon rather than on the sign lexicon, because the 
internal articulation of words is faster than the articulation of signs and as a consequence the RTs 
were lower for bilinguals.  
The results in the triad-comparison task now show again that the overall pattern of results 
between bilinguals and deaf are similar rather than between bilinguals and hearing. This means 
that although the bilinguals rely primarily on their word-lexicon while performing the task, the 
bilingual’s recognition of a semantic relation between two pictures is also influenced by the 
structure of the sign language system.  
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Results for bilingual subjects in the linguistic (words and signs) and pictorial condition 
As reported before, there was no significant interaction of the responses of bilinguals in the triad-
comparison task with signs compared to the ones in the task with words. The bilinguals show the 
same pattern of results in the two linguistic tasks. Thus, it is interesting to see, whether the pattern 
of results in the pictorial task is different from the ones in the linguistic task. A 4x3 ANOVA was 
performed on the mean latency per relation category and experimental condition.  
Table III.27: 3 x 4 ANOVA/minF’: Main effects and interaction 
Effects Bilinguals (Signs/Words/Pictures) 
Experimental Condition minF'(2,137)= 0.418, p = .6587   n.s. 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(3,113)= 27.66, p = .0001 
Language Status x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(6,220)= 1.413, p = .2103   n.s. 
 
The main effect of the variable 'class of semantic relations' was significant. The effect of the 
variable 'experimental condition' and of the interaction of the two factors was not significant. This 
means, that not only the responses of the bilinguals in the two linguistic tasks (signs and words) 
are the same. Moreover the pattern of results in the pictorial task does not differ from the ones 
in the two linguistic tasks.  
 
Figure III.21: Mean RTs for each class of semantic relation (superordinate, coordinate, action and 
attribute) for each task condition (signs, word and pictures) 
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Thus, although the bilinguals chose in the pictorial task less action-related pictures. Post hoc 
paired samples t-tests revealed only for 'action'-pictures a significant difference to 'action'-signs 
(t(38)=3,899; p= .001) and 'action'-words (t(38)=3,851; p= .001. 
As in Experiment one the only deviation among the patterns in each condition was found 
for the 'action-class' in the pictorial condition of the Triad-Comparison Task. In the Verification 
Task the bilinguals responded slower to 'actions' and in Triad-Comparison Task, they chose less 
action-pictures compared to actions presented as signs or words. The deviation in the Verification 
Task was explained by the higher visual complexity of the pictures which leads to higher RTs. The 
results in the triad-comparison might have the same reason. All groups of participants chose in 
the pictorial task less action-related pictures than action-related signs or words in the linguistic 
task. It seems as if the higher complexity somehow reduces the 'attraction' of the action-pictures.  
However, the 4x3 ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between the factors 
'experimental condition' and 'class of semantic relations'. Although the mean 'Number of choices 
in %' were different in each condition, the overall pattern of results did not differ. In sum, the 
results support the interpretation of the outcome in Experiment one, i.e. they indicate an 
influence of both language systems in cross-modal bilinguals on semantic categorization. 
2.3. Measurement of Syntagmatic Semantic Relations in Deaf with a 
Verification Task with Nonpolycomponential and Polycomponential Signs  
Since we found in the Verification Task and the Triad-Comparison Task some evidence for stronger 
semantic relations between verbs and attributes to a specific noun in deaf participants, in 
Experiment 3 it was further investigated, whether a meaningful handshape in a classifier 
morpheme, i.e. a polycomponential sign, leads to stronger semantic relations between 
action/attribute and a related noun. The main question addressed is whether polycomponential 
actions and attributes, which contain a linguistic unit that reflects salient characteristics of the 
referent, have a stronger semantic relation to a noun referent as nonpolycomponential actions 
and attributes, which do not incorporate features of the noun-referent. Important, although the 
polycomponential sign reflects characteristics of the referent, there is no phonological similarity 
between the presented stimulus item 1 and 2 (see below). 
Method 
Participants  
The participants were the same 22 deaf, who performed in experiment 1 and 2. 
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Stimulus materials  
The experimental material consisted of 160 pairs of signs composed of 20 repeatedly presented 
nouns (stimulus 1) and 80 semantically related and 80 unrelated actions and attributes (stimulus 
2). The semantically related items were further divided in 40 polycomponential action/attribute 
signs and 40 nonpolycomponential action/attribute signs. 
The duration of the sign-videos varied between 578 ms and 1754 ms (Mean = 1616 ms). 
Mean duration of videos for nonpolycomponential action-related items were 1276 ms and 
nonpolycomponential attributive 1312 items ms. Mean duration of videos for polycomponential 
action-related items were 1322 ms and polycomponential attributive items 1357 ms. The 
correlation between video duration and response time of the participants was not significant 
(r=.137).  
Table III.28: Example of a basic level item and selected related and unrelated stimulus set 
Taxonomy Stimulus 1 Related Stimulus 2 Unrelated Stimulus2 
Basic Level Buch (book)   
Nonpolycomponential-
Action 
 kaufen (buy) bauen (built) 
Polycomponential-
Action 
 lesen (read) kochen (cook) 
Nonpolycomponential -
Attribute 
 neu (new) verrückt (crazy) 
Polycomponential -
Attribute 
 dick (thick) langsam (slow) 
(see for an visualized example in Appendix C) 
 
The stimuli were selected systematically according to the criteria defined in Experiment 1. For this 
experiment it was essential, that there was no phonological similarity between the basic level item 
(stimulus 1) and the related polycomponential and nonpolycomponential sign (stimulus 2). 
Procedure 
In a verification task a group of deaf participants had to judge the presence or absence of a 
semantic relation between two signs, i.e a noun combined with a nonpolycomponential or a 
polycomponential action/attribute. The reaction time required to judge whether there was a 
semantic relation between the two signs was measured. The procedure in Experiment 3 was the 
same as in Experiment 1. Since the test items used in Experiment 3 were different from the ones 
in Experiment 1, it was possible to test the deaf participants at the same day with both tasks. 
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Results 
Separate statistical analyses were conducted for response times (RTs) and error rates of test-
items. Distractor-items were not analyzed and are not reported. 12 items (3 in each group of 
items) were removed from the item lists (see appendix), either because the error rate was higher 
than 20 % or the 'familiarity' was not within the range of 80-100%.  
Error rates of all participants, were on the average about 4-6% and they correlated 
positively with reaction times (Signs: r = 0.56, p = .01; i.e. no speed accuracy trade off was found. 
Error analyses were not significant and are not reported. Outliers were removed from the data. 
This procedure eliminated less than 4% of the data. The mean response times are given in Table 
III.30. 
Table III.29: Mean RTs and Standard Deviations (in brackets) for deaf participants in Experiment 3 
 Action Attribute 
Nonpolycomponential 1544 
(199) 
1628 
(176) 
Polycomponential 1465 
(174) 
1511 
(179) 
Total 1504 
(186) 
1570 
(177) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA performed on the mean latency per relation category of deaf participants: 2 'class 
of semantic relations' and 2 'componential type'.  
Table III.30. 2 x 2 ANOVA/minF’: Main effects and interaction 
Effects Deaf Participants 
Componential Type minF'(1,53)= 12,93, p = .0008 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(1,47)= 3.752, p = .0588   n.s. 
Componential Type x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(1,47)= 3.752, p = .5699   n.s. 
 
The main effect of the variable 'Componential Type' was significant. The t-test for paired samples 
revealed a difference between mean RTs of nonpolycomponential actions and polycomponential 
actions (t(21)=3,993; p= .001). Mean RTs for polycomponential actions were 79 ms faster than for 
nonpolycomponential actions. The difference between mean RTs of nonpolycomponential 
attributes and polycomponential attributes (t(21)=4,279; p= .0001) was also significant. Mean RTs 
for polycomponential attributes were 117 msec faster than for nonpolycomponential attributes. 
In general deaf participants responded faster to polycomponential signs compared to 
nonpolycomponential signs.  
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Figure III.22: Mean RTs for each class of semantic relation (action and attribute) and 
componential type of item (nonpoly- and polycomponential) 
The main effect of the variable 'class of semantic relations' and the interaction of the two factors 
were not significant. Although in general the deaf participants responded similar to attributes 
compared to verbs, the more detailed analysis revealed a difference between mean RTs of 
nonpolycomponential actions and attributes (t(21)=-3,322; p= .003). Mean RTs for 
nonpolycomponential actions were 84 msec faster than for nonpolycomponential attributes. The 
difference between mean RTs of polycomponential actions and attributes was not significant (t-
test for paired samples (t(21)=-2,185; p= .040) (Bonferroni correction: p< 0.025). Mean RTs for 
nonpolycomponential actions were only 46 msec faster than for nonpolycomponential attributes. 
In detail deaf participants responded faster to nonpolycomponential action signs compared to 
attribute signs. However, this difference was not found for polycomponential signs. 
As expected, some evidence was found suggesting that polycomponential signs have a 
stronger semantic relation to a noun-referent than nonpolycomponential signs. Although in sign 
recognition, nonpolycomponential signs are identified earlier than polycomponential complex 
signs (Emmorey & Corina, 1990), in semantic verification task it is the other way around. 
Polycomponential signs, which contain a linguistic unit that reflects salient characteristics of the 
referent, have a stronger semantic relation to a noun referent as nonpolycomponential actions 
and attributes, which do not incorporate features of the noun-referent. 
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2.4. Triad-Comparison Task with Nonpolycomponential and Polycomponential 
Signs  
In Experiment 4 – a triad-comparison task with nonpolycomponential and polycomponential 
signs- addresses the same research question as Experiment 3. It explores whether the subjective 
judgment of meaning similarities between polycomponential actions and attributes corresponds 
with the results found in the verification task. The main question addressed is whether deaf 
signers judge polycomponential action- and attribute-related signs as stronger related to a noun 
referent than nonpolycomponential actions and attributes.  
Method 
Participants  
The participants were the same 22 deaf (group 1), who performed in experiment 1, 2 and 3. The 
test-latency between Experiment 1 + 3 and Experiment 2 + 4 was two weeks. 
Stimulus materials  
The experimental materials overlapped those of Experiment 1. By removing the unrelated items 
(distractors), the test list contained 20 basic level target items (stimulus 1) combined randomly 
with 2 (stimulus 2+3) of 4 related items (nonpolycomponential action, nonpolycomponential 
attribute, polycomponential action and polycomponential attribute, i.e. 6 combinations within 
one set. Every possible combination of the items within a taxonomy was realized. Thus, there were 
120 combinations of a target item with two related items. The presentation position was 
completely counterbalanced.  
Table III.31: Example stimulus set (1 out of 20) of a basic level item in combination with two related items 
Taxonomy Stimulus 1 Stimulus 2 Stimulus 3 
Related Noun book (Buch)   
Nonpoly-Action + Nonpoly-Attribute  buy (kaufen) new (neu) 
Nonpoly-Action + Poly-Attribute  buy (kaufen) thick (dick) 
Poly-Action + Nonpoly-Action  read (lesen) buy (kaufen) 
Poly-Action + Poly-Attribute  read (lesen) thick (dick) 
Nonpoly-Attribute + Poly-Action  new (neu) read (lesen) 
Poly-Attribute + Nonpoly-Attribute  thick (dick) new (neu) 
(see Appendix C for the whole list of items) 
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Procedure 
The procedure in Experiment 4 was exactly the same as in Experiment 2. Deaf participants were 
asked to decide which of two presented items had a stronger semantic relation to another 
presented target item. The number of choices in favor to a specific semantic relation was 
measured for each group of participants. It was expected that the responses in the triad-
comparison would correspond to the responses in the verification task for each group of 
participants, i.e. the lower the mean response time for polycomponential/ nonpolycomponential 
actions and attributes, respectively, the higher the relative number of choices for these groups of 
items.  
Results 
Two separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs were conducted on participants and items. The pre-analysis of the 
data is similar to that of the previous experiment. Each participant's mean error rates (missings) 
and number of choices in % for correct trials were determined for each condition. The same 12 
items (3 in each group of items) which were removed from the item list in the previous 
experiment, were removed in the Triad-Task too. Error analysis were not significant and are not 
reported. Outliers were removed from the data. This procedure eliminated less than 4% of the 
data. The mean number of choices in % for correct trials are given in Table III.33: 
Table III.32: Mean number of choices in % for correct trials and Standard Deviations (in brackets) for deaf 
participants in Experiment 3 
 Action Attribute 
Nonpolycomponential 18 
(4) 
10 
(3) 
Polycomponential 38 
(5) 
34 
(3) 
Total 28 
(4,5) 
22 
(3) 
 
A 2 x2 ANOVA was performed on the mean latency per relation category of deaf participants: 2 
'class of semantic relations' x 2 'componential type’ ANOVA (see Table III.34). 
Table III.33. 2 x 2 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interaction 
Effects Deaf Participants 
Componential Type minF'(1,34)= 19.15, p = .0002 
Class of Semantic Relation minF'(1,31)= 0.984, p = .3287   n.s. 
Componential Type x Class of Semantic Relation minF'(1,30)= 0.028, p = .866   n.s. 
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Comparable with the results in the verification task with nonpoly- and polycomponential signs, 
the main effect of the variable 'Componential Type' was significant. The t-test for paired samples 
revealed a difference between mean number of choices of nonpolycomponential actions and 
polycomponential actions (t(21)=-11,592; p= .0001). The mean number of choices for 
polycomponential actions were 20 % higher than for nonpolycomponential actions. The difference 
between mean number of choices of nonpolycomponential attributes and polycomponential 
attributes (t(21)=-19,684; p= .0001) was also significant. Mean number of choices for 
polycomponential attributes were 24 % higher than for nonpolycomponential attributes. In 
general deaf participants chose more to polycomponential signs compared to 
nonpolycomponential signs.  
 
Figure III.23: Mean Number of Choices % for each class of semantic relation (action and 
attribute) and componential type of item (nonpoly- and polycomponential) 
The main effect of the variable 'class of semantic relations' and the interaction of the two factors 
were not significant. Comparable with the results in the verification task the mean number of 
choices in % for action-items was similar to the number of choices for attribute-items. However, 
the more detailed analysis revealed a difference between mean number of choices of 
nonpolycomponential actions and attributes (t(21)=7,187; p= .0001). Mean number of choices for 
nonpolycomponential actions were 8 % higher than for nonpolycomponential attributes. The 
difference between mean number of choices of polycomponential actions and attributes was also 
significant (t-test for paired samples, t(21)=2,740; p= .0012) (Bonferroni correction: p< 0.025). 
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Choices for nonpolycomponential actions were 4 % higher than for nonpolycomponential 
attributes. In detail deaf participants chose more action-signs compared to attribute-signs. This 
result confirms the outcome in Experiment 1. 
With this outcome some additional evidence was found for the hypothesis that 
polycomponential signs have a stronger semantic relation to a noun-referent than 
nonpolycomponential signs in the semantic lexicon of deaf participants. The semantic relation 
between a polycomponential sign and a noun referent seems to be stronger compared to the 
semantic relation between a nonpolycomponential sign and a noun referent. The latter is 
confirmed not only by faster responses to, but also by a higher number of choices for 
polycomponential signs.  
2.5. Measurement of Nonpolycomponential and Polycomponential Signs 
related to a Noun Referent in a Recognition Memory Task 
Studies of memory errors revealed that when participants study lists of words, they think of 
semantic associates to those words during study and as a consequence, they make false 
recognitions on the basis of this prior activation ('False Recognition Effect' see Deese 1959; 
Underwood 1965, Anisfeld & Knapp 1968; Hall & Kozloff 1973; Roedinger & McDermott 1995; 
Robinson & Roediger 1997; Seamon, Luo & Gallo 1998; Seamon, Luo, Schlegel, Greene & 
Goldenberg 2000). 
The goal of Experiment 5 was to study false memory for associated signs of German Sign 
Language and to determine if deaf signers would made false recognitions of signs that were 
semantic associates of previously presented signs. Since false recognition is influenced by the 
strength of semantic relatedness between items it was hypothesized that the highest false 
memory would occur for polycomponential associates, because they contain a meaningful 
component that expresses an object characteristic of the previously studied sign-referent and 
therefore have a stronger semantic relation to a noun referent than nonpolycomponential 
associates. The main question addressed was, whether signers in a recognition memory task 
falsely recognize more polycomponential signs than nonpolycomponential signs. 
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Method 
Participants  
The participants were 20 deaf signers out of the group, who performed in experiment 1, 2 and 3. 
Two signers were not able to attend the test at the obligatory testing-date. The test-latency 
between Experiment 1 + 3, Experiment 2 + 4 and Experiment 5 was about two weeks. 
Stimulus Materials  
The experimental materials consisted of four study-lists, each containing 20 target items and the 
accompanying four recognition-lists, each containing the 20 previously studied target items and 
in addition 40 nonstudied items. The nonstudied material consisted of 20 signs strongly associated 
with the studied signs and 20 non-related distractors. Again, the associated signs were divided 
into two groups of 10 items, i.e. polycomponential and nonpolycomponential associates (see 
Table 2.33). The studied items as well as the unstudied items were a balanced mixture of signs for 
objects, actions and attributes. The presentation position of target signs, polycomponential signs, 
nonpolycomponential signs and distractors in the recognition list was completely 
counterbalanced. 
Table III.34: Example stimulus set (2 out of 4x20) of target level item in combination with 1. 
polycomponential sign and distractor and 2. a nonpolycomponential sign and distractor 
Target Polycomponential 
Associate 
Nonolycomponential 
Associate 
Distracter 
Glas (glass) spülen (wash up)  Feder (feather) 
bügeln (iron)  Hemd (shirt) geheim (secret) 
(see Appendix E for the whole list of items) 
Procedure  
In Experiment 5 a group of deaf participants was presented in four different sessions with a list of 
20 signs to study. Subsequently, after the presentation of the list, they were asked whether the 
signs in a second list (60 items) occurred in the first list. The second list contained the 20 target 
signs, i.e. the signs presented in the first list, 10 polycomponential and 10 nonpolycomponential 
associates of the target signs and 20 distracters. The number of false positives and mean reaction 
times for false positives was measured. It was expected that the probability of false recognition of 
a nonstudied sign would increase with its associative strength to a studied sign. Thus the number 
of false positives for polycomponential signs should be high compared to nonpolycomponential 
signs and distractors.  
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The participants were tested in four different sessions at regular intervals of 
approximately 30 minutes. The standardized test-instructions were computer-based and 
informed the participants that they were taking part in a memory recognition experiment and that 
they would see 20 different signs, to which they should pay close attention because they were 
going to be asked to recognize them later. The study-session and recognition-session were 
demonstrated and the participants were given a practice trial. After the instruction and practice 
trials participants were informed that they had to press the space bar to begin presentation on 
the first study list. 
The signs of the first list were displayed in a continuous sequence in the center of the 
computer screen and remained corresponding to their video-length. Each sign was followed by a 
blank screen for 2 sec before the next item appeared. Following the presentation of the final word 
in the list, the participants were asked to solve a set of four simple two-digit addition problems. 
After approximately 30 seconds a yes/no recognition test was administered to each participant. 
The recognition test items were presented individually on the computer screen and remained 
visible corresponding to their video length. Each video was followed by a blank screen for 2 
seconds. The participants were instructed to press the right button of a 'Game Port Checker' if he 
or she thought the presented sign was identical with a sign studied before and the left button if 
he/she thought it was a new sign. The participants were told to do so as accurately and as quickly 
as possible at any time from the start of the first test item, but fast responses did not alter the 
timing. After each session the participants had a rest-period for 30 minutes. 
Results 
The pre-analysis of the data is similar to the ones of the previous experiments. Each participant's 
mean error rates (false positives and missings) and response times for false positives were 
determined for all sessions. One participant, 2 polycomponential, 3 nonpolycomponential and 10 
distracter signs were excluded from the data, because of high missing rates. 
Two separate ANOVAs were conducted on participants and items. Based on these two 
analysis, min F' was calculated. The one-way ANOVA was conducted on the crossed within-subject 
factors 'type of associative' with three levels (polycomponential, nonpolycomponential and non-
related distractor). Dependent variables were Number of False Positives in % (fp in %) and 
Response Time in Milliseconds (RT in ms). Two separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the 
two factors. In addition multiple comparisons were performed in order to establish which pairs of 
levels are actually significant (Bonferroni procedure). An overview of the data is given in Table 
III.36. 
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Table III.35: False Positives in % and Response Time in ms for deaf signers in the recognition memory task 
 Polycomponential Nonpolycomponential Non-Related Distracter 
False Positives 23% (15) 11% (9) 9% (10) 
Response Time 1669 ms (192) 1537 ms (183) 1498 ms (187) 
(see Appendix E for detailed information) 
 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA of mean 'False positives in %' revealed a significant effect. 
The influence of 'Type of Associative' on 'Response Time' was also significant (see Table III.37). 
Table III.36: One-way repeated measures ANOVA/minF' 
Effects False Positives in % Response Time 
Type of Associative minF'(2,175)= 10.06, p = .0001 minF'(2,174)= 6.454, p = .002 
 
 
Figure III.24. Mean False Positives in % of Deaf Participants in the Memory Recognition Task with 
Polycomponential and Nonpolycomponential Signs 
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Figure III.25. Mean Response Time in ms for false positives of Deaf Participants in the Memory 
Recognition Task with Polycomponential and Nonpolycomponential Signs 
An integrated chart comparing the mean score of 'False Positives' and 'Response Time' in each 
level is shown below (Figure III.26). On the first glance the distribution of errors and response 
times seem to be different for all levels of the factor 'Type of Associative', i.e. the largest number 
of errors and highest response times for polycomponential signs, followed by 
nonpolycomponential signs and finally distractors.  
Pairwise comparisons of the differences in the means while adjusting the significance level 
using the Bonferroni procedure were performed in order to reveal which pairs of levels are 
actually significantly different. The number of errors as well as the response times for level one, 
‘polycomponential’, was significantly different to all other levels (p.=0001). Non-significant 
differences were found between level two and three, ‘nonpolycomponential’ and ‘non-related 
distractor’, although the analyses of 'Response Time' revealed a trend for a significant difference 
between level 2 and 3 (p=.057).  
Memory Recognition Task
(Mean Response Time in ms)
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
Polycomponential Nonpolycomponential Non-Related (Distracter)
Type of Associate
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 T
im
e
 i
n
 m
s
142 
 
Figure III.26: Integrated Chart of Mean False Positives in % and Mean Response Time in % of Deaf 
Participants in the Memory Recognition Task with Polycomponential and Nonpolycomponential 
Signs 
In conclusion the experimental hypothesis that 'Type of Associative' has a significant effect on 
overall accuracy and response time and that in particular the associative type of level one 
'Polycomponential' significantly decreases accuracy and increases response time over all other 
types of information is accepted. 
3. Testing the Influence of Iconicity on Categorization 
3.1. Measurement of Semantic Relations between with iconic signs/non-iconic 
words and pictures in a Verification Task with Deaf, Hearing and Bilingual 
Participants 
Based on the theoretical considerations discussed in Part II section 2.4., a verification task with 
iconic signs was developed to explore the potential cognitive effect of sign language iconicity on 
semantic categorization processes. In particular, the empirical study presented here aimed at 
investigating whether the iconicity of a sign affects the structure of the semantic network of deaf 
and hearing signers in the way that certain characteristics, which are highlighted by the iconic 
aspect of a sign, play a central role in the corresponding semantic concept. In other words, when 
a sign in German Sign Language (DGS) like ‘house’ provides an image of a prototypical house in 
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the way that the articulators (the hands) sign the trace of the shape of a house with a pointed 
roof, does the roof then play a special role in the semantic concept of the house? Thus, the 
hypothesis tested in the verification task was that the Response Times (RTs) of the deaf and 
bilingual participants for the pictures which correspond to the iconic features of the signs are 
shorter than the response times for the pictures which do not correspond to the iconic features. 
Since the translated equivalents of the signs in spoken language were all non-iconic, the response 
times of the hearing participants were expected not to differ for both types of pictures. 
Method 
Participants  
The participants were the same 20 deaf, 20 hearing native cross-modal bilinguals and 20 hearing 
who performed in experiment 1 and 2, i.e. the verification task and triad-comparison task with 
signs/words and pictures. Two deaf signers were not able to attend the test at the obligatory 
testing-date 
Stimulus Materials  
The experimental material consisted of 120 item-pairs composed of 20 repeatedly presented 
signs/words and 60 semantically related and 60 unrelated pictures. The sign/word represented a 
specific semantic concept, for example Adler (‘eagle’) (Fig. 3). In this stimulus set, the semantically 
related items were Schnabel (‘beak’), Flügel (‘wing’) and Kralle (‘claw’). Not semantically related 
were Bagger (‘digger’), Kette (‘necklace’) and Koffer (‘suitcase’). One of the related pictures 
corresponded to the iconic aspect of the presented sign (iconic sign-picture correspondence), the 
other pictures did not correspond (no correspondence). Referring to the example, the 
corresponding picture was the picture with the crooked beak (marked black in Figure III.27), which 
is typical for eagles. In the word condition no picture corresponded to any of the words because 
none of them were iconic. 
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Figure III.27: Example Stimulus-Set ‘Adler’ with related pictures (test-items) and unrelated 
pictures (distractors). One stimulus-set out of twenty 
The German Sign for ‘eagle’ highlights the beak of an eagle by (1) the shape of the articulator 
(bended index-finger), (2) location of the hand (in the area of the signers nose), and (3) the 
movement of the hand (tracing the shape of the ‘beak’). To confirm our hypothesis that the iconic 
features of a sign have an impact on the related semantic concept, the deaf participants and the 
bilingual participants had to react fastest to the black-marked beak-picture. 
Procedure 
For deaf and bilingual participants the sign-video and the picture were displayed one at a time on 
a computer monitor. Timing and recording responses were under program control. In order to 
prevent visual masking, the sign-video was centered at the top of the monitor, the picture at the 
bottom.  
The words were presented via two loudspeakers which were attached to the computer. 
In addition to the acoustic presentation a visual marker (icon of a loudspeaker) appeared on the 
screen at the same position where the video was presented for the deaf participants. At the 
bottom of the screen the picture appeared. A sign was considered to begin when the hand(s) 
entered signing space and to end when the hand(s) began to move out of the sign configuration 
and back down to resting position. 
The deaf, hearing and bilingual participants were seated directly in front of the monitor at 
a distance of about 60 cm with the two index fingers resting on two response buttons. Response 
times were measured from the onset of the target item. The participants were informed that they 
 145 
would see several pairs of items. The interstimulus interval between the first and the second item 
was 1000 ms. The signs and spoken words were grouped in three series of 40 + 40 + 40 trials (120 
trials), with 2 rest periods. Each pair of items (sign-picture vs. word-picture) was followed by a 
blank screen for 2 seconds before the next pair appeared. The right-handed subject was instructed 
to press the right button if there was a semantic relation between the two presented items and 
the left button if there was none. Left-handed participants used the response buttons the other 
way around. Equal numbers of related and non-related items were assigned to the test list 
randomly. The subject was told to perform the task as accurately and quickly as possible. The 
subject could respond anytime from the start of the second test item, but fast responses did not 
alter the timing of stimulus presentation. Each subject was instructed by a standardized 
explanation (signed and written vs. spoken and written) and was given 10 practice trials. 
Results 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted. The within-subject factor was ‘type of correspondence' with two 
levels: 1. sign-picture-correspondence and 2. no-correspondence. The between subject factor was 
'language status': deaf & hearing, deaf & bilingual-signs, hearing &bilingual-words and bilinguals-
signs & bilinguals-words, respectively. Dependent variable was Response Time (RT) in Milliseconds 
(ms).  
The average response time data of deaf (signs) (n=20), hearing (words) (n=20) and 
bilingual participants (signs and words) (n=20) are shown Table III.38. 
Table III.37: Mean RTs and Standard Deviations (in brackets) for deaf, hearing and bilingual participants in 
Experiment 6: Verifications Task with Iconic Signs 
 Deaf-Signs Hearing-Words Bilinguals-Signs Bilinguals-Words 
Sign-Picture-
Correspondence 
724,94 
(89,80) 
790,17 
(101,94) 
753,13 
(98,31) 
727,60 
(96,63) 
No Correspondence 885,39 
(97,10) 
779,57 
(99,10) 
881,92 
(102,38) 
832,83 
(101,06) 
Total 805,16 
(93,45) 
817,52 
(100,52) 
784,87 
(100,35) 
780,21 
(98,85) 
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Table III.38: 2 x 2 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interactions 
Main Effects & 
Interaction 
Deaf & Hearing Deaf & Bilingual Hearing & 
Bilingual 
Bilingual & 
Bilingual 
Language Status minF'(1,42)=0.435, 
p = .5127…n.s. 
minF'(1,42)= 
0.173, 
p = .6795   n.s. 
minF'(1,85)= 
0.250 
p = .618   n.s. 
minF'(1,46)= 
1.423, 
p = .2391   n.s. 
Type of 
Correspondence 
minF'(1,65)= 7.699, 
p = .0073 
minF'(1,70)= 
26.26, 
p = .0001 
minF'(1,66)= 
3.031, 
p = .0864  n.s. 
minF'(1,74)= 
17.80, 
p = .0001 
Language Status x 
Correspondence 
minF'(1,42)= 84.04, 
p = .0001 
minF'(1,54)= 
2.589 
p = .1135   n.s. 
minF'(1,92)= 
28.60, 
p = .0001 
minF'(1,87)= 
0.776, 
p = .3805   n.s. 
 
Comparing deaf and hearing participants the analysis revealed a non-significant main effect for 
the variable Language Status’, which means that the overall mean response time in a sign-picture 
vs. word–picture task for deaf and hearing participants is the same. The latter result differs from 
the one in Experiment 1 (Verification Task with Signs vs. Words vs. Pictures), where the response 
time of the deaf was always higher compared to the ones of the hearing participants. It seems 
that the deaf participants were able to compensate for their usually longer response times on 
pictures compared to hearing participants by responding very fast on pictures with a 
correspondence to the iconic sign. 
 
Figure III.28: Mean response times of deaf and hearing participants for the iconic sign-picture 
and word-picture combinations. The first columns represent the mean responses to the pictures 
which correspond to iconic signs and to their translations into spoken words, respectively, 
whereas the second columns show mean response times to pictures which correspond to non-
iconic signs and to their spoken-word translations 
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However, the main effect for the variable ‘Type of correspondence’ and the interaction was 
significant. Moreover, a t-test for paired samples revealed a difference in response time for deaf 
participants between items with iconic sign-picture correspondence vs. no correspondence 
(t(19)= -18,998; p= .0001). Mean response times for items with iconic sign-picture-
correspondence were 160,45 ms faster than the ones for items without such correspondence. For 
the hearing participants no differences in judging the two categories of word-picture 
combinations (word translations of iconic vs. word translations of non-iconic signs) were found. 
This result was expected since none of the words showed any iconic correspondence to the 
pictures. 
The responses of the bilingual participants in the sign-picture task were similar to the deaf 
participants. The analysis revealed no main effect of the variable ‘Language Status' and the 
interaction, but a main effect for the variable ‘Type of correspondence’.  
 
Figure III.29: . Mean response times of deaf and bilingual participants for the iconic sign-picture 
combinations. The first columns represent the mean responses to the pictures which correspond 
to iconic, whereas the second columns show mean response times to pictures which correspond 
to non-iconic signs 
The overall pattern of results of deaf and bilingual participants was almost the same. Just like the 
deaf the bilingual participants showed a significant difference between mean response times for 
sign-picture-pairs with and with no iconic correspondence (t(19)= -8,138; p= .0001). Mean 
response times for items with iconic sign-picture-correspondence were 128,79 ms faster than the 
ones for items without such correspondence. 
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Figure III.30: Mean response times of hearing and bilingual participants for the word-picture 
combinations. The first columns represent the mean responses to the pictures which correspond 
to iconic signs whereas the second columns show mean response times to pictures which 
correspond to non-iconic signs. Between the pictures and the presented spoken words no iconic 
correspondence existed 
As already mentioned for the hearing participants no differences in judging the two categories of 
word-picture combinations (word translations of iconic vs. word translations of non-iconic signs) 
were found. Yet, more astonishing were the response times of the bilinguals in the word-condition 
of the task. The analysis of variance revealed no significant main effect of the variable ‘Language 
Status’ and ‘Type of correspondence’, but a significant interaction. Thus the overall pattern of 
results of hearing and bilingual participants is different. 
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Figure III.31: Mean response times of bilingual participants for the sign-picture and word-picture 
combinations. The first columns represent the mean responses to the pictures which correspond 
to iconic signs whereas the second columns show mean response times to pictures which do not 
correspond to iconic signs. Between the pictures and the presented spoken words no iconic 
correspondence existed 
Although between words and pictures there was obviously no iconic correspondence, the 
bilinguals showed in the word-picture-task significantly different response times compared to the 
hearing participants, but similar results to their responses in the sign-picture-task. The mean 
response time for the words which corresponded to iconic signs was about 105,23 ms faster than 
the response times for the words which corresponded to the non-iconic signs (t(19)= -8,903; p= 
.0001). The analysis show, that for bilinguals the overall pattern of results is the same. No main 
effect for language status and the interaction between language status and type of 
correspondence was found. There was only a main effect for ‘Type of Correspondence’. Thus, the 
bilinguals showed the same pattern of responses whether they performed the task with words or 
with signs. This result indicates that the iconic base of a sign is prominent in the conceptualization 
of the sign’s referent. 
This outcome supports the hypothesis that the iconicity of a sign affects the structure of 
the semantic network of deaf signers in the way that certain characteristics, which are highlighted 
by the iconic aspect of a sign, play a central role in the corresponding semantic concept. We had 
expected that the response times for deaf, hearing and bilingual participants would differ 
depending on the category of item-pair used in the experiment. The results are compatible with 
this prediction. The deaf participants were significantly faster in judging iconic sign-picture 
relations, such as ‘eagle’ combined with ‘beak’, than in judging non iconic sign-picture relations, 
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like ‘eagle’ combined with ‘wing’. The hearing participants performed differently from the deaf, 
especially with respect to the relevant item-category containing spoken-word translations of 
iconic signs. Thus, the iconicity of the sign seems to accelerate the response times of the deaf and 
bilinguals to the corresponding picture, whereas in the case of non-iconic signs we did not find 
such an effect. Similar to the latter, we found for the hearing group no significant difference in 
judging words which show no resemblance to the pictures. In contrast to the hearing participants, 
the bilinguals showed a somewhat surprising result in the word-picture task. Even in the vocal 
mode we obtained for bilinguals significantly faster response times for word-picture pairs when 
the preceding word was a translation of an iconic sign. These results can be interpreted as a first 
evidence that sign language iconicity has an impact on the semantic relations in the conceptual 
system. The properties of a concrete referent which are highlighted by the iconic aspect of a 
linguistic sign seem to play a central role in the corresponding semantic concept. This suggests 
that the architecture of the conceptual system is shaped by the iconic properties of a language. 
Furthermore this influence of iconicity on conceptual categorization seems to exceed the language 
boundaries, i.e. it seems to work cross-linguistically. 
3.2. Measurement of Semantic Relations between with iconic signs/non-iconic 
words and pictures in a Triad-Comparison Task with Deaf, Hearing and 
Bilingual Participants 
In the experiment 7 with iconic signs the same research question was addressed as in the previous 
verification task with iconic signs. It was examined whether deaf, hearing and bilingual 
participants show different choices in a task where they were asked to decide which of two 
presented pictures had a stronger semantic relation to a presented sign or word, respectively. The 
number of choices in favor of a specific semantic relation was measured for each group of 
participants. It was expected that in the triad-comparison task the relative number of choices of 
the deaf and bilingual participants for the pictures which correspond to the iconic features of the 
signs would be greater than the relative number of choices for the pictures which do not depict 
the features. The relative number of choices of the hearing participants were assumed not to 
differ for both types of pictures. 
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Method 
Materials  
The experimental materials overlapped those of Experiment 6. By removing the unrelated items 
the test list contained 20 target items combined randomly with 3 related items. Every possible 
combination of the items within a taxonomy was realized. Thus, there were 60 combinations of a 
target item (sign/word) with two related items (pictures). The presentation position was 
completely counterbalanced. The items were grouped in triads of three series of 20 runs. 
Procedure 
For the deaf participants the signs and pictures were displayed one at a time on a computer 
monitor. Again, in order to provide visual masking the sign-video was centered at the top of the 
monitor, the first picture at the left bottom and the second one at the right bottom.  
For the hearing participants the spoken words were connected with a visual marker 
followed by two pictures presented one by one (see Appendix G). 
The subject was instructed to press the right button if he or she thought the picture on 
the right bottom of the screen had the strongest relation to the sign/word and the left button if 
he/she thought the picture on the left bottom of the screen was the strongest related. The subject 
was told to do so as accurately and as quickly as possible at any time from the start of the third 
test item, but fast responses did not alter the timing. Each subject was instructed by a 
standardized explanation (signed/written vs. spoken/written) and was given a practice of 10 runs. 
Results 
For analyzing the data of the experiment, the mean number of choices in % per type of 
correspondence and participant were computed. The average number of choices of deaf (signs) 
(n=20), hearing (words) (n=20) and bilingual participants (signs and words) (n=20) are shown Table 
III.40 
Table III.39: Mean Number of choices in % and Standard Deviations (in brackets) for deaf, hearing and 
bilingual participants in Experiment 7: Triad-Comparison Task with Iconic Signs 
 Deaf-Signs Hearing-Words Bilinguals-Signs Bilinguals-Words 
Sign-Picture-
Correspondence 
80,63 
(4,28) 
51,25 
(6,95) 
66,75 
(10,00) 
62,38 
(11,82) 
No 
Correspondence 
18,69 
(4,63) 
48,63 
(3,41) 
33,06 
(4,24) 
37,63 
(6,85) 
Total 49,66 
(4,45) 
49,94 
(5,18) 
49,91 
(7,12) 
50,00 
(9,33) 
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The results of the repeated measures two-way analysis of variance for the pair wise comparisons 
of deaf, hearing and bilingual participants are shown in Table III.41: 
Table III.40: 2 x 2 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interactions 
Main Effects & 
Interaction 
Deaf & Hearing Deaf & Bilingual Hearing & Bilingual Bilingual & 
Bilingual 
Language Status minF'(1,38)=0.096 
p = .7579   n.s. 
minF'(1,38)=0.048 
p = .8261   n.s. 
minF'(1,85)=0.005 
p = .9387   n.s. 
minF'(1,38)=0.007 
p = .9293   n.s. 
Type of 
Correspondence 
minF'(1,95)=186.3 
p = .0001 
minF'(1,82)=127.1 
p = .0001 
minF'(1,57)=39.229 
p = .0001 
minF'(1,96)=53.14 
p = .0001 
Language Status x 
Correspondence 
minF'(1,68)=27.67 
p = .0001 
minF'(1,53)=25.56 
p = .0001 
minF'(1,53)=18.60 
p = .0001 
minF'(1,43)=2.886 
p = .0966   n.s. 
 
The results of Experiment 7 (Triad Comparison Task with Iconic Signs) support the outcomes of 
Experiment 6 (Verification Task with Iconic Signs). Comparing deaf and hearing participants the 
analysis revealed a non-significant main effect for the variable Language Status’, i.e. the overall 
mean number of choices in a sign-picture vs. word–picture task for deaf and hearing participants 
is the same. The latter result is not surprising, because for the dependent variable ' number of 
choices in %' the responses for each ‘type of correspondence’ will always add up to 100 %. Thus, 
there can’t be a main effect of 'language status'. 
 
Figure III.32: Mean number of choices in % of deaf and hearing participants for the iconic sign-
picture and word-picture combinations. The first columns represent the mean responses to the 
pictures which correspond to iconic signs and to their translations into spoken words, 
respectively, whereas the second columns show mean response times to pictures which 
correspond to non-iconic signs and to their spoken-word translations 
Triad Comparison Task with Signs/Words and Pictures
0,00
10,00
20,00
30,00
40,00
50,00
60,00
70,00
80,00
90,00
100,00
Deaf (Sign-Picture) Hearing (Word-Picture)
Language Status
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
C
h
o
ic
e
s
 i
n
 %
Sign-Picture Correspondence No Correspondence
 153 
However, as in Experiment 6 the main effect for the variable ‘Type of correspondence’ and the 
interaction was significant. A t-test for paired samples revealed a difference in number of choices 
for deaf participants between items with iconic sign-picture correspondence vs. no 
correspondence (t(19)= 52,335; p= .0001). Deaf participants chose significantly more pictures 
which depict the iconic aspects of signs than pictures which correspond to semantically related, 
but not to the iconic aspects of a sign. Mean number of choices for items with iconic sign-picture-
correspondence were 61,94 % higher than the ones for items without such correspondence. Again 
for the hearing participants no differences in judging the two categories of word-picture 
combinations (word translations of iconic vs. word translations of non-iconic signs) were found.  
The responses of the bilingual participants in the Triad Comparison Task were not as 
similar to the deaf participants as in the Verification Task. The analysis revealed no main effect of 
the variable ‘Language Status', but a main effect for the variable ‘Type of correspondence’ and the 
interaction.  
 
Figure III.33: Mean number of choices in % of deaf and bilingual participants for the iconic sign-
picture combinations. The first columns represent the mean responses to the pictures which 
correspond to iconic, whereas the second columns show mean response times to pictures which 
correspond to non-iconic signs 
In the Triad Comparison Task the overall pattern of results of deaf and bilingual participants is 
significantly different, because the bilingual participants showed a significant difference between 
mean number of choices for sign-picture-pairs with and with no iconic correspondence (t(19)= 
11,088; p= .0001), but this discrepancy was not as big as in the deaf group of participants. Mean 
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number of choices for items with iconic sign-picture-correspondence was only 33,68 % higher 
(deaf =61,94 % higher) than the ones for items without such correspondence. 
For the hearing and bilingual participants the 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed no main effect of the 
variable ‘Language Status', but a main effect for the variable ‘Type of correspondence’ and the 
interaction. As already mentioned for the hearing participants no differences in the number of 
choices for the words corresponding to the iconic signs vs. the non-iconic signs were found. As in 
study 1 this result was expected. 
 
Figure III.34: Mean response times of hearing and bilingual participants for the word-picture 
combinations. The first columns represent the mean responses to the pictures which correspond 
to iconic signs whereas the second columns show mean response times to pictures which 
correspond to non-iconic signs. Between the pictures and the presented spoken words no iconic 
correspondence existed 
The responses of the bilinguals in the word-picture triad-comparison task were – analogous to 
study 1 – somewhat different from the results of the hearings and similar to the results in the sign-
picture task. The bilinguals showed in the word-picture-task significantly more choices for the 
pictures which correspond to the iconic features.  
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Figure III.35: Mean response times of bilingual participants for the sign-picture and word-picture 
combinations. The first columns represent the mean responses to the pictures which correspond 
to iconic signs whereas the second columns show mean response times to pictures which do not 
correspond to iconic signs. Between the pictures and the presented spoken words no iconic 
correspondence existed 
Despite the fact that between words and pictures was no iconic correspondence, the bilinguals 
chose in the word-picture task significantly more pictures which depict the iconic aspects of signs 
than pictures which correspond to semantically related, but not to the iconic aspects of a sign. The 
mean number of choices for the words which corresponded to iconic signs was about 24,75 % 
higher than for the words which corresponded to the non-iconic signs (t(19)= -6,045; p= .0001). 
The analysis show, that for bilinguals the overall pattern of results is the same. As in Experiment 
6 (Verification Task with iconic Signs) no main effect for language status and the interaction was 
found. There was only a main effect for ‘Type of Correspondence’. Thus, the bilinguals showed the 
same pattern of responses whether they performed the task with words or with signs. This result 
indicates that the iconic base of a sign is prominent in the concept of the sign’s referent.  
The results in the Triad-Comparison Task go along with the result in the Verification Task 
and verify the hypothesis that deaf and bilinguals choose significantly more pictures which depict 
the iconic feature. E.g. with respect to the sign for ‘cow’ which highlights the ‘horn’ of a cow, the 
deaf and bilinguals chose significantly more often the sign-picture combination ‘cow’ and ‘horn’ 
than the combination ‘cow’ and ‘udder’ or ‘cow’ and ‘spotted hide’. Consequently the attribute 
‘has horns’ for the concept ‘cow’ seems to be a central one for deaf and bilingual signers, one that 
is more important, for example, than the attribute ‘has an udder’ or ‘has a spotted hide’. In 
contrast, the hearing participants did not choose the picture with the ‘horn’ as often, which 
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indicates that horns are not that central for the concept of a ‘cow’, rather the participants chose 
more frequently the picture presenting a spotted black and white hide. At least for the participants 
from the region of ‘North Rhine-Westphalia’, the test-location, a black and white hide seems to 
be the most important attribute of a cow.  
To sum up, compared to the hearing participants, the deaf as well as the bilingual 
participants made significantly more choices for pictures which correspond to the iconic features 
of the matched signs. For the bilingual participants this effect is found also in the task with words. 
Thus, the overall pattern of results suggests that the semantic organization of a mental lexicon is 
influenced by the iconicity of a language. 
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3.3. Sign-Iconicity Rating in Deaf and Hearing Participants 
Since iconicity is not an objective fact about two entities but rather depends on the judgments of 
similarity, and these are products of the cognitive ability to perceive resemblance, the third 
iconicity study (Experiment 8) is aimed at investigating whether the recognition of a resemblance 
between sign and referent is dependent on specific linguistic knowledge. In Sign Language only 
phonetically and morphologically acceptable forms are used to create a legitimate iconic signs. 
These forms are often linguistic elements that refer to some class of entity and the signer has to 
know these classes in order to recognize the iconicity of the sign. For example, in German Sign 
Language a 'human being' can be signed by the index and middle fingers extended from a fist. This 
handshape is a classifier for the referent 'human being'. Signers can freely modulate such signs to 
describe a huge variety of different situations or to create new signs. For example, the sign 'sofa' 
(Figure III.36) contains the crocked index and middle finger and is a modulation of the 'human 
being'-classifier. Moreover, the expression 'lying on the sofa' contains the classifier for 'human 
being' and simultaneously some morphological parts of the sign 'sofa'. The iconicity of these signs 
is often not recognized by non-signers, because they do not know both, the basic classifier 'human 
being' as well as the sign language principles of morphological modulation. 
 Sofa (auf einem Sofa) liegen 
 
Figure III.36: Modulation of the classifier 'human being' (index and middle fingers extended from 
a fist) 
Based on these theoretical considerations, the main question addressed is whether deaf and 
hearing participants will judge the grade of iconicity of specific signs differently depending on their 
linguistic knowledge. 
Method 
One hundred thirty German Sign Language signs selected from sign vocabulary collections (DGS-
Gebärdensprach-CD-Rom) and used in the Experiments 1-7 were rated for degree of iconicity by 
20 deaf signers and 20 hearing non-signers. The signs were systematically divided into specific 
groups according to linguistic criteria. Participants were asked to rate the degree of iconicity of a 
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single sign on a scale from 0 to 100. The mean ratings of the deaf were compared with the mean 
ratings of the hearing for each sign. It was expected that the deaf signers judge more signs as being 
highly iconic than non-signers, because they have specific knowledge about morphological forms 
and their modulation principles. 
Materials 
The 130 signs used as stimuli in Experiment 1-7 were divided into 7 classes of items: 
Gesture-Signs 
Signs of German Sign Language which are identical 
with conventionalized gestures and used within a 
language community. Examples from German Sign 
Language and German are the gestures thumb-up 
for 'OK', thumb and index finger crocked for 'Good' 
as well as the hand-to-head gesture that means 'to 
sleep'. 
 
Indexical Signs 
Signs that are pointing to an object, location or 
direction. Indexical signs are lexicalized and part of 
the lexicon. For example the sign for 'hair', 'eye' or 
'face'. 
  
Figure III.38: Indexical Sign 'Eye' 
Figure III.37: Gesture-Sign 'Good' 
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Transparent Signs 
Transparent or guessable signs are those whose 
referent can be understood from the appearance of 
the signs alone (Bellugi & Klima 1976; Brown 
1977;1978; Lloyed & Fristoe 1978). The handshape 
and movement of these signs resembles their 
referent in some salient characteristics. 
 
 
 
Metonymic Signs 
Metonymy has a referential function, i.e a single 
selected image stands for a complex associated 
concept. It allows us to use one entity to stand for 
another (Fauconnier 1985, Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 
36). Metonymic signs pick a particular feature or 
object of the whole meaning to highlight the concept. 
For example, signs for kinds of animals are often 
encoding a salient body part of the animal, which then 
associated metonymically with the concept of the animal itself. Examples from German Sign 
Language include whiskers in the sign 'cat', trunk in 'elephant', and beak in 'bird'. 
Metaphorical Signs 
Signs which are extended in use beyond their primary 
meaning to describe referents that are similar to the 
signs primary referent. Often a concrete image is used 
to describe an abstract concept, e.g. 'stabbing 
someone' is the sign for 'murder'. 
  
Figure III.40: Metonymic Sign 'Bird' 
Figure III.39. Transparent Sign 'to 
iron' 
Figure III.41: Metaphorical Sign 
'Murder' 
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Classifier Signs 
Classifier signs are highly iconic and refer to 'classes' 
of referents rather than specific kinds of referents. In 
order to recognize the iconicity of these signs, often 
specific linguistic knowledge is required. E.g. the sign 
for ‘forest’. 
 
 
 
Opaque Signs 
Signs which are not iconic, i.e. they are not 
guessable for non-signers as well as for signers of a 
different sign-language. One is not able to perceive 
a relationship between the sign form and its 
referent when both are known (Klima & Bellugi 
1976). Examples are the sign for 'poison' or 'tools'. 
 
Procedure 
The signs were displayed one at a time on a computer monitor and the subject was instructed to 
rate each sign according to the degree of resemblance between the form of the signs and its 
reference by moving a bar along a scale of 0-100 with the computer-mouse (see Appendix H). Low 
scales reflected a low degree of iconicity and high scales a high degree. To get to the next sign the 
participants had to press a button and the sign-video was automatically displayed once. It was 
always possible to see the sign again before making the judgment. For the hearing participants 
the signs were presented along with the spoken German translation-equivalent via loud-speakers. 
Each subject was individually instructed with a standardized explanation by a deaf vs. hearing test-
instructor either in sign language or in spoken language and was given some practice trials. 
 
Figure III.42: Classifier Sign 'Forest' 
Figure III.43: Opaque Sign 'poison' 
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Results 
An analysis was conducted on the mean iconicity ratings for every type of test-item. The 
experimental design was 7 x 2, i.e. one crossed within-subject factor with seven levels and one 
between subject factor with two levels. The within-subject factor was 'Type of Iconicity’ with seven 
levels: 1. Gesture-Sign, 2. Indexical Sign, 3. Transparent Sign, 4. Metonymic Sign, 5. Methaphorical 
Sign, 6. Classifier Sign and 7. Opaque Sign. The between subject factor was 'language status': deaf 
vs. hearing. Dependent variable was mean iconicity rating. Two separate ANOVAs were conducted 
on participants and items. Based on these two analysis, min F' was calculated. 
Table III.41: Mean Ratings and Standard Deviations (in brackets) for deaf and hearing participants in 
Experiment 8 
  Type of Iconicity 
  Gesture Indexical Transparent Metonymic Metaphoric Classifier Opaque 
Deaf 81,40 89,85 78,45 81,00 62,00 74,00 44,95 
  (10,04) (7,23) (9,06) (8,84) (8,13) (7,27) (7,37) 
Hearing 89,75 86,30 72,00 53,90 36,00 33,00 28,95 
  (7,72) (9,78) (7,50) (8,18) (8,32) (8,32) (7,62) 
Mean 85,58 88,08 75,23 67,45 49,00 53,50 36,95 
  (8,88 (8,51) (8,28) (8,51) (8,23) (7,80) (7,49) 
Table III.42: 2 x 7 ANOVA/minF': Main effects and interaction 
 
The repeated measures two-way analysis of variance on the mean rating per type of sign category 
of deaf and hearing participants revealed significant main effects for ‘Type of Iconicity’ and 
Language Status’. The interaction of the two factors was significant as well. Thus, the pattern of 
responses of the hearing participants was significantly different from the responses of the deaf 
participants (see Figure III.44). 
Especially the iconicity-ratings of the deaf participants for metonymic, metaphoric, 
classifier and opaque signs were higher compared to the ratings of the hearing. A t-test for paired 
samples revealed a difference for these types of iconic signs between the two groups of 
participants. No difference was found for gesture-signs, indexical signs and transparent signs (see 
Table III.44): 
 
Main Effects Deaf &Hearing 
Language Status minF'(1,125)= 49.71, p = .0.0001 
Type of Iconicity minF'(6,152)= 29,37, p = .0001 
Language Status x Type of Iconicity minF'(6,202)= 32.478, p = .0001 
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Figure III.44: Mean Ratings of 20 deaf and 20 hearing participants for different classes of signs 
 
Table III.43: T-Test for paired samples (Bonferroni correction p=.007) 
 Paired samples T df Sig. (2-side) 
Iconicity 
Type Mean 
Standard-
Deviation 
Standard-
mistake of 
the Mean 
95% 
Konfidenzinte
rvall    
       Untere Obere       
Gesture -8,40000 15,52918 4,91076 -19,50891 2,70891 -1,711 9 ,121 
Indexical 3,87500 16,31334 5,76764 -9,76329 17,51329 ,672 7 ,523 
Transparen
t 
6,08333 18,25643 3,72658 -1,62568 13,79235 1,632 23 ,116 
Metonymic 26,31250 15,52197 2,74392 20,71623 31,90877 9,589 31 ,000 
Metaphori
c 
26,25000 20,22656 5,83890 13,39866 39,10134 4,496 11 ,001 
Classifier 41,64000 16,58785 3,31757 34,79287 48,48713 12,551 24 ,000 
Opaque 15,63158 15,52135 3,56084 8,15053 23,11263 4,390 18 ,000 
 
The results show clearly that deaf and hearing participants judge the grade of iconicity of 
metonymic, metaphoric, classifier and opaque signs differently, because of their specific linguistic 
knowledge. They are able to recognize polycomponential linguistic features which correspond to 
features of the referent, whereas non-signers are not able to detect them. Overall, this outcome 
indicates that the perception of iconicity in German Sign Language signs is different for deaf and 
hearing participants.  
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IV. Summary and General Discussion 
1. The Impact of Simultaneity 
Overall, the presented studies lend some support to the hypothesis of an impact of simultaneity 
on the structural diversity in the semantic system of deaf signers and hearing non-signers as 
compared to cross-modal bilinguals. The analysis of data revealed differences in the structure of 
semantic relations in the conceptual system between these groups and a similarity within the 
groups. 
In Experiment 1, the verification task with Signs/Words and Pictures, it was expected that 
the RT curves for paradigmatic and syntagmatic responses would be different depending on the 
modality of language in which the experiment was performed. The results are compatible with 
this prediction. In the linguistic condition with signs and words, the deaf participants were 
significantly faster in judging syntagmatic semantic relations, such as action and attributes, than 
in judging paradigmatic relations, like superordinate and coordinate relations. The hearing 
participants performed differently from the deaf, especially in judging superordinates. Compared 
to the responses of deaf and hearing participants, the bilinguals showed a significantly different 
pattern of responses. Whereas their performance in the sign-verification task was, compared to 
the deaf, better for paradigmatically and worse for syntagmatically related items, it was the 
opposite in the verification task with words. Thus, the conceptual system of signers seems to be 
influenced by the visual-gestural language modality, the system of nonsigners by the audio-vocal, 
and that of cross-modal native balanced bilinguals by both modalities. The latter implies 
comparable semantic relations between signs and words, respectively.  
In the pictorial condition of the verification task with pictures, the responses were 
different for all groups of participants. The prediction was that the pattern of responses in the 
linguistic condition of the experiment would be similar to that in the pictorial condition for each 
group of participants. On first glance, the pattern of results in the picture-presentation mode is 
somewhat similar to the pattern in the sign/word-presentation mode. However, the significant 
interaction between the two factors ‘experimental condition’ and ‘type of semantic relation’ 
indicates that the patterns of results in the linguistic compared to the pictorial condition are 
significantly different for deaf and hearing participants. For the hearing group this might be due 
to the fact that the RT improvement for the action-words is somewhat lower than for the words 
of the other semantic classes: RT for superordinates, coordinates and attributes in the picture task 
is about 300 ms faster, the RT for actions is only 200 ms faster. The greater complexity of the 
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action-pictures might be responsible for this divergence. A significant correlation between RT and 
complexity of the items was found. Controlling for the differences in response times for action-
words, the interaction between experimental condition' and 'type of semantic relation' is no 
longer significant, which means that the pattern of RT-responses of the hearing participants in the 
linguistic vs. the picture task is the same. This seems to indicate that the spoken language system 
influences the categorization of pictures.  
Compared to the hearing group, the deaf participants showed a similar amount of 
improvement for superordinates and coordinates, but a smaller improvement for actions and 
attributes. A tentative explanation could be that when recognizing a complex picture showing 
actions or attributes, deaf signers might tend to activate an internal articulation of a sign-phrase 
consisting of noun and noun-predicate rather than a single sign. This would slow down the 
verification of a semantic relation between the two presented pictures. In contrast, for 
superordinates and coordinates they might articulate the exact sign and show more or less the 
same difference between RT in the verbal and the pictorial mode of presentation than the hearing 
participants do.  
In general, the hearing participants responded much faster both in the verbal and in the 
pictorial task as compared to deaf participants. Whereas this outcome was not surprising in the 
linguistic condition (the videos were much longer than the audios), it is somewhat perplexing in 
the pictorial condition, because all participants were confronted with the same stimuli. An 
explanation for this result could be that the participants employ internal sign or speech to some 
extent. The activation of an internal articulatory sign-rehearsal-loop parallel to the visuospatial 
sketchpad in working memory (Wilson & Emmorey, 1997), i.e. the internal articulation of the signs 
which match the pictures, slows down the rapid processing of pictorial information because the 
processes share resources in the visual working memory (Wilson & Fox, 2007).  
Thus, the language systems might influence the response times in the picture verification 
task in two different ways. Firstly - in both modalities - it might accelerate conceptual 
categorization of pictures through internal articulation. Secondly, in the visual-gestural modality, 
internal signing slows down the visual categorization process to some extent due to a scarcity of 
resources in working memory. In addition, the inner sign-articulation might activate the sensory-
motor system, which interferes with the task to press the answer button. 
Nonetheless, the mean RTs of the bilinguals resemble those of the hearing and therefore 
it was assumed that the bilinguals categorize pictures by relying on their auditive-vocal rather than 
on their visual-gestural system. Surprisingly, the bilinguals performed similarly in every condition 
of the experiment, i.e. no significant difference in the overall pattern of results was found. They 
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always responded quickly to the semantic relation of action, followed by superordinates, 
coordinates and eventually attributes. The results of the bilinguals in the verification task with 
signs indicate that both language modalities seem to influence conceptual categorization. 
Considering that the bilinguals were all native balanced cross-modal bilinguals working as sign-
language interpreters and thus perceive and produce signed and spoken German simultaneously 
every day, it can be concluded that both systems are tightly linked together and have a shaping 
influence on the structure of semantic relations between semantic concepts.  
The latter conclusion becomes even more obvious when comparing the results of 
Experiment 2, the Triad-Comparison Task with Signs, Words and Pictures. The responses in 
experiment 1 corresponded with the results in experiment 2. As in Experiment 1 the deaf 
participants were faster in judging syntagmatic semantic relations than paradigmatic ones, in 
Experiment 2 they chose syntagmatic semantic relations more often than paradigmatic ones. For 
the hearing participants the responses were – as in Experiment 1 - the other way around. Likewise, 
the bilinguals chose in the triad-comparison task with signs fewer actions compared to the deaf 
and there was a tendency for choosing more superordinates. In the triad-comparison task with 
words the bilinguals responded similar as in the Verification Task. The higher number of choices 
for syntagmatic semantic relations in Experiment 2 corresponds with the faster RTs in Experiment 
1 and the lower number of choices for paradigmatic semantic relations corresponds with the 
slower RTs.  
However, in the triad-comparison task with pictures the results were somewhat different 
from those in Experiment 1. Whereas in Experiment one the overall pattern of results of deaf, 
hearing and bilingual participants were different in the two conditions of the experiment 
(linguistic vs. pictorial), the pattern of results in the triad-comparison task with pictures were not 
different from the patterns in the linguistic condition for each group of participants. As previously 
mentioned, in Experiment 1 it was not possible to clearly interpret whether the responses in the 
linguistic vs. pictorial mode were the same or different. Thus, it was hypothesized that the 
differences in the verification task were actually due to inner articulation and picture complexity. 
Since we found in Experiment 2 no differences between the two types of experimental conditions, 
the more subjective judgment in the triad-comparison supports this interpretation. Again, as in 
Experiment one the bilinguals performed similarly in every condition of the experiment. The latter 
outcome supports the interpretation of the results in Experiment one, i.e. they indicate an 
influence of both language systems in cross-modal bilinguals on semantic categorization. In a 
bilingual conceptual system of native balanced codas the two subsystems of ‘sign-network’ and 
‘spoken word-network’ might be fully connected and thus influence each other constantly. The 
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adjoining network probably influences each language system (Dufour, 1997). Dufour supports this 
hypothesis by arguing that cross-modal bilingualism does not differ radically from mono-modal 
bilingualism and therefore it could be assumed - at least at an abstract level of representation - 
that current theories of bilingual language representation based on spoken languages apply 
directly to cross-modal bilingualism. They suggest that at the lexical form level, two different 
languages have distinct and separate representations whereas at the conceptual level the 
semantic representations overlap across languages (e.g. Kroll & Tokowicz, 2001; Kroll & de Groot, 
1997). Studies on cross-language categorization (Caramazza & Brones, 1980; Potter et al., 1984) 
and cross-language semantic priming (e.g. Schwanenfluegel & Rey, 1986; Kirsner et al., 1984) 
support this view. However, cross-modal bilingualism differs from mono-modal bilingualism on 
the nature of processes involved, namely simultaneous/sequential visual processing of visual-
gestural signs vs. sequential auditory processing of audio-vocal words. The two different 
modalities of sign and speech allow for the simultaneous production of the two languages, i.e. 
speaking and signing at the same time. The possibility of simultaneous articulation of two different 
languages at a given point in time results in an activation of two base languages (Grosjean, 2001). 
This type of language mode, i.e. the level of activation of two languages, cannot be produced in 
mono-modal bilinguals. It suggests that the lexical representations of each language are distinct, 
but that there is a strong connection between them which can be used to match items from one 
language with the other. The structure of connections between the two languages might be 
specific in cross-modal bilinguals and thus very different from the type of connections between 
two spoken or signed languages in mono-bilinguals. The findings in the presented study with cross-
modal bilinguals lend support to this view, but the issue needs much further investigation. 
Since Experiment 1 and 2 revealed in deaf participants stronger semantic relations 
between a noun and actions/attributes (syntagmatic relations) as compared to semantic relations 
between a noun and superordinates/coordinates (paradigmatic relations), a continuing 
experiment was developed. In Experiment 3 (verification task with nonpolycomponential and 
polycomponential signs) and Experiment 4 (triad-comparison task with nonpolycomponential and 
Polycomponential signs) it was investigated whether a linguistic unit that reflects salient 
characteristics of the referent in a polycomponential sign might be responsible for the latter 
outcome. The visual modality affords parallel processing, because of universal constraints on 
working memory. Thus, signers most often employ polycomponential signs and they are a 
necessary part of their communication. Simultaneity in sign language is crucial in order to explain 
strong semantic relations between syntagmatically related concepts. These concepts are most 
often communicated through polycomponential signs and they are a necessary and all-dominant 
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part of a signed language. This processing provides, in a simultaneous fashion, information that 
cannot be provided efficiently or robustly by using signs in a sequential order as in spoken 
languages. As expected in the performed Experiments 3 and 4, some evidence was found 
suggesting that polycomponential signs (containing syntagmatically related information) have a 
stronger semantic relation to a noun-referent than nonpolycomponential signs. Although in sign 
recognition tasks nonpolycomponential signs are generally identified earlier than 
polycomponential complex signs (see section 2.3.2., Emmorey & Corina, 1990), in the presented 
experiments in this thesis it is vice versa. Verifying a semantic relation between a noun and a 
polycomponential sign which reflects some aspects of the noun-object (without having a 
phonological relationship) is faster than verifying a noun related to a nonpolycomponential sign 
which does not reflect any aspects of the referent. Similarly, in the triad-comparison task with 
nonpolycomponential and polycomponential signs, the percentage of number of choices was 
higher for polycomponential signs than for nonpolycomponential. Thus, polycomponential signs 
which contain a linguistic unit that reflects salient characteristics of the referent, have a stronger 
semantic relation to a noun referent as nonpolycomponential actions and attributes which do not 
incorporate features of the noun-referent.  
The latter results were confirmed by the outcome of Experiment 5, the recognition 
memory task with nonpolycomponential and polycomponential Signs. The highest false memory 
occurred for polycomponential associates, as they contain a meaningful component that 
expresses an object characteristic of the previously studied sign-referent and therefore the 
participants of the Experiment make false recognitions on the basis of prior activation. This 
outcome is consistent with the results of memory studies, which show that deaf signers probably 
decompose complex signs into a base form and morphological marker when remembering signs 
(Hanson & Bellugi, 1982; Poizner et al., 1981) and thus they make certain errors when recognizing 
polycomponential associates.  
Taken together, the results of the experiments suggest that in a conceptual system based 
on signs, the semantic relations between a noun and action/attributes (i.e. syntagmatic relations) 
on average are stronger than between a noun and superordinates/coordinates (i.e. paradigmatic 
relations). For a conceptual system based on spoken words it is reversed. Since different 
linguistically important aspects such as phonology, morphology and subjective frequency do not 
account for the findings, the differences between deaf, hearing and bilingual participants may be 
caused modality aspects, i.e. simultaneous or sequential articulation. Simultaneous articulation 
allows the signer to manipulate aspects of the polycomponential sign such as amplitude or speed 
of the movement or handshape according to the shape, manner, direction of movement, location 
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and size of a subject or an object. By modifying the linguistic features which correspond to features 
of the referent it is possible to express a lot of information simultaneously and in more detail. In 
other words, the German Sign (GSL) for 'bus' provides an image of a prototypical 'bus' in the way 
that the articulators (the hands) sign the trace of the shape of a cuboid bus and it is possible to 
express additional information, e.g. the size or form of the bus, through manipulating the 
amplitude and trace of the movement patterns or facial components (see Figure IV.1). Crucial, the 
additional information is usually syntagmatically related. 
Figure IV.1: Example of a nonpolycomponential and polycomponential sign 
Simultaneity is quite essential for the visual-gestural linguistic system, because - as afore 
mentioned - without this advantage in the visual-gestural code, sign languages would be too slow 
in articulation compared to spoken languages. Consequently, syntagmatically related signs such 
as 'actions' or 'attributes' are often polycomponential and morphologically very specific for the 
noun to which they refer. E.g. the word 'soft' in spoken language is related to many different 
referents (soft pillow, soft skin, soft heart etc.) whereas in sign language the signs are different for 
every mentioned example (see Figure IV.2). 
Figure IV.2: Specific Examples of the sign ‘soft’ 
They share a sign-stem or base form, nested within morphemes which encode information about 
some characteristics of the referent. The author of this thesis hypothesizes that this is the reason 
Bus (bus) großer Bus (big bus) 
soft little round thing 
(e.g. soft egg) 
soft surface 
(e.g. soft fur) 
soft cuboid thing(e.g. soft 
mattress) 
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why many signs remain iconic. Only by manipulating iconic morphemes of the polycomponential 
sign it is possible to incorporate additional information. 
When considering a spreading activation network model, it can be assumed that 
syntagmatically related signs have a very close or strong connection to the related noun-referent 
because of their specificity. The amount of activation spreading from the activated specific sign-
concept (action/attribute) distributes very quickly to the connected noun-concept because the 
sum of the links between the specific sign-concept and other connected signs generally is 
relatively low due to its specificity. Because it does not widely disperse into the conceptual system 
network, the amount of activation coming from the specific sign is relatively high and therefore 
speeds up the verification process.  
The overall results of the experiments with pictures indicate moreover that language 
modality influences perceptual categorization. Since we found similar response patterns in both 
linguistic and visual tasks, but differences in response patterns between the tested groups, it is 
suggested that language has a direct impact on the categorization process of visual information. 
This indicates an interplay between verbal and visual categorization. The data found in the 
presented study lends support to a connectionist framework in which conceptual categorization 
interacts with perceptual categorization. Thus, the structure of semantic concepts might be 
subject to changes depending on the languages one applies at a given moment. Whereas most 
cognitive linguists in the tradition of the generative paradigm explain the relation between lexical 
and conceptual structures in terms of a linguistic reflection of conceptual meaning, the results 
presented in this paper indicate a reverse effect from language to conceptual and even perceptual 
categorization. Most notably the results of the bilinguals ascribe a possible semantic impact of 
two languages in different modalities on the formation of semantic network-relations. However, 
this research program is presently in its initial phase, and the topic raised here requires much 
more investigation. To provide additional evidence or different results on the functioning of 
semantic memory in cross-modal bilinguals, further experiments should be performed. 
2. The Impact of Iconicity 
In the presented studies the possible cognitive function of iconicity was explored. The results 
provide some empirical evidence for the influence of sign language iconicity on the strength of the 
semantic relations in the conceptual system. The hypothesis that the characteristics or aspects of 
an entity, which are accentuated by the iconic feature of the sign, play a central role in the 
corresponding semantic network is supported by the outcomes of the performed experiments. 
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For the deaf participants the differences between mean response times of the categories 
'iconic sign-picture-correspondence' and 'no iconic correspondence' was significant in the 
Verification Task (Experiment 6). Mean response times for items with iconic sign-picture-
correspondence were faster than those  for items without such correspondence. The responses 
of the bilingual participants in the sign-picture task were similar to the deaf participants. They also 
showed a significant difference between mean response times of both item-categories. For the 
hearing participants no differences in judging the two categories of word-picture combinations 
(word translations of iconic vs. word translations of non-iconic signs) were found. This result was 
expected since none of the words indicated any iconic correspondence to the pictures. Yet, more 
astonishing were the response times of the bilinguals in the word-condition of the task. The 
bilinguals showed in the word-picture-task significantly different response times to the hearing 
participants, but similar results to their responses in the sign-picture-task. The response times for 
the words which corresponded to iconic signs were significantly faster than the response times 
for the words which corresponded to the non-iconic signs.  
The results of the Triad-Comparison Task (Experiment 7) support the outcomes of the 
verification task. Deaf participants chose significantly more pictures which depict the iconic 
aspects of signs than pictures which correspond to semantically related, but not to the iconic 
aspects of a sign. For the deaf participants the difference between the mean number of choices 
of the categories 'iconic sign-picture-correspondence' and 'no iconic-correspondence' was 
significant. The responses of the bilingual participants in the sign-picture task were similar to the 
deaf participants. They also showed a significant difference in the number of choices for sign-
picture combinations with iconic-correspondences compared to combinations with no iconic-
correspondences. For the hearing participants no differences in the number of choices for the 
words corresponding to the iconic signs vs. the non-iconic signs were found. This result was 
expected. The responses of the bilinguals in the word-picture triad-comparison task were – 
analogous to the Verification Task – somewhat different from the results of the hearings and 
similar to the results in the sign-picture task. In the word-picture-task the bilinguals regestered 
significantly more choices for the pictures which correspond to the iconic features.  
The results imply an effect of iconicity on conceptual categorization. The question is 
whether the close form-meaning relationship, i.e. the resemblance between semantic and iconic 
phonological properties, directly causes the language processing advantage, because the iconic 
form of the sign directly activates the corresponding concept referent (Thompson et al., 2009). 
Another explanation is that the specific aspect that is highlighted by the iconic phonological form 
of the sign actually plays a central role in the concept of the referent. The author of this thesis 
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argues that iconicity does not cause faster online processing because of mappings between form 
and meaning. Then the sign would perform as an image or icon rather than as a linguistic sign. This 
would suggest that the potential iconic dimension of signs would interfere with their linguistic 
function. The signer would rather see ‘pictures’ than linguistic signs. The author of this thesis 
rather suggests that an iconic sign can work both as an imagic-icon and a linguistic sign. Whether 
it acts primarily as an icon or as a symbol is determined by its actual use. The onset of either one 
of these sign 'transcription' processes (Jäger, 2004b) is to some extent dependent on the linguistic 
context. Whether the focus of attention of the signer or the recipient lies on the symbolic meaning 
of the linguistic sign (symbolization of an icon) or on the iconic aspects of the linguistic properties 
(re-iconization of a symbol), is a matter of situational requirements for a successful 
communication (Grote & Linz, 2003). During communication the recognition of linguistic signs is 
usually predominately guided by the systematic structures of the sign language system and the 
signs are recognized as linguistic symbols. The latter explains why in many recognition tasks the 
iconicity does not play a role (e.g. Bosworth & Emmorey, 2010). In such a task it is contra 
productive to focus on the form, and the iconic properties of the signs are irrelevant. However, 
there is still the question of whether the iconic aspect of the sign retains a permanent effect on 
conceptual structures. This is caused through the re-iconization of the sign. For example, when a 
child learns a new sign, it often does not recognize the iconic phonological properties of the sign. 
Eventually after some experience with the language, it notices the link between form and meaning 
and henceforth it is able to use it as a productive linguistic form in order to incorporate additional 
information by manipulating iconic aspects of the sign. In such a case the related property of the 
referent is highlighted and might receive a prominent status in the concept of the referent. Thus, 
the influence of imagic iconicity seems not to be limited to a motivational aspect in the process of 
sign creation, but rather has an impact on the conceptual categorization through the process of 
re-iconization. The fact that cross-modal bilinguals perform in the verification task with iconic 
signs similar to the task with non-iconic words, supports the hypothesis that the iconicity effect 
occurs not only during the actual processing of iconic signs but rather that iconicity has a 
permanent shaping impact on conceptual structures. 
The impact of linguistic experience was tested in a subsequent experiment, i.e. Sign-
Iconicity-Ratings (Experiment 8). It aimed at investigating whether the recognition of a 
resemblance between sign and referent is dependent on specific linguistic knowledge. The 
outcome shows that deaf and hearing participants judge the grade of iconicity differently, because 
iconicity is not an objective fact about two entities but rather depends on the judgments of 
similarity, and these are products of language experience and the cognitive ability to perceive 
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resemblance. The iconicity-ratings of non-signers reveal that they often do not recognize the 
iconicity of many signs, because they do not know iconic classifiers as well as the sign language 
principles of morphological modulation. The mapping relation is not between objectively defined 
forms and objectively determined scenes. Objective properties, whether of events in the world or 
of articulatory events, play little role in iconicity. Iconicity is not a relation between the objective 
properties of a situation and the objective properties of articulators. Rather, the iconic relation is 
between construals of real-world scenes and construals of form.  
Hence the empirical findings not only serve to confirm the Peircean conception of iconicity 
but furthermore to specify it with respect to language in a double way: Firstly, they demonstrate 
that linguistic signs as a main class of symbols can, in fact, include iconic parts. When an iconic 
sign becomes integrated into a language system, it behaves mainly as a symbol. Nevertheless the 
predominance of its symbolic character does not imply that the iconic dimension of a linguistic 
sign becomes completely bleached or deleted. It seems that even in the case of primary imagic 
iconicity, the persistence of the iconic function is not restricted to specific contexts of poetics or 
advertising, etc., i.e. to processes of re-iconization in which the sign is unhinged from its regular 
usage. Rather, the iconicity appears to maintain a semiotic function in ordinary language usage 
too, albeit in a reduced and modified manner.  
Secondly, regarding the cognitive impact of signs, the results support the epistemological 
key assumption of Peirce that our way of conceptualizing the world is mediated by signs. Following 
Peirce we argue that the iconic relation between sign and object does not apply to a sign-
independent ‘real’ object but to the "Object as cognized in the sign" (see Nöth 2001, 20) – the 
‘immediate object’ in Peircean terms. With an iconic sign its object of reference is conceptualized 
in a specific way, namely as an object with just that property that defines the iconic relation. This 
means that through the relation of similarity which constitutes the iconic dimension of a sign, a 
specific feature is singled out and therewith becomes essential for the assigned object. Exactly 
this process of choosing a single feature and giving it a prominent status in the conceptualization 
of the object is what we observed in the experiments. One main function of iconic signs might 
therefore consist in marking specific features as particularly relevant for a concept.  
Considering psycholinguistic models of the semantic lexicon, e.g. spreading activation 
network models, it can be assumed that semantically related concepts which are reinforced by 
the form of a specific sign have a very close or strong connection to the related referent. 
Whenever specific characteristics and attributes of a referent are highlighted in an iconic sign, the 
related concepts become reactivated and the semantic relation is reinforced repeatedly. 
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Moreover, the semantic network seems not to be bounded by a single linguistic system as the 
results with bilingual participants reveal. 
3. 'Modality Relativity'? 
The findings reported in this thesis give some evidence for the modality relativity proposal. The 
data demonstrate differential response patterns between deaf, hearing and bilingual participants 
in different experiments with signs/ words and with pictures. Although the results of the described 
experiments with deaf, hearing and bilinguals do not support the hypothesis that the language 
modality changes the very nature of cognitive processes, they do suggest that it might influence 
conceptual and perceptual categorization through (1) simultaneous encoding of information with 
classifier constructions, i.e. polycomponential signs, (2) the modulation of iconic morphemes in 
order to communicate additional information simultaneously and (3) re-iconisation of a symbol, 
focusing on the property, which is highlighted by the sign. Thus, the two aspects of Simultaneity 
and Iconicity together ascribe a possible semantic impact on the formation of semantic network-
relations. This presumed effect of ‘Language Modality’ seems to be most apparent in the 
conceptualization of syntagmatically related concepts as opposed to paradigmatically related 
concepts. It appears that the acquisition of related conceptual categories requires not only 
experience with the world, but also with language, and that the eventual structure of the 
conceptual system might be - among other influences –shaped by language modality. Although 
Simultaneity and Iconicity are aspects of many languages, their high degrees are special to the 
visual-gestural mode. During communication, signers focus on those dimensions of experience 
that are systematically encoded in the structure of their native language. They are able to mark 
more and finer categories because of the possibility of continuously modulating the iconic aspects 
of a sign, whether they are classifier, phonological parameters or morphological units of the sign. 
This highlights the need for a shift in focus for language and cognition research from the 
simplistic question of whether or not there are Linguistic Relativity effects, to the more detailed 
analysis of what aspects of a language and how they eminate language-on-cognition effects. The 
overall view of how language and cognition are related intimately depends on how cross-linguistic 
variations and universals are apprehended. Theories which are characterized by their use of the 
information processing approach and which have dominated cognitive science for several 
decades, have difficulties in explaining the presented results. The information-processing 
approach is a functionalist one, i.e. mental states are defined by their causes and effects. It is 
based on the computer metaphor. As with computers, the human mind is considered a symbol-
manipulating system in which the symbols stand in a one-to-one relationship with objects and 
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categories in the world (for a review see Linz, 2002). Since the mechanical manipulation of abstract 
symbols make up mental representations which are reflections of reality that get their meaning 
because the symbols stand in direct correspondence with objects, it should not be possible that 
the use of a specific language changes the structure of innate concepts. The specific nature of 
different languages is seen as having little consequence on these processes. The problem with this 
is that many recent experiments show that there is an influence of language use on conceptual 
categorization processes (see section 2, chapter II). In the experiments presented here, it is 
hypothesized that language modality might be responsible for the result that syntagmatically 
related concepts such as action or attributes are overall more strongly related to the referent than 
paradigmatic semantic relations. The basic explanation of this effect is that, through the habitual 
use of polycomponential and iconic signs, the semantic relations between a referent and 
syntagmatically related concepts grow stronger in signers of a visual-gestural language than in 
speakers of an audio-vocal language. April 19~20  
The effects go beyond ‘thinking for speaking’ (Slobin, 1996) because the findings here with 
users of German Sign Language indicate that the language one uses can influence conceptual 
categorization even when speaking/signing is not directly required, as in the picture verification 
task. Moreover, in cross-modal bilinguals the results show that both the visual-gestural language 
and the audio-vocal language have an impact on the structure of their concepts, regardless of 
whether the categorization is language based or pictorial based. Since they show the same pattern 
of categoriazation in every experimental condition, but different responses compared to the deaf 
and hearing, it seems very likely that both language modalities have modulated their conceptual 
structures. As previously discussed, the reason for this might be that the users of a sign language 
are subjects of certain constrains, but also advantages which are caused by modality. Because of 
working memory and articulation constrains (Emmorey & Wilson, 2006), they are forced to pay 
attention to specific aspects of the referent, whereby through the advantages of polysynthesism 
and iconicity, signers are able to compensate the articulation constrains of the modality. The 
differences in language structures then lead to differences in the conceptual structure, whether 
the concepts are activated through language or pictures.  
But how does this actually happen? What is the biological account for an influence of 
language modality on conceptual categorization? In order to explain such a hypothesis, the author 
of this thesis relies on the theory of neuronal group selection (TNGS) (Edelman, 1987, 1995, 2002, 
2004) and Damasios convergence-divergence framework (Meyer & Damasio, 2009) and assumes 
that the processes of conceptual and perceptual categorization are considered to be connected 
and based on a dynamic self-organizing system. Concepts are complex overlapping patterns of 
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activity distributed across a relatively large number of processing neurons. They do not reside as 
stable units permanently in memory (representational view), instead conceptual meaning is 
always newly generated by multiregional retro-activation of widespread time-locked fragmented 
traces (Hintzman, 1986; Damasio 1989, 1989, 1989; Singer, 1995, Edelman 2001). In general, the 
brain holds traces of the neural activity, but these traces are influenced by interaction with the 
external reality and the use of a language. Concepts are based on patterns of synaptic connections 
which can be reactivated to recreate sets of activity during communication. Both the linguistic 
phonological forms and the related semantic concepts are embodied in ensembles of neurons 
within the brain. The linguistic form is either vocal or gestural and in the first line a sensory input 
which triggers activation of multiple reentrant local maps (topographically organized neuronal 
groups) that are able to interact with non-mapped parts of the brain and convey the sensory 
information to higher-order structures. If the sound or sign input (e.g. for ‘eagle’) activates sets of 
neurons in the left hemisphere that formulate a neural circuit depicting a linguistic unit, 
conceptual categories that are constituted in a second set of structures, i.e. a larger collection of 
neural systems in both the right and left cerebral hemispheres, become activated. Thus, in the 
process of language perception, i.e. symbolic perception, all the neurons that are correlated with 
a specific linguistic unit activate a dispositional neural pattern in the higher-order association 
cortices, whereby each activated pattern of neurons can stimulate another one and thereby 
recreating a conceptual image (the recalled concept of ‘eagle’). First and foremost in the process 
of perceptual categorization, i.e. sensory perception, the phonological form activates sets of 
neurons which are different from those activated through the perception of a linguistic symbol. 
But what happens when the phonological form is iconic and corresponds directly to a specific 
concept (e.g. the iconic form of the sign ‘eagle’ resembles the ‘beak’ of an ‘eagle’)? Focusing on 
the iconic form of an iconic linguistic stimuli, i.e. iconizing a symbol (Grote & Linz, 2003), may 
activate another dispositional neural pattern in the higher-order association cortices, thus 
recreating the conceptual image of a ‘beak’. The moment the signer realizes the connection 
between the iconic form and the corresponding meaning, i.e. the ‘beak’, it might produce a 
substantial value for the whole concept of an ‘eagle’. Thus, the high degree of iconicity and 
simultaneity, i.e. correspondences between the linguistic form and properties of the referent in 
sign languages, might have important implications for the relationship between language and 
neural connections in the brain. In the described frame of reference the existence of signed 
languages raises a multitude of issues in regard to the interplay between language, modality and 
conceptualization processes. Semioticians in the tradition of Saussure theorize that meaning is 
always bound up with a linguistic form, i.e. the linguistic sign and the connected semantic concept 
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are two aspects of a unitary phenomenological entity and as inseparable as the two sides of a 
piece of paper (Saussure, 1916). In fact, it is possible to focus on either form or content of the sign 
and thereby activate different neural curcuits. Jäger (2004b) calls the different ‘Aggregatzustände’ 
of communication ‘Störung’ and ‘Transparenz’. According to him, transcription is the transition 
from ‘Störung’ to ‘Transparenz’, from decontextualization to recontextualization. ‘Störung’ is the 
perception of the material form of the sign and ‘transparenz’ the undisturbed perception of the 
content (p. 59 – 60). Thus, they are two functional states of media performances, which are 
constitutive for the process of transcription. 
However, according to Jäger (1997, 1999, 2000) language is a medium and its material 
form shapes the conceptual system. Since sign languages vary radically in form, meaning, and 
syntactic organization from spoken languages, language modality is essential to building certain 
embodied kinds of concepts. The results in this thesis, along with the studies of many other 
researchers, suggest possibilities concerning how language may shape and structure the 
conceptual system. They provide an indication that there are not discrete modules, but rather 
interconnections between nonlinguistic and linguistic cognitive domains in the mind. Further 
explorations of what aspects and how language might influence cognition can help shed a broader 
light on the nature of the interface between language and thought. If more far-reaching evidence 
is found that there is substantial variability in how languages in different modalities have an 
influence on the structure of concepts, the consequence of these findings would imply that the 
core assumptions held by supporters of Chomskyan linguistics were virtually unsustainable. If 
semantics varies cross-linguistically in various aspects, then one cannot maintain that language is 
a separate system from general cognition, that concepts are innate and that they are merely 
named by a language. The consequence of these considerations is to rethink the general nature 
of language. If more researchers support the presented findings through further empirical results, 
this development might eventually lead to a change in linguistic paradigm as Levinson and Evans 
predict (2010). 
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V. Appendices 
Appendix A 
Stimulus Items of Experiment 1: Measurement of Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic Semantic Relation 
in Deaf, Hearing and Bilinguals  
Sign and Words 
Code Semantic Relation 
Stimulus 1 
Related Stimulus 2 
Unrelated Stimulus 
2 
    Rose     
1 Superordinate   Blumen Auto 
2 Coordinate   Tulpe Stuhl 
3 Action   duften  rauchen  
4 Attribute   rot verrückt 
    Gurke     
1 Superordinate   Gemüse Fluß 
2 Coordinate   Möhre Lampe 
3 Action   schneiden fließen 
4 Attribute   grün lila 
    Tanne     
1 Superordinate   Bäume Motor 
2 Coordinate   Eiche Elefant 
3 Action   wachsen schmelzen 
4 Attribute   grün rosa 
    Apfel     
1 Superordinate   Obst Buch 
2 Coordinate   Banane Wal 
3 Action   pflücken fahren 
4 Attribute   rund bunt 
    Hund     
1 Superordinate   Tiere Stern 
2 Coordinate   Katze Salz 
3 Action   bellen malen 
4 Attribute   treu giftig 
    Taube     
1 Superordinate   Vögel Möbel 
2 Coordinate   Adler Heft 
3 Action   gurren schreiben 
4 Attribute   grau rosa 
    Mund     
1 Superordinate  Körperteile Kalender 
2 Coordinate  Auge Hund 
3 Action  küssen kochen 
4 Attribute   rot scharf 
    Rucksack     
1 Superordinate  Gepäck Computer 
2 Coordinate  Koffer Bäcker 
3 Action  tragen gießen 
4 Attribute   schwer böse 
    Küche     
1 Superordinate  Zimmer Weltall 
2 Coordinate  Bad Stier 
3 Action  backen lassen 
4 Attribute   gemütlich gemein 
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    Ring     
1 Superordinate  Schmuck Bagger 
2 Coordinate  Kette Schere 
3 Action  anstecken  essen 
4 Attribute   glänzend faul 
    Hemd     
1 Superordinate  Kleidung Besteck  
2 Coordinate  Rock Kreide 
3 Action  bügeln wachsen 
4 Attribute   dünn gesund 
    Tasse     
1 Superordinate  Geschirr Bekeidung 
2 Coordinate  Glas Schere 
3 Action  trinken schneiden 
4 Attribute   weiß magnetisch 
    Zange     
1 Superordinate  Werkzeug Obst 
2 Coordinate  Hammer Ball 
3 Action  ziehen singen 
4 Attribute   schwer weich 
    Bus     
1 Superordinate  Verkehrsmittel Anzug 
2 Coordinate  Zug Schlange 
3 Action  warten kochen 
4 Attribute   groß spitz 
    Bett     
1 Superordinate  Möbel Pflanze 
2 Coordinate  Schrank Flugzeug 
3 Action  schlafen baden 
4 Attribute   weich durchsichtig 
    Bild     
1 Superordinate  Kunstwerke Getränk 
2 Coordinate  Skulptur Lampe 
3 Action  malen gießen 
4 Attribute   bunt warm 
    Fleisch     
1 Superordinate  Lebensmittel Blume 
2 Coordinate  Gemüse Hose 
3 Action  braten  spielen 
4 Attribute   rot blau 
    Käse     
1 Superordinate  Milchprodukte Wolle 
2 Coordinate  Butter Essig 
3 Action  stinken schreiben 
4 Attribute   gelb fromm 
    Bier     
1 Superordinate  Alkohol Spielzeug 
2 Coordinate  Sekt Schaufel 
3 Action  gären bremsen 
4 Attribute   gelb weiß 
    Mord     
1 Superordinate  Verbrechen Werbung 
2 Coordinate  Raub Blech 
3 Action  töten singen 
4 Attribute   brutal lustig 
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Linguistically relevant dimensions (X) of Related-Stimulus 2 
Deaf Participants 
Stimulus 1 
Related 
Stimulus 2 
Code 
Sem.
Rel. 
Signs-
RT 
Signs-
Error Iconicity 
Image-
ability 
Famili-
arity 
Phon. 
Similarity 
Morphol. 
Similarity 
Video-
Length 
Apfel Obst 1 1779 0 60 100 70 0 1 1555 
Rose Blume 1 1668 0 80 90 82 0 0 1178 
Tasse Geschirr 1 1736 0 95 100 100 0 0 1852 
Tanne Baum 1 1893 0 100 100 95 0 0 1458 
Ring Schmuck 1 1849 0 100 100 56 0 0 1606 
Taube Vogel 1 1852 0 100 100 89 0 0 1360 
Hemd Kleidung 1 1891 0 100 100 89 0 0 1407 
Rucksack Gepäck 1 1776 1 66 100 75 0 0 1505 
Bett Möbel 1 1900 3 30 100 50 0 0 1515 
Gurke Gemüse 1 1913 2 70 100 70 0 0 1707 
Hund Tier 1 1875 1 91 100 71 0 0 1458 
Küche Zimmer 1 1952 1 90 100 58 0 0 1451 
Käse Milchprodukt 1 1935 2 77 65 68 0 0 1710 
Mord Verbrechen 1 1788 1 30 80 60 0 0 1404 
Ring Kette 2 1902 0 100 100 66 0 0 1309 
Hund Katze 2 1910 2 100 100 80 0 0 1511 
Rucksack Koffer 2 2070 2 100 100 51 1 0 1357 
Rose Tulpe 2 2006 1 90 100 72 0 1 1006 
Taube Adler 2 1982 0 100 100 58 0 0 1259 
Bus Zug 2 1877 1 61 100 81 0 0 959 
Apfel Banane 2 1888 2 100 100 100 0 0 1804 
Gurke Möhre 2 1934 0 70 100 50 0 0 1407 
Bett Schrank 2 1977 1 100 100 72 1 0 1508 
Tasse Glas 2 1999 3 98 100 100 0 0 1905 
Hemd Rock 2 2009 0 95 100 76 0 0 1407 
Tanne Eiche 2 1823 3 95 80 49 0 0 1710 
Mund Auge 2 1821 0 95 100 100 1 0 1306 
Käse Butter 2 1909 1 95 100 79 0 0 1559 
Mord Raub 2 1885 1 90 100 65 0 0 1205 
Küche Bad 2 1901 0 66 100 95 0 0 1357 
Taube picken 3 1482 1 100 100 68 0 0 2454 
Hund bellen 3 1570 0 90 100 80 0 0 1208 
Rose duften 3 1589 0 85 100 81 0 0 1710 
Ring anstecken 3 1519 0 100 100 80 0 1 1707 
Gurke schälen 3 1406 2 100 100 85 0 1 1905 
Mund küssen 3 1386 0 93 100 100 1 0 1357 
Hemd bügeln 3 1444 0 100 100 81 0 0 1508 
Bett schlafen 3 1572 0 100 100 65 0 0 1259 
Mord töten 3 1681 0 76 100 64 1 0 1259 
Tasse trinken 3 1679 0 94 100 65 0 1 1606 
Küche backen 3 1394 0 90 80 89 0 0 2101 
Tanne wachsen 3 1545 0 90 100 70 0 0 1262 
Käse stinken 3 1470 2 80 100 72 0 0 1855 
Apfel pflücken 3 1240 1 100 100 76 0 1 1606 
Bild  malen 3 1344 0 100 100 83 0 0 2101 
Rose rot 4 1738 0 100 100 80 0 0 1548 
Käse gelb 4 1680 0 40 100 91 0 0 1212 
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Gurke grün 4 1561 1 100 100 81 0 0 1404 
Mund rot 4 1561 0 100 100 80 1 0 1548 
Hund treu 4 1553 1 1 72 46 0 0 1360 
Taube grau 4 1528 0 20 91 78 0 0 1703 
Rucksack schwer 4 1527 0 100 100 89 0 1 1505 
Tanne grün 4 1611 0 100 100 90 0 0 1404 
Küche gemütlich 4 1598 2 30 98 49 0 0 1360 
Bett weich 4 1758 0 65 99 89 0 0 1407 
Tasse weiß 4 1691 3 98 100 93 0 0 1010 
Ring glänzend 4 1658 1 98 100 67 0 1 1707 
Bild bunt 4 1729 0 67 94 79 0 0 1498 
Correlation Between Deaf RT 
and X     0,01 -0,18 0,34     
-
0,351 
 
 
Hearing Participants 
Stimulus 1 
Related 
Stimulus 2 
Code 
Sem.Rel
. 
Wor
d-RT 
Word-
Error 
Image
ability 
Familiar
ity 
Phon. 
Similar
ity 
Morphol.
Similarity 
Video-
Length 
Match-
Meaning
-Range 
(Deaf 
and 
Hearing) 
Apfel Obst 1 880 0 65 64 0 0 761 89 
Rose Blume 1 779 0 87 78 0 0 780 94 
Tasse Geschirr 1 948 0 67 79 0 0 789 100 
Tanne Baum 1 882 0 83 80 0 0 624 98 
Ring Schmuck 1 695 0 79 68 0 0 646 96 
Taube Vogel 1 859 0 96 78 0 0 680 100 
Hemd Kleidung 1 944 0 72 71 0 0 917 92 
Rucksack Gepäck 1 829 0 66 64 0 0 805 100 
Bett Möbel 1 882 0 90 88 0 0 902 94 
Gurke Gemüse 1 879 0 89 82 0 0 786 97 
Hund Tier 1 798 0 79 87 0 0 485 85 
Küche Zimmer 1 1014 0 94 85 0 0 669 87 
Käse Milchprodukt 1 870 2 45 75 0 0 1017 45 
Mord Verbrechen 1 848 0 46 71 0 0 860 92 
Ring Kette 2 1186 0 69 69 0 0 629 100 
Hund Katze 2 1029 0 87 78 0 0 741 100 
Rucksack Koffer 2 936 0 88 79 0 0 637 100 
Rose Tulpe 2 1086 0 79 66 0 0 584 94 
Taube Adler 2 1025 0 85 80 0 0 666 99 
Bus Zug 2 1111 1 81 75 0 0 777 96 
Apfel Banane 2 1109 0 88 87 0 0 845 100 
Gurke Möhre 2 887 0 82 72 0 0 897 99 
Bett Schrank 2 880 3 87 87 0 0 653 100 
Tasse Glas 2 989 0 86 84 0 0 792 100 
Hemd Rock 2 919 0 87 67 0 0 515 96 
Tanne Eiche 2 969 1 74 51 0 0 685 86 
Mund Auge 2 962 1 83 83 0 0 663 100 
Käse Butter 2 886 0 91 83 0 0 573 92 
Mord Raub 2 924 0 69 67 0 0 741 88 
Küche Bad 2 1075 0 79 95 0 0 567 95 
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Taube picken 3 1140 1 66 62 0 0 655 78 
Hund bellen 3 1141 0 85 75 0 0 705 100 
Rose duften 3 936 0 21 41 0 0 769 94 
Ring anstecken 3 975 2 68 61 0 0 1012 91 
Gurke schälen 3 979 1 67 65 0 0 797 90 
Mund küssen 3 942 0 63 83 0 0 653 99 
Hemd bügeln 3 917 0 69 82 0 0 880 100 
Bett schlafen 3 1074 0 75 87 0 0 929 95 
Mord töten 3 874 0 52 61 0 0 620 85 
Tasse trinken 3 868 0 86 90 1 0 736 97 
Küche backen 3 841 0 82 76 0 0 668 84 
Tanne wachsen 3 1010 2 70 70 0 0 839 73 
Käse stinken 3 898 0 51 60 0 0 845 95 
Apfel pflücken 3 900 1 95 76 0 0 696 77 
Bild  malen 3 981 0 79 86 0 0 803 84 
Rose rot 4 1468 0 79 85 1 0 548 100 
Käse gelb 4 1048 3 67 68 0 0 734 94 
Gurke grün 4 999 0 79 77 0 0 711 100 
Mund rot 4 1067 0 79 72 0 0 548 100 
Hund treu 4 1148 1 74 73 0 0 651 84 
Taube grau 4 1025 0 65 75 0 0 638 100 
Rucksack schwer 4 1063 0 85 76 0 0 729 65 
Tanne grün 4 976 1 70 74 0 0 711 100 
Küche gemütlich 4 1130 2 69 77 0 0 904 69 
Bett weich 4 1043 0 75 79 0 0 682 61 
Tasse weiß 4 1261 3 89 89 0 0 666 70 
Ring glänzend 4 974 0 82 65 0 0 1018 71 
Bild bunt 4 1229 2 86 84 0 0 565 89 
Correlation Between Hearing RT and 
X     0,10 -0,01     -0,13   
 
Experimental conditions in Experiment 1 (Verification Task): 
(1) Task with Signs  (2) Task with Words  (3) Task with Pictures 
 
Three different experimental conditions, i.e. with signs, words and pictures. The stimuli were 
displayed one at a time on the computer monitor.  
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Experiment 1: 22 Items excluded prior to the ANOVA 
Code Sem.Relation Stimulus 1 Stimulus 2 
    Bier   
1 Superordinate  Alkohol 
2 Coordinate  Sekt 
3 Action  gären 
4 Attribute   gelb 
    Fleisch   
1 Superordinate  Lebensmittel 
2 Coordinate  Gemüse 
3 Action  braten  
4 Attribute   rot 
    Bild   
1 Superordinate  Kunstwerke 
2 Coordinate  Skulptur 
    Bus   
1 Superordinate  Verkehrsmittel 
3 Action  warten 
4 Attribute   groß 
    Hemd   
4 Attribute   dünn 
    Mund   
1 Superordinate  Körperteile 
    Apfel   
4 Attribute   rund 
    Rucksack   
3 Action  tragen 
    Mord   
1 Attribute   brutal 
    Zange   
1 Superordinate  Werkzeug 
2 Coordinate  Hammer 
3 Action  ziehen 
4 Attribute   schwer 
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Appendix B 
Experiment 1: Response Times of Deaf, Hearing and Bilingual in den Verification Task with Signs, 
Words and Pictures (Subject Analysis) 
  Linguistic (Signs / Words) Pictorial (Pictures) 
  
Super-
ordinate Coordinate Action Attribute 
Super-
ordinate Coordinate Action Attribute 
Deaf 1975 2062 1233 1563 1059 1290 1257 1249 
  2006 2065 1715 1862 1370 1480 1394 1313 
  1542 1607 1161 1321 967 1263 1064 1169 
  1686 1764 1292 1555 1180 1201 1317 1404 
  1702 1820 1372 1447 1333 1676 1553 1609 
  1602 1574 1231 1348 1011 936 1075 1022 
  2022 2126 1883 1945         
  1887 2029 1604 1649 1960 1852 1716 1766 
          1942 1932 1752 1749 
  1698 1838 1506 1544 1262 1136 1222 1310 
          1491 1735 1394 1570 
  2109 2454 1591 1799 1778 1984 1687 1808 
  1638 1719 1314 1496 1210 1344 1317 1279 
  1863 1925 1355 1567         
  1853 1970 1494 1685 1383 1473 1009 1143 
  1575 1474 1396 1470 1398 1299 1398 1188 
  1787 1904 1581 1670 1483 1695 1644 1597 
  2074 2198 1678 1817 1432 1524 1548 1592 
  2073 2082 1703 1761 1726 1789 1277 1377 
  2107 2214 1631 1906 1463 1578 1566 1706 
  1858 1951 1443 1525 1194 1466 1165 1355 
  1804 1847 1577 1676 1804 1724 1434 1606 
Mean 1844 1935 1488 1634 1414 1510 1399 1436 
SD 197 251 192 186 291 293 229 243 
Hearing 1176 1471 1356 1588 860 1039 1264 1187 
  684 671 726 760 531 580 757 711 
  851 833 933 1042 745 946 1025 1059 
  833 943 983 1127 702 910 969 973 
  559 606 595 703 583 709 790 767 
  642 665 627 625 495 703 688 617 
  1128 1518 1105 1453 839 1144 1152 1224 
  879 1055 1101 1132 760 943 1068 993 
  1013 1379 1179 1342 891 1127 1178 1319 
  972 1017 1017 1091 768 953 1093 1116 
  1196 1313 1273 1202 402 500 586 477 
  588 774 618 738 738 990 932 1048 
  729 753 808 994 807 1043 1128 1136 
  766 850 879 1066 731 948 977 990 
  1021 1128 976 1234 609 836 845 859 
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  620 770 599 827 721 832 919 979 
  997 1175 1141 1097 650 811 877 977 
  1223 1421 1594 1935 1065 1317 1476 1436 
  727 897 969 1375 674 890 853 979 
  695 722 830 868 632 731 824 908 
Mean 865 998 965 1110 710 898 970 988 
SD 214 294 269 324 150 195 210 230 
Bilingual  1792 2014 1730 1862 1176 1264 1145 1187 
(Signs) 1872 1994 1904 1872 1240 1375 1117 1003 
  1357 1431 1371 1737 1164 1238 1050 1052 
  1451 1519 1305 1610 1184 1232 1008 1076 
  1863 1925 1399 1618 875 969 994 1010 
  1909 1970 1531 1685 1041 1075 1117 1022 
  1650 1631 1467 1473 1083 1192 1061 1196 
  1774 2092 1579 1771 562 678 679 785 
  1400 1960 1158 1576 855 787 787 852 
  1657 1582 1450 1917 904 1101 911 1023 
  1426 1642 1419 1544 963 1296 968 1046 
  1845 1951 1459 1570 1019 1131 1009 1145 
  1844 1883 1577 1734 1205 1317 1272 1279 
  2048 2202 1999 1802 1055 1152 978 1233 
  1682 1649 1420 1867 1212 1324 1221 1268 
  2036 2127 1765 2217 1108 1378 1280 1374 
  1627 1862 1625 2027 992 1093 980 1113 
  1844 1977 1696 1378 1414 1544 1452 1504 
  1371 1525 1405 1641 861 953 911 1088 
  1768 1820 1376 1512 715 928 811 917 
Mean 1711 1838 1532 1721 1031 1151 1038 1109 
SD 215 225 206 203 199 212 183 172 
Bilingual  1021 1105 1032 1113         
(Words) 1074 1152 1143 1220         
  978 1052 653 760         
  1203 1150 689 776         
  1061 1271 1156 1348         
  615 770 599 827         
  1198 1299 911 1135         
  1105 1278 1286 1310         
  1121 1197 810 976         
  1210 1331 687 1172         
  1110 1280 1045 1244         
  1034 1220 998 1285         
  864 927 970 1009         
  1533 1665 996 1181         
  1108 1190 802 1098         
  1069 1125 1179 1242         
  967 917 617 691         
  1188 1203 968 1103         
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  876 943 873 1002         
  1517 1657 1251 1446         
Mean 1093 1187 933 1097         
SD 204 219 213 208         
Experiment 1: Response Times of Deaf, Hearing and Bilingual in den Verification Task with Signs, Words and Pictures 
(Item Analysis) 
Stimulus 
1 
Related 
Stimulus 2 
Code 
Sem.Rel. 
Signs-
Deaf 
Pictures-
Deaf 
Words-
Hearing 
Pictures-
Hearing 
Signs-
Bilingual 
Words-
Bilingual 
Pictures-
Bilingual 
Apfel Obst 1 1779 1353 880 692 1557 1075 1119 
Rose Blume 1 1668 1258 779 661 1793 1230 1104 
Tasse Geschirr 1 1736 1362 948 821 1631 923 1078 
Tanne Baum 1 1893 1479 882 817 1745 1107 963 
Ring Schmuck 1 1849 1523 695 747 1780 1291 907 
Taube Vogel 1 1852 1358 859 798 1804 1136 1167 
Hemd Kleidung 1 1891 1364 944 767 1569 1178 1148 
Rucksack Gepäck 1 1776 1268 829 723 1609 949 1087 
Bett Möbel 1 1900 1534 882 793 1739 1084 936 
Gurke Gemüse 1 1913 1501 879 639 1680 1072 812 
Hund Tier 1 1875 1330 798 562 1815 986 1130 
Küche Zimmer 1 1952 1567 1014 616 1784 1217 1129 
Käse Milchprodukt 1 1935 1583 870 720 1765 1008 972 
Mord Verbrechen 1 1788 1427 848 581 1679 1031 887 
Ring Kette 2 1902 1552 1186 905 1834 1235 1155 
Hund Katze 2 1910 1343 1029 822 1806 1143 1263 
Rucksack Koffer 2 2070 1502 936 849 1910 1330 1219 
Rose Tulpe 2 2006 1513 1086 933 1913 988 984 
Taube Adler 2 1982 1586 1025 999 1965 1358 1172 
Bus Zug 2 1877 1506 1111 915 1940 1064 1266 
Apfel Banane 2 1888 1478 1109 942 1855 1095 1097 
Gurke Möhre 2 1934 1448 887 792 1778 1082 1146 
Bett Schrank 2 1977 1400 880 894 1835 1312 1158 
Tasse Glas 2 1999 1669 989 871 1853 1222 1067 
Hemd Rock 2 2009 1589 919 994 1857 1462 1139 
Tanne Eiche 2 1823 1537 969 897 1797 1036 1222 
Mund Auge 2 1821 1525 962 760 1786 1103 1195 
Käse Butter 2 1909 1589 886 950 1647 1183 1243 
Mord Raub 2 1885 1490 924 833 1879 1218 1129 
Küche Bad 2 1901 1581 1075 1008 1754 1143 960 
Taube picken 3 1482 1290 1140 982 1515 984 1040 
Hund bellen 3 1570 1468 1141 1000 1653 853 1091 
Rose duften 3 1589 1422 936 1026 1557 972 1125 
Ring anstecken 3 1519 1398 975 833 1614 973 985 
Gurke schälen 3 1406 1425 979 997 1494 1079 1153 
Mund küssen 3 1386 1222 942 810 1474 881 927 
Hemd bügeln 3 1444 1358 917 989 1568 999 1024 
Bett schlafen 3 1572 1271 1074 1000 1513 1035 922 
Mord töten 3 1681 1519 874 1077 1482 890 978 
Tasse trinken 3 1679 1439 868 1110 1466 1059 1162 
Küche backen 3 1394 1545 841 1050 1474 792 996 
Tanne wachsen 3 1545 1440 1010 888 1588 822 1153 
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Käse stinken 3 1470 1298 898 946 1480 934 1018 
Apfel pflücken 3 1240 1360 900 957 1582 922 940 
Bild  malen 3 1344 1379 981 883 1520 803 1057 
Rose rot 4 1738 1504 1468 1030 1744 1172 1301 
Käse gelb 4 1680 1656 1048 1149 1727 1279 1125 
Gurke grün 4 1561 1499 999 936 1699 1052 1212 
Mund rot 4 1561 1345 1067 880 1652 973 1036 
Hund treu 4 1553 1451 1148 1006 1791 780 1077 
Taube grau 4 1528 1244 1025 970 1792 1049 1155 
Rucksack schwer 4 1527 1327 1063 950 1652 1219 1151 
Tanne grün 4 1611 1238 976 889 1720 1090 981 
Küche gemütlich 4 1598 1547 1130 1085 1516 1213 1028 
Bett weich 4 1758 1387 1043 951 1751 1045 1119 
Tasse weiß 4 1691 1605 1261 1037 1708 984 1048 
Ring glänzend 4 1658 1377 974 877 1863 1114 1059 
Bild bunt 4 1729 1548 1229 1081 1754 1290 1127 
Experiment 1: Response Times of Deaf in den Verification Task with Signs (corrected for the time a video-sign is longer 
than an audio-word (subject analysis) 
  Linguistic (Signs) (corrected Video Duration) 
  Super-ordinate Coordinate Action Attribute 
Deaf 1245 1337 376 828 
  1276 1340 858 1127 
  812 882 304 586 
  956 1039 435 820 
  972 1095 515 712 
  872 849 374 613 
  1292 1401 1026 1210 
  1157 1304 747 914 
      
  968 1113 649 809 
      
  1379 1729 734 1064 
  908 994 457 761 
  1133 1200 498 832 
  1123 1245 637 950 
  845 749 539 735 
  1057 1179 724 935 
  1344 1473 821 1082 
  1343 1357 846 1026 
  1377 1489 774 1171 
  1128 1226 586 790 
  1074 1122 720 941 
Mean 1114 1210 629 899 
SD 197 251 201 186 
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Experiment 1: Response Times of Deaf in den Verification Task with Signs (corrected for the time a 
video-sign is longer than an audio-word (itemanalysis) 
Stimulus 1 Related Stimulus 2 Code Sem.Rel. Signs-Deaf-corrected RT 
Apfel Obst 1 1049 
Rose Blume 1 938 
Tasse Geschirr 1 1006 
Tanne Baum 1 1163 
Ring Schmuck 1 1119 
Taube Vogel 1 1122 
Hemd Kleidung 1 1161 
Rucksack Gepäck 1 1046 
Bett Möbel 1 1170 
Gurke Gemüse 1 1183 
Hund Tier 1 1145 
Küche Zimmer 1 1222 
Käse Milchprodukt 1 1205 
Mord Verbrechen 1 1058 
Ring Kette 2 1177 
Hund Katze 2 1185 
Rucksack Koffer 2 1345 
Rose Tulpe 2 1281 
Taube Adler 2 1257 
Bus Zug 2 1152 
Apfel Banane 2 1163 
Gurke Möhre 2 1209 
Bett Schrank 2 1252 
Tasse Glas 2 1274 
Hemd Rock 2 1284 
Tanne Eiche 2 1098 
Mund Auge 2 1096 
Käse Butter 2 1184 
Mord Raub 2 1160 
Küche Bad 2 1176 
Taube picken 3 625 
Hund bellen 3 713 
Rose duften 3 732 
Ring anstecken 3 662 
Gurke schälen 3 549 
Mund küssen 3 529 
Hemd bügeln 3 587 
Bett schlafen 3 715 
Mord töten 3 824 
Tasse trinken 3 822 
Küche backen 3 537 
Tanne wachsen 3 688 
Käse stinken 3 613 
Apfel pflücken 3 383 
Bild  malen 3 487 
Rose rot 4 1003 
Käse gelb 4 945 
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Gurke grün 4 826 
Mund rot 4 826 
Hund treu 4 818 
Taube grau 4 793 
Rucksack schwer 4 792 
Tanne grün 4 876 
Küche gemütlich 4 863 
Bett weich 4 1023 
Tasse weiß 4 956 
Ring glänzend 4 923 
Bild bunt 4 994 
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Appendix C 
Experimental conditions in Experiment 2 (Triad-Comparison Task): 
 (1) Task with Signs (2) Task with Words (3) Task with Pictures 
 
Three different experimental conditions, i.e. with signs, words and pictures. The stimuli were 
displayed one at a time on the computer monitor.  
Experiment 2: Number of Choices (%) of Deaf, Hearing and Bilingual in den Verification Task with 
Signs, Words and Pictures (Subject Analysis) 
  Linguistic (Signs / Words) Pictorial (Pictures) 
  
Super-
ordinate Coordinate Action Attribute 
Super-
ordinate Coordinate Action Attribute 
Deaf 10,99 5,49 51,65 31,87 15,63 7,29 42,71 34,38 
  27,47 6,59 40,66 25,27 25,00 2,08 47,92 25,00 
  20,00 7,78 46,67 25,56 22,92 2,08 43,75 31,25 
  28,89 6,67 44,44 20,00 35,42 5,21 38,54 20,83 
  20,00 17,78 42,22 20,00 16,67 9,38 40,63 33,33 
  24,44 3,33 44,44 27,78 27,08 1,04 32,29 39,58 
  12,50 12,50 48,86 26,14 31,58 11,58 34,74 22,11 
  24,72 8,99 44,94 21,35 31,58 11,58 34,74 22,11 
  6,74 23,60 39,33 30,34 25,26 8,42 41,05 25,26 
  21,98 2,20 47,25 28,57 23,16 7,37 33,68 35,79 
  26,97 13,48 42,70 16,85 20,83 4,17 40,63 34,38 
  20,88 5,49 43,96 29,67 36,46 6,25 39,58 17,71 
  20,88 18,68 37,36 23,08 21,88 1,04 39,58 37,50 
  29,67 6,59 43,96 19,78 20,00 14,00 37,50 29,17 
  17,58 10,99 47,25 24,18 25,26 6,32 41,05 27,37 
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  26,67 5,56 43,33 24,44 27,08 4,17 46,88 21,88 
  30,77 9,89 39,56 19,78 21,05 4,21 42,11 32,63 
  38,46 7,69 40,66 13,19 41,05 3,16 36,84 18,95 
  16,48 6,59 45,05 31,87 30,21 8,33 32,29 29,17 
  31,46 7,87 32,58 28,09 17,71 13,54 41,67 27,08 
Mean 22,88 9,39 43,34 24,39 25,79 6,56 39,41 28,27 
SD 7,69 5,43 4,28 5,12 6,86 3,98 4,40 6,46 
Hearing 36,26 21,98 27,47 14,29 46,88 13,54 16,67 22,92 
  30,00 22,22 31,11 16,67 38,30 18,09 29,79 13,83 
  38,46 20,88 28,57 12,09 43,75 16,67 22,92 16,67 
  24,18 29,67 28,57 17,58 29,47 12,63 36,84 21,05 
  29,67 19,78 34,07 16,48 38,54 9,38 35,42 16,67 
  40,66 12,09 26,37 20,88 41,67 13,54 23,96 20,83 
  37,36 8,79 36,26 17,58 34,38 14,06 31,25 20,31 
  46,43 23,81 20,24 9,52 50,00 28,42 14,74 7,00 
  36,26 10,99 31,87 20,88 30,21 25,00 35,42 9,38 
  36,26 19,78 25,27 18,68 31,25 17,71 30,21 20,83 
  30,00 26,67 23,33 20,00 37,50 22,92 22,92 16,67 
  37,36 19,78 31,87 10,99 28,13 18,75 36,46 16,67 
  30,77 8,79 41,76 18,68 43,16 20,00 29,47 7,37 
  31,87 13,19 32,97 21,98 30,21 13,54 33,33 22,92 
  29,67 20,88 27,47 21,98 41,67 25,00 22,92 10,42 
  38,46 18,68 29,67 13,19 29,47 22,11 27,37 21,05 
  32,18 9,20 37,93 20,69 32,63 13,68 31,58 22,11 
  24,36 28,21 26,92 20,51 34,78 19,57 22,83 22,83 
  20,88 36,26 27,47 15,38 38,54 21,88 25,00 14,58 
  35,16 17,58 27,47 19,78 23,16 14,74 24,21 37,89 
Mean 33,31 19,46 29,83 17,39 36,18 18,06 27,66 18,10 
SD 6,15 7,45 5,07 3,75 6,98 5,02 6,36 6,98 
Bilingual  18,68 5,49 43,96 31,87 43,16 12,63 18,95 25,26 
(Signs) 30,77 6,59 37,36 25,27 33,33 13,98 33,33 19,35 
  25,56 7,78 41,11 25,56 37,50 14,58 27,08 20,83 
  32,22 6,67 41,11 20,00 24,21 10,53 40,00 25,26 
  22,22 17,78 40,00 20,00 28,13 5,21 43,75 22,92 
  30,00 3,33 38,89 27,78 38,54 9,38 26,04 26,04 
  19,32 11,36 42,05 27,27 28,13 10,94 37,50 23,44 
  30,34 6,74 39,33 23,60 48,42 28,42 15,79 7,37 
  18,68 16,48 40,66 24,18 16,67 14,58 38,54 30,21 
  12,36 19,10 33,71 34,83 27,08 16,67 33,33 22,92 
  35,56 13,33 26,67 24,44 32,29 17,71 28,13 21,88 
  27,47 2,20 41,76 28,57 18,75 8,33 40,63 32,29 
  32,22 12,22 37,78 17,78 32,63 14,74 34,74 17,89 
  26,37 5,49 38,46 29,67 23,96 5,21 37,50 33,33 
  27,47 16,48 30,77 25,27 33,33 18,75 29,17 18,75 
  34,07 5,49 39,56 20,88 24,21 14,74 30,53 30,53 
  23,08 10,99 41,76 24,18 27,37 8,42 34,74 29,47 
  32,22 4,44 37,78 25,56 27,17 18,48 27,17 27,17 
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  35,16 8,79 35,16 20,88 20,83 38,54 23,96 16,67 
  43,96 5,49 35,16 15,38 20,00 14,74 27,37 37,89 
Mean 28 9 38 25 29 15 31 24 
SD 7 5 4 5 8 8 7 7 
Bilingual  28,57 6,59 40,66 24,18         
(Words) 25,56 8,89 45,56 20,00         
  19,78 5,49 36,26 38,46         
  18,68 29,67 34,07 17,58         
  24,18 6,59 39,56 29,67         
  32,97 10,99 34,07 21,98         
  30,77 5,49 42,86 20,88         
  36,47 23,53 30,59 9,41         
  27,47 7,69 40,66 24,18         
  28,57 19,78 32,97 18,68         
  23,33 14,44 30,00 32,22         
  24,18 6,59 39,56 29,67         
  28,57 7,69 43,96 19,78         
  24,18 9,89 40,66 25,27         
  25,27 20,88 31,87 21,98         
  29,67 6,59 36,26 27,47         
  28,41 9,09 42,05 20,45         
  20,00 26,25 32,50 21,25         
  15,38 36,26 32,97 15,38         
  30,77 16,48 31,87 20,88         
Mean 26,14 13,95 36,95 22,97         
SD 5,15 9,15 4,86 6,37         
Experiment 2: Number of Choices (%) of Deaf, Hearing and Bilingual in den Triad-Comparison- Task 
with Signs, Words and Pictures (Item Analysis) 
Stimulus 
1 
Related 
Stimulus 2 
Code 
Sem.Rel. 
Signs-
Deaf 
Pictures-
Deaf 
Words-
Hearing 
Pictures-
Hearing 
Signs-
Bilingual 
Words-
Bilingual 
Pictures-
Bilingual 
Apfel Obst 1 68,33 76,27 71,19 88,14 76,67 73,33 71,79 
Bett Möbel 1 30,00 35,00 38,98 66,10 31,67 33,90 50,00 
Bild Kunstwerk 1 8,33 20,00 31,03 52,54 5,00 42,50 57,50 
Bus Verkehrsmittel 1 60,00 66,67 83,05 80,00 66,67 80,00 64,41 
Gurke Gemüse 1 45,76 47,46 64,41 71,67 56,67 40,00 47,46 
Hemd Kleidung 1 38,33 40,00 52,54 67,80 47,46 43,59 60,00 
Hund Tiere 1 55,00 58,33 75,00 73,68 60,00 40,68 37,29 
Käse Milchprodukt 1 44,07 40,68 55,00 69,49 53,33 81,03 62,71 
Küche Zimmer 1 38,33 40,00 55,00 69,49 49,15 53,33 33,90 
Mord Verbrechen 1 23,73 30,51 38,98 58,62 6,25 50,00 67,80 
Ring Schmuck 1 58,33 65,00 80,00 77,97 63,33 56,67 70,18 
Rose Blumen 1 46,67 48,33 65,00 71,79 57,50 50,00 53,45 
Rucksack Gepäck 1 30,51 36,67 45,76 67,80 43,86 44,07 53,85 
Tanne Baum 1 58,33 61,67 77,97 74,14 60,00 76,27 75,00 
Tasse Geschirr 1 47,46 48,33 73,68 71,79 58,33 28,81 62,71 
Taube Vögel 1 61,02 66,67 83,33 82,50 73,33 50,00 55,93 
Apfel Banane 2 8,33 1,69 25,00 24,56 5,17 43,33 17,95 
Bett Schrank 2 13,33 11,67 32,20 27,59 15,00 18,33 17,54 
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Bus Zug 2 40,00 58,33 55,00 51,79 40,00 20,00 38,98 
Gurke Möhre 2 16,95 28,33 33,33 37,29 18,33 32,76 25,42 
Hemd Rock 2 10,17 8,33 26,32 25,42 11,67 34,21 28,81 
Hund Katze 2 16,67 15,25 33,33 32,76 18,33 37,29 26,67 
Käse Butter 2 15,25 11,67 32,20 30,51 16,07 27,59 18,64 
Küche Bad 2 26,67 37,29 43,33 45,76 26,67 26,67 36,21 
Mord Raub 2 23,73 36,67 41,67 41,03 26,67 25,00 22,03 
Mund Auge 2 8,33 0,00 22,03 22,03 5,00 15,00 37,50 
Ring Kette 2 30,00 46,67 44,07 50,00 31,67 37,29 38,98 
Rose Tulpe 2 26,67 43,33 43,33 47,46 27,78 10,00 24,14 
Rucksack Koffer 2 18,33 30,00 38,98 38,98 20,00 32,76 28,21 
Tanne Eiche 2 22,03 36,67 41,38 40,68 21,67 29,82 27,59 
Tasse Glas 2 10,34 8,47 28,81 27,12 15,00 33,33 47,46 
Taube Adler 2 17,24 28,81 38,98 38,33 18,33 28,81 28,81 
Apfel pflücken 4 38,33 33,33 18,97 33,90 45,00 40,00 60,00 
Bett schlafen 4 94,92 83,33 81,03 72,88 91,67 96,61 80,70 
Bild malen 4 61,67 51,67 36,67 49,15 66,67 95,00 55,00 
Gurke schneiden 4 86,67 76,27 71,19 64,41 81,67 57,63 66,10 
Hemd bügeln 4 51,67 40,00 22,03 37,93 50,00 71,79 70,00 
Hund bellen 4 90,00 81,36 79,66 70,18 90,00 81,67 77,97 
Käse stinken 4 78,33 66,67 45,76 54,24 74,58 45,76 73,21 
Küche backen 4 81,67 71,67 53,45 60,00 75,00 80,00 65,52 
Mord töten 4 88,14 80,00 71,19 68,33 88,33 96,67 77,97 
Mund küssen 4 56,67 50,00 33,90 47,46 66,10 79,49 79,31 
Ring anstecken 4 86,67 72,88 60,00 62,71 81,67 72,41 61,02 
Rose duften 4 73,33 65,00 45,00 51,72 72,22 79,66 62,71 
Tanne wachsen 4 62,71 56,67 43,33 50,00 70,00 18,64 33,90 
Tasse trinken 4 96,61 88,33 93,10 77,59 94,92 81,67 59,32 
Taube picken 4 81,36 68,33 49,15 54,24 75,00 66,67 54,24 
Apfel rund 5 55,00 58,33 45,61 44,83 56,67 43,33 56,90 
Bett weich 5 61,67 63,33 56,14 55,93 62,71 51,67 51,72 
Bild bunt 5 30,00 36,67 21,05 25,00 36,67 12,50 37,50 
Gurke grün 5 50,00 45,00 35,00 37,50 50,00 70,18 61,02 
Hund treu 5 38,33 38,33 25,42 25,42 47,50 40,00 58,33 
Käse gelb 5 61,67 61,67 55,00 49,15 61,67 45,76 46,43 
Küche gemütlich 5 53,33 49,15 35,59 38,33 55,00 40,00 64,41 
Mord brutal 5 64,41 71,67 56,90 55,93 63,33 28,33 32,20 
Mund rot 5 35,00 38,33 21,67 25,42 40,00 56,41 57,14 
Ring glänzend 5 25,00 13,33 8,33 17,24 30,00 33,90 30,51 
Rose rot 5 28,33 15,00 15,25 21,43 35,00 61,02 59,65 
Rucksack schwer 5 53,33 55,00 36,67 38,98 55,00 48,28 67,50 
Tanne grün 5 56,67 60,00 46,67 45,61 61,67 74,58 62,71 
Tasse weiß 5 45,00 41,67 30,51 32,20 50,00 55,93 30,51 
Taube grau 5 39,66 40,00 25,42 27,59 49,15 54,24 61,02 
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Appendix D 
Stimulus Items of Experiment 3: Measurement of Nonpolycomponetial und Polycomponential 
Semantic Relation in Deaf. 
Code 
Semantic 
Relation 
Stimulus 1 Related Stimulus 2 
Unrelated 
Stimulus 2 
    Ei     
nonpoly Action  kochen schießen 
poly Action  aufschlagen husten 
nonpoly Attribute  braun magnetisch 
poly Attribute   weich dünn 
    Maus     
nonpoly Action  knabbern unterrichten 
poly Action  verschwinden stinken 
nonpoly Attribute  grau rosa 
poly Attribute   klein bissig 
    Brille     
nonpoly Action  vergessen braten 
poly Action  schnutzig aufhängen 
nonpoly Attribute  aufsetzen laut 
poly Attribute   schief gefährlich 
    Fahrrad     
nonpoly Action  putzen sprudeln 
poly Action  reparieren schlafen 
nonpoly Attribute  defekt verückt 
poly Attribute   rostig lila 
    Auto     
nonpoly Action  bauen rausziehen 
poly Action  fahren trinken 
nonpoly Attribute  groß faul 
poly Attribute   schnell gesund 
    Gabel     
nonpoly Action  verbiegen tragen 
poly Action  spülen küssen 
nonpoly Attribute  alt viereckig 
poly Attribute   krumm braun 
    Knopf     
nonpoly Action  annähen krabbeln 
poly Action  abreißen beißen 
nonpoly Attribute  bunt böse 
poly Attribute   groß scharf 
    Kartoffel     
nonpoly Action  kochen anstecken 
poly Action  schälen gurren 
nonpoly Attribute  gelb durchsichtig 
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poly Attribute   dick magnetisch 
    Suppe     
nonpoly Action  kochen wachsen 
poly Action  umrühren bellen 
nonpoly Attribute  kalt blau 
poly Attribute   dick fromm 
    Boot     
nonpoly Action  leihem mischen 
poly Action  rudern pflücken 
nonpoly Attribute  klein geheim 
poly Attribute   langsam lustig 
    Hose     
nonpoly Action  waschen duften 
poly Action  anziehen schälen 
nonpoly Attribute  blau spitz 
poly Attribute   lang bissig 
    Glas     
nonpoly Action  eingießen rauchen 
poly Action  spülen fließen 
nonpoly Attribute  dünn weich 
poly Attribute   groß gemütlich 
    Katze     
nonpoly Action  schlafen weinen 
poly Action  schleichen fahren 
nonpoly Attribute  schwarz schwer 
poly Attribute   weich praktisch 
    Brot     
nonpoly Action  backen spielen 
poly Action  schneiden schreiben 
nonpoly Attribute  lecker treu 
poly Attribute   weich lila 
    Kirsche     
nonpoly Action  ernten töten 
poly Action  essen einpacken 
nonpoly Attribute  süß grün 
poly Attribute   rund ansteckend 
    Pfeife     
nonpoly Action  duften schmelzen 
poly Action  qualmen fahren 
nonpoly Attribute  braun brutal 
poly Attribute   lang naß 
    Honig     
nonpoly Action  essen malen 
poly Action  schlecken fliegen 
nonpoly Attribute  süß streng 
poly Attribute   klebrig spannend 
    Buch     
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nonpoly Action  kaufen fliegen 
poly Action  lesen kochen 
nonpoly Attribute  neu heiß 
poly Attribute   dick glänzend 
    Haare     
nonpoly Action  färben schneiden 
poly Action  schneiden baden 
nonpoly Attribute  blond rund 
poly Attribute   kurz grün 
    Sonne     
nonpoly Action  wärmen lesen 
poly Action  scheinen brennen 
nonpoly Attribute  gelb schön 
poly Attribute   heiß gelb 
 
Experiment 3: Excluded Items 
Fahrrad     
 putzen sprudeln 
 reparieren schlafen 
 defekt verückt 
  rostig lila 
Gabel     
 verbiegen tragen 
 spülen küssen 
 alt viereckig 
  krumm braun 
Suppe     
 kochen wachsen 
 umrühren bellen 
 kalt blau 
  dick fromm 
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Experiment 3: Linguistically relevant dimensions  
Stimulus 
1 
Action-Related 
Stimulus 
RT 
Word-
Error 
(Missings) 
Image-
ability 
Famili-
arity 
Phon. 
Similarity 
Morphol. 
Similarity 
Video-
Length 
Nonpolycomponential Actions 
Buch kaufen 1623 0 67 82 0 0 1328 
Maus knabbern 1638 1 95 67 0 0 2055 
Boot leihen 1579 0 74 83 0 0 1608 
Glas eingießen 1517 0 95 96 0 0 1906 
Auto bauen 1816 0 85 82 0 0 1507 
Katze schlafen 1619 0 94 75 0 0 1259 
Hose waschen 1578 0 85 92 0 0 1696 
Haare färben 1552 2 88 78 0 0 1850 
Knopf annähen 1349 0 94 85 0 0 1648 
Kartoffel kochen 1449 0 81 74 0 0 1638 
Brille vergessen 1555 0 45 99 0 0 1348 
Ei kochen 1678 0 88 78 0 0 1345 
Brot backen 1423 0 92 83 0 0 2101 
Honig essen 1488 0 93 97 0 0 1507 
Kirsche ernten 1505 3 86 65 0 0 1504 
Sonne wärmen 1446 0 90 89 0 0 1611 
Pfeife duften 1434 0 68 94 0 0 1710 
Buch neu 1626 0 96 89 0 0 1092 
Maus grau 1615 0 86 52 1 1 1703 
Boot klein 1618 0 80 97 0 0 1551 
Glas dünn 1635 0 76 81 0 1 1851 
Auto groß 1714 0 72 92 0 0 1652 
Katze schwarz 1385 0 81 79 0 0 1195 
Hose blau 1551 0 94 38 0 0 1103 
Haare blond 1616 0 28 78 0 0 1099 
Knopf bunt 1577 0 82 92 0 0 1498 
Kartoffel gelb 1812 0 74 88 0 0 1212 
Brille schmutzig 1713 1 88 66 0 0 1951 
Ei braun 1645 0 95 83 0 0 1548 
Brot lecker 1571 0 94 79 0 0 1558 
Honig süß 1479 0 80 76 0 0 1302 
Kirsche rot 1710 0 57 71 0 0 1548 
Sonne gelb 1628 0 89 75 0 0 1212 
Pfeife braun 1772 0 84 81 0 0 1548 
Buch lesen 1487 0 89 77 0 1 1802 
         
Maus verschwinden 1549 1 86 87 0 0 1450 
Boot rudern 1471 0 94 87 0 0 1403 
Glas spülen 1608 0 73 78 0 1 1750 
Auto fahren 1560 0 80 99 0 0 1551 
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Katze schleichen 1416 0 87 91 0 0 1750 
Hose anziehen 1550 0 80 59 0 0 1403 
Haare schneiden 1393 0 95 91 0 0 1594 
Knopf abreißen 1353 0 83 70 1 0 1692 
Kartoffel schälen 1275 0 76 50 1 0 1905 
Brille aufsetzen 1285 0 87 83 0 0 1426 
Ei aufschlagen 1520 0 84 73 0 1 1773 
Brot schneiden 1539 0 80 82 0 1 1426 
Honig schlecken 1404 0 87 88 0 0 1726 
Kirsche essen 1458 0 82 84 0 0 1972 
Sonne scheinen 1540 0 78 84 1 0 1669 
Pfeife qualmen 1508 1 96 78 0 0 1925 
Buch dick 1632 0 84 95 0 0 1627 
Maus klein 1480 0 99 96 0 0 1623 
Boot langsam 1444 0 91 95 0 0 2117 
Glas groß 1323 0 93 67 0 0 1720 
Auto schnell 1643 0 84 51 0 0 1430 
Katze weich 1547 0 77 68 0 0 1625 
Hose lang 1775 0 91 72 0 0 1669 
Haare kurz 1360 0 92 92 0 0 1726 
Knopf groß 1474 0 95 93 0 1 1676 
Kartoffel dick 1450 0 85 93 0 0 1424 
Brille schief 1691 0 87 81 0 0 1429 
Ei weich 1497 0 53 87 0 0 1521 
Brot weich 1432 0 64 78 0 0 1723 
Honig klebrig 1405 1 66 88 0 0 1819 
Kirsche rund 1575 0 62 90 0 0 1676 
Sonne heiß 1484 0 29 69 1 0 1827 
Pfeife lang 1477 1 87 86 0 0 1525 
Correlation Between RT and X 0,00 0,12 0,00 -0,36 0,09 0,17 
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Experiment 3: Example of a basic level item and related polycomponential and 
nonpolycomponential attributes and actions. 
 
 
 
 
  
Action Attribute 
Polycomponential 
Nonpolycomponential 
Katze 
schleichen 
schlafen schwarz 
Weich 
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Experiment 3: Response Times of Deaf in den Verification Task with Signs polycomponential and 
Nonpolycomponential Signs (Subject Analysis) 
  
Action-
nonpolycomponen
tial 
Attribute-
nonpolycomponen
tial 
Action-
polycomponential 
Attribute-
polycomponential 
Deaf 1532 1571 1505 1507 
  1816 1878 1664 1737 
  1313 1496 1289 1368 
  1293 1445 1240 1344 
  1489 1448 1420 1392 
  1389 1554 1389 1432 
  1864 1835 1775 1777 
  1688 1717 1590 1608 
  1735 1959 1801 1741 
  1545 1478 1377 1356 
  1416 1768 1445 1602 
  1770 1805 1753 1668 
  1374 1451 1332 1333 
  1477 1460 1290 1609 
  1447 1506 1423 1536 
  1538 1469 1455 1595 
  1305 1534 1368 1345 
  1462 1468 1330 1403 
  1885 1877 1596 1726 
  1869 1883 1619 1697 
  1340 1639 1295 1368 
  1416 1582 1264 1099 
Mean 1544 1628 1465 1511 
SD 199 176 174 179 
Experiment 3: Response Times of Deaf in den Verification Task with Polycomponential and 
Nonpolycomponential Signs (Item Analysis) 
  
Stimulus 
1 
Action-       
Related 
Stimulus 
Response 
Time 
Stimulus 
1 
Attribute-       
Related 
Stimulus 
Response 
Time 
Nonpoly-componential Buch kaufen 1623 Buch neu 1626 
 Maus knabbern 1638 Maus verschwinden 1615 
 Boot leihen 1579 Boot klein 1618 
 Glas eingießen 1517 Glas dünn 1635 
 Auto bauen 1816 Auto groß 1714 
 Katze schlafen 1619 Katze schwarz 1385 
 Hose waschen 1578 Hose blau 1551 
 Haare färben 1552 Haare blond 1616 
 Knopf annähen 1349 Knopf bunt 1577 
 Kartoffel kochen 1449 Kartoffel gelb 1812 
 Brille vergessen 1555 Brille schmutzig 1713 
 Ei kochen 1678 Ei braun 1645 
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 Brot backen 1423 Brot lecker 1571 
 Honig essen 1488 Honig süß 1479 
 Kirsche ernten 1505 Kirsche rot 1710 
 Sonne wärmen 1446 Sonne gelb 1628 
  Pfeife duften 1434 Pfeife braun 1772 
Poly-componential Buch lesen 1487 Buch dick 1632 
 Maus grau 1549 Maus klein 1480 
 Boot rudern 1471 Boot langsam 1444 
 Glas spülen 1608 Glas groß 1323 
 Auto fahren 1560 Auto schnell 1643 
 Katze schleichen 1416 Katze weich 1547 
 Hose anziehen 1550 Hose lang 1775 
 Haare schneiden 1393 Haare kurz 1360 
 Knopf abreißen 1353 Knopf groß 1474 
 Kartoffel schälen 1275 Kartoffel dick 1450 
 Brille aufsetzen 1285 Brille schief 1691 
 Ei aufschlagen 1520 Ei weich 1497 
 Brot schneiden 1539 Brot weich 1432 
 Honig schlecken 1404 Honig klebrig 1405 
 Kirsche essen 1458 Kirsche rund 1575 
 Sonne scheinen 1540 Sonne heiß 1484 
  Pfeife qualmen 1508 Pfeife lang 1477 
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Appendix E 
Experiment 4: Example of a basic level item and related polycomponential and 
nonpolycomponential attributes and actions. 
 
Task with signs 
Experiment 4: Number of Choices % of Deaf in Triad-ComparisonTask with Signs Polycomponential 
and Nonpolycomponential Signs (Subject Analysis) 
  
Action-
nonpolycomponential 
Attribute-
nonpolycomponential 
Action-
polycomponential 
Attribute-
polycomponential 
Deaf 13 5 45 38 
 21 7 37 36 
 16 10 39 34 
 21 9 41 29 
 21 10 36 33 
 19 7 40 35 
 13 12 44 31 
 17 7 44 32 
 13 14 38 36 
 14 14 38 34 
 22 14 30 34 
 14 6 43 37 
 17 14 37 31 
 16 9 36 39 
 15 17 38 30 
 21 7 36 36 
 14 10 44 32 
 20 7 37 36 
 23 13 34 30 
 26 10 34 29 
 16 6 39 39 
 24 11 25 41 
Mea
n 18 10 38 34 
SD 4 3 5 3 
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Experiment 3: Number of Choices % of Deaf in den Triad Comparison Task with Polycomponential 
and Nonpolycomponential Signs (Item Analysis) 
  Stimulus 1 
Action-       
Related 
Stimulus 
Number 
of Choices 
% 
Stimulus 1 
Number of 
Choices % 
Response 
Time 
Nonpolycomponential Buch kaufen 4 Buch neu 26 
 Maus knabbern 8 Maus verschwinden 19 
 Boot leihen 13 Boot klein 35 
 Glas eingießen 4 Glas dünn 36 
 Auto bauen 28 Auto groß 27 
 Katze schlafen 23 Katze schwarz 33 
 Hose waschen 25 Hose blau 37 
 Haare färben 4 Haare blond 44 
 Knopf annähen 25 Knopf bunt 52 
 Kartoffel kochen 31 Kartoffel gelb 37 
 Brille vergessen 29 Brille schmutzig 42 
 Ei kochen 31 Ei braun 37 
 Brot backen 27 Brot lecker 44 
 Honig essen 14 Honig süß 45 
 Kirsche ernten 13 Kirsche rot 43 
  Sonne wärmen 14 Sonne gelb 51 
Polycomponential Buch lesen 0 Buch dick 23 
 Maus grau 0 Maus klein 42 
 Boot rudern 27 Boot langsam 37 
 Glas spülen 49 Glas groß 29 
 Auto fahren 22 Auto schnell 30 
 Katze schleichen 54 Katze weich 33 
 Hose anziehen 58 Hose lang 34 
 Haare schneiden 36 Haare kurz 33 
 Knopf abreißen 36 Knopf groß 34 
 Kartoffel schälen 39 Kartoffel dick 34 
 Brille aufsetzen 36 Brille schief 27 
 Ei aufschlagen 30 Ei weich 39 
 Brot schneiden 45 Brot weich 27 
 Honig schlecken 57 Honig klebrig 39 
 Kirsche essen 69 Kirsche rund 38 
  Sonne scheinen 57 Sonne heiß 39 
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Appendix E 
Stimulus Items of Experiment 5: Measurement of Nonpolycomponential and Polycomponential 
Signs related to a Noun Referent in a Recognition Memory Task 
Target       
Polycomponential   
Non-Poly-Associated       
Distracter       
  Session 1   Session 2   Session 3   Session 4 
Number Remember Number Remember Number Remember Number Remember 
1 Tee 1 lernen 1 Mund 1 putzen 
2 spülen 2 Schrank 2 Haus 2 Apfel 
3 bügeln 3 Schnee 3 kurz 3 weich 
4 bremsen 4 heiß 4 fließen 4 Baum 
5 Brille 5 streng 5 ansteckend 5 malen 
6 saufen 6 braten 6 kicken 6 Mund 
7 Hund 7 weich 7 Affe 7 gießen 
8 süß 8 durchsichtig 8 hart 8 schief 
9 Tisch 9 leihen 9 Mädchen 9 Sonne 
10 lesen 10 glänzend 10 kochen 10 aufschlagen 
11 waschen 11 Gemüse 11 Sonne 11 dünn 
12 frech 12 reparieren 12 Kuh 12 giftig 
13 rudern 13 Hund 13 kostbar 13 Mond 
14 Haare 14 Bett 14 Bleistift 14 gerade 
15 scharf 15 Straße 15 naß 15 schreiben 
16 Beton 16 brutal 16 picken 16 fett 
17 Bild 17 schwer 17 abreißen 17 Himmel 
18 grün 18 galloppieren 18 weich 18 Tier 
19 Bus 19 spülen 19 kopieren 19 anstreichen 
20 dünn 20 liegen 20 groß 20 Knopf 
Number Recognize Number Recognize Number Recognize Number Recognize 
1 Lampe 1 Tanne 1 Kuh 1 Sekt 
2 waschen 2 glänzend 2 Haus 2 unterrichten 
3 Boot 3 verrückt 3 Kloster 3 Wohnung 
4 alt 4 reparieren 4 Fluß 4 Decke 
5 Tisch 5 Werbung 5 Bleistift 5 Vase 
6 Hund 6 aufmachen 6 Honig 6 aufschlagen 
7 backen 7 Leder 7 bauen 7 Knopf 
8 Bier 8 Lehrer 8 rauchen 8 Berg 
9 Haare 9 Straße 9 küssen 9 Brille 
10 Ameise 10 Magen 10 kräftig 10 wachsen 
11 Bus 11 lernen 11 reich 11 gären 
12 malen 12 Pfanne 12 naß 12 Apfel 
13 Beruf 13 stinken 13 Herd 13 Blumen 
14 Glas 14 Schule 14 weich 14 gemütlich 
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15 essen 15 Sonne 15 lustig 15 Tier 
16 Beton 16 grau 16 Krankheit 16 gurren 
17 faul 17 Schnee 17 groß 17 Straße 
18 lesen 18 Schrank 18 Schwanz 18 Mord 
19 Feder 19 starten 19 Ball 19 belesen 
20 warten 20 Fahrrad 20 ansteckend 20 malen 
21 Tee 21 Matratze 21 Salat 21 Dornen 
22 geheim 22 liegen 22 Suppe 22 fett 
23 dick 23 brennen 23 weinen 23 rot 
24 Meer 24 Glas 24 Eisen 24 Mond 
25 saufen 25 schlafen 25 Mund 25 Koffer 
26 dünn 26 Brücke 26 schmutzig 26 anstreichen 
27 Hut 27 Hund 27 fließen 27 Tafel 
28 Junge 28 weiß 28 putzen 28 magnetisch 
29 Hemd 29 kurvig 29 Zange 29 Baum 
30 jagen 30 fangen 30 fressen 30 annähen 
31 schneiden 31 Verbrechen 31 lieb 31 rund 
32 Kleidung 32 heiß 32 schleichen 32 schlank 
33 Krone 33 fromm 33 abreißen 33 blau 
34 bügeln 34 Geschirr 34 gelb 34 Pflanze 
35 lila 35 Ring 35 Draht 35 dünn 
36 Brille 36 Antenne 36 kicken 36 Bild 
37 frech 37 streng 37 spitz 37 Salz 
38 Zirkus 38 braten 38 Essig 38 weich 
39 treu 39 spülen 39 Schmuck 39 töten 
40 Messer 40 Butter 40 hart 40 schlecken 
41 Bild 41 Pferd 41 vergessen 41 pflücken 
42 singen 42 durchsichtig 42 Kochen 42 gießen 
43 Auto 43 weich 43 Mädchen 43 Nadeln 
44 wackelig 44 Gefängnis 44 Arzt 44 schief 
45 rund 45 Geld 45 Wasser 45 putzen 
46 Gras 46 leihen 46 Knopf 46 Buch 
47 Zucker 47 Banane 47 klebrig 47 Pfeife 
48 spülen 48 Buch 48 kurz 48 gerade 
49 Rock 49 Gemüse 49 Taube 49 Fleisch 
50 rudern 50 braun 50 Gesicht 50 schreiben 
51 bremsen 51 schwer 51 Fell 51 Melone 
52 trinken 52 bellen 52 Sonne 52 Geschenk 
53 Schale 53 Auge 53 Buch 53 Mund 
54 Hose 54 brutal 54 Keller 54 Ei 
55 scharf 55 Sofa 55 Bus 55 mischen 
56 Buch 56 klug 56 kostbar 56 giftig 
57 schwarz 57 gesund 57 Affe 57 gefährlich 
58 süß 58 Käse 58 Möhre 58 Kette 
59 grün 59 galoppieren 59 picken 59 Wand 
60 fest 60 Bett 60 Haare 60 Himmel 
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Experimental conditions in Experiment 5 (Recognition Memory Task): 
Experiment 5: False Positives in % and Response Times in ms of Deaf in the Memory Recognition 
Task with Polycomponential and Nonpolycomponential Signs (Subject Analysis) 
  False Positive Answers in % Response Time (ms) for False Positive Answers 
  fp_poly fp_ass fp_dis fp_poly fp_ass fp_dis 
Deaf 10,26 2,50 0,00 1993 1846 1801 
 17,95 2,50 5,06 1676 1441 1365 
 25,64 17,50 8,86 1801 1540 1515 
 46,15 17,50 18,99 1567 1311 1310 
 12,82 0,00 1,27 1593 1541 1522 
 7,69 2,50 0,00 1679 1416 1540 
 0,00 5,00 5,06 1875 1665 1627 
 56,41 32,50 31,65 1829 1783 1647 
 30,77 17,50 13,92 1863 1656 1666 
 20,51 2,50 2,53 1781 1666 1654 
 17,95 12,50 15,19 1715 1662 1586 
 28,21 5,00 6,33 1650 1586 1429 
 15,38 12,50 3,80 1711 1725 1655 
 35,90 25,00 29,11 1873 1628 1636 
 10,26 2,50 1,27 1498 1456 1515 
 33,33 17,50 3,80 1242 1168 1045 
 33,33 22,50 10,13 1554 1536 1442 
 35,90 15,00 17,72 1421 1311 1248 
  7,69 2,50 0,00 1396 1273 1250 
Mean 23,48 11,32 9,19 1669,32 1537,37 1498,53 
SD 15 9 10 192 183 187 
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Experiment 5: False Positives in % and Response Times in ms for Polycomponential and 
Nonpolycomponential Signs in the Memory Recognition Task with (Item Analysis) 
    
False Positives in 
% 
Mean Resonse Time 
(ms) 
Polycomponential aufmachen 14 1294 
 bellen 19 1321 
 Bild 51 1336 
 blau 14 1342 
 Boot 19 1426 
 Brille 51 1441 
 Buch 30 1452 
 Buch 41 1453 
 Buch 25 1453 
 Bus 46 1471 
 dick 4 1473 
 Ei 19 1492 
 Fell 25 1498 
 Fluß 4 1510 
 fressen 30 1526 
 Glas 35 1545 
 Gras 4 1556 
 Haare 77 1556 
 Hemd 51 1556 
 Knopf 51 1558 
 kurvig 4 1596 
 küssen 9 1619 
 Matratze 14 1622 
 Messer 4 1635 
 Pfanne 9 1646 
 Pferd 9 1678 
 pflücken 25 1682 
 Ring 14 1717 
 rot 4 1725 
 schneiden 4 1733 
 Sofa 14 1783 
 Sonne 77 1831 
 spitz 4 1874 
 Straße 46 1946 
 Suppe 19 2426 
 Tafel 14 2426 
 trinken 4 2613 
 Wand 9 2629 
Nonpolycomponential annähen 15 1130 
 Auto 0 1136 
 bauen 15 1154 
 Bier 4 1230 
 Blumen 25 1325 
 Buch 20 1355 
 Decke 4 1375 
 Eisen 4 1382 
 Fahrrad 36 1385 
 fest 10 1404 
 Fleisch 4 1431 
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 gefährlich 4 1431 
 gelb 0 1488 
 Geld 10 1495 
 Geschirr 10 1496 
 gesund 0 1520 
 Glas 10 1520 
 Hose 36 1529 
 Junge 31 1553 
 Kleidung 10 1592 
 Krankheit 10 1602 
 Lehrer 15 1621 
 lieb 20 1622 
 Pflanze 10 1634 
 rund 25 1636 
 schlafen 10 1648 
 Schmuck 10 1665 
 Schule 15 1680 
 Taube 4 1681 
 töten 4 1690 
 treu 10 1719 
 Verbrechen 10 1739 
 wachsen 10 1760 
 warten 0 1771 
 Wasser 10 1777 
 weiß 10 1821 
 Zucker 4 1890 
Nonrelated Distracter alt 8 1279 
 Antenne 3 1433 
 Arzt 13 1201 
 Auge 0 1428 
 backen 8 1549 
 Banane 8 1709 
 belesen 13 1473 
 Berg 8 1409 
 Beruf 0 1312 
 braun 8 1692 
 brennen 34 1479 
 Brücke 8 1712 
 Butter 24 1336 
 Dornen 3 1517 
 Draht 3 1202 
 essen 3 1655 
 Essig 19 1153 
 fangen 3 1507 
 faul 0 1590 
 Feder 0 1459 
 fromm 3 1591 
 gären 3 1558 
 Gefängnis 3 1563 
 geheim 3 1556 
 Geschenk 3 1415 
 Gesicht 8 1636 
 grau 8 1555 
 Honig 3 1521 
 Hut 8 1554 
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 jagen 13 1515 
 Käse 24 1684 
 Kette 8 1412 
 klebrig 24 1746 
 klug 19 1699 
 Koffer 3 1374 
 Krone 8 1299 
 Lampe 50 1340 
 lila 8 1632 
 lustig 3 1334 
 Magen 3 1466 
 magnetisch 3 1348 
 mischen 34 1540 
 Möhre 0 1528 
 Nadeln 13 1492 
 Pfeife 24 1433 
 rauchen 0 1333 
 reich 34 1735 
 Rock 29 1688 
 rund 29 1496 
 Salat 0 1588 
 Salz 3 1438 
 Schale 19 1635 
 schlank 0 1383 
 schlecken 3 1541 
 schleichen 0 1631 
 schmutzig 13 1245 
 schwarz 0 1506 
 Sekt 8 1429 
 singen 3 1522 
 starten 3 1382 
 stinken 0 1597 
 Tanne 13 1405 
 unterrichten 13 1501 
 Vase 3 1642 
 vergessen 8 1673 
 verrückt 8 1753 
 weinen 0 1329 
 Werbung 3 1621 
 Zange 8 1353 
 Zirkus 3 1583 
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Appendix F 
Stimulus Items of Experiment 5: Measurement of Semantic Relations between with iconic 
signs/non-iconic words and pictures in a Verification Task with Deaf, Hearing and Bilingual 
participants 
Iconic Sign/ 
Noniconic Word 
Picture with 
Correspondence to 
Iconic Sign 
Picture with no 
Correspondence to Iconic Sign 
Picture with no 
Correspondence to 
Iconic Sign 
Mord erstechen erschießen erwürgen 
Adler Schnabel Flügel Kralle 
Katze Schnurrhaare  Auge Pfote 
Haus Dach Fenster Türen 
Hund rufen  Stock werfen streicheln 
Blume riechen pflanzen gießen 
Apfel essen pflücken schälen 
Zug Zugräder' Schienen Waggon 
Baby wiegen schlafen wickeln 
Kuh Horn Euter Fell gefleckt  
Mann Hut Anzug Krawatte 
rot Mund Herz Rose 
Schmuck Kette Ring Armband  
Auto lenken Reifen wechseln reparieren 
grün Gras (kurz) Tannenzweig Blatt 
Büro Computer Aktenordner Bürotisch+Stuhl 
Küche kochen braten backen 
Telefon Hörer Tasten Handy 
Zirkus Zelt Manege Seiltänzer 
Hemd Kragen Bündchen Knopf/Hemdtasche 
 
Experimental procedure in Experiment 6 (Verification Task with Iconic Signs) 
 
 
 
 
Test-procedure 'sign-picture' 
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Test-procedure 'word-picture' 
Experiment 6: Mean RTs for deaf, hearing and bilingual participants in the Verifications Task with 
Iconic Signs (Subject Analysis) 
Response Time       Sign-Picture-Correspondence                               No correspondence 
in ms  
Deaf 704,42 932,13 
 718,91 954,48 
 925,40 1140,00 
 763,74 920,26 
 725,75 925,31 
 729,20 878,38 
 704,92 864,00 
 776,22 952,19 
 458,62 604,41 
 724,33 846,06 
 737,37 887,91 
 808,15 943,05 
 708,65 859,69 
 678,63 833,25 
 662,09 840,08 
 779,37 896,30 
 835,28 912,00 
 634,85 795,27 
 716,38 872,39 
  706,55 850,57 
Hearing 830,50 825,10 
 895,19 879,15 
 698,28 627,86 
 900,70 827,25 
 754,26 748,55 
 662,44 674,29 
 681,18 786,70 
 819,17 825,95 
 744,62 767,83 
 915,20 919,14 
 670,80 665,92 
 596,16 568,74 
 762,00 773,05 
 772,67 818,91 
 773,05 758,50 
 761,55 685,54 
 837,88 807,31 
 1009,83 983,21 
 827,17 802,03 
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  890,65 846,44 
Bilingual  887,50 1089,61 
Signs 821,50 884,90 
 647,00 773,75 
 632,00 893,38 
 729,50 794,31 
 767,50 980,92 
 782,50 931,97 
 932,00 1059,89 
 535,00 760,82 
 728,50 964,09 
 672,89 835,24 
 719,18 804,28 
 816,00 893,05 
 934,00 1063,22 
 796,50 858,16 
 756,50 826,33 
 736,50 836,24 
 774,00 759,11 
 698,00 816,48 
  696,00 812,58 
Bilingual  878,43 995,18 
Words 775,85 882,46 
 679,47 706,83 
 850,29 946,72 
 636,79 797,98 
 724,10 836,10 
 790,31 908,50 
 712,56 797,24 
 502,85 668,50 
 664,21 759,78 
 702,78 896,97 
 783,21 995,32 
 670,19 795,81 
 817,47 903,85 
 675,57 695,97 
 668,53 756,45 
 744,18 825,10 
 916,85 980,16 
 624,59 760,41 
  733,74 747,26 
 
Experiment 6: Mean RTs for pictures in the Verifications Task with Iconic Signs (Item Analysis) 
  Deaf-Signs Hearing Biling_Signs Biling_Words 
Sign-Picture-Correspondence 734 793 743 766 
 639 759 683 663 
 861 950 896 897 
 582 657 607 589 
 713 762 721 733 
 768 875 846 760 
 772 795 772 773 
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 764 830 786 787 
 733 809 767 742 
 753 858 790 732 
 542 561 548 528 
 772 799 778 727 
 619 669 640 623 
 844 923 885 867 
 757 869 815 748 
 793 893 843 856 
 559 608 569 557 
 727 794 774 713 
 774 754 790 733 
  790 838 803 757 
No Correspondence 923 772 893 871 
 861 818 885 826 
 782 659 723 701 
 921 855 918 743 
 810 679 762 783 
 880 720 872 729 
 860 758 838 731 
 886 628 894 708 
 906 786 890 839 
 874 718 833 718 
 863 761 846 759 
 931 817 857 894 
 872 761 881 838 
 986 831 964 862 
 1198 1041 1185 1022 
 862 857 876 954 
 828 782 889 959 
 1035 810 990 945 
 874 763 844 851 
 823 770 851 773 
 951 744 879 929 
 875 760 865 704 
 966 794 958 915 
 862 747 856 843 
 833 774 840 908 
 884 768 874 826 
  882 914 893 
 707 616 693 704 
 845 762 857 814 
 878 782 928 766 
 1011 960 1085 1020 
 613 556 603 734 
 856 729 879 722 
 880 769 885 863 
 828 748 838 830 
 1112 1088 1156 1100 
 883 885 895 950 
 854 713 827 712 
 847 786 899 825 
  872 730 855 752 
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Appendix G 
Experimental Procedure in Experiment 7 (Triad-Comparison Task with Iconic Signs) 
Test-procedure of the triad-comparison task with signs and pictures 
 
Test-procedure of the triad-comparison task with words and pictures 
 
Experiment 7: Mean Number of Choices for deaf, hearing and bilingual participants in the Triad 
Comparison Task with Iconic Signs (Subject Analysis) 
 
 Sign-Picture-Correspondence  No-Correspondence 
Deaf 85,00 26,25 
Signs 87,50 28,75 
 87,50 27,50 
 77,50 33,75 
 80,00 27,50 
 75,00 32,50 
 85,00 27,50 
 82,50 25,00 
 80,00 30,00 
 80,00 28,75 
 82,50 27,50 
 80,00 27,50 
 77,50 28,75 
 77,50 28,75 
 77,50 28,75 
 77,50 26,25 
 77,50 28,75 
 82,50 26,25 
 87,50 30,00 
Hearing 35,00 55,00 
Words 40,00 55,00 
 55,00 46,25 
 50,00 50,00 
 52,50 48,75 
 42,50 52,50 
 47,50 51,25 
 50,00 48,75 
220 
 62,50 42,50 
 50,00 50,00 
 47,50 51,25 
 57,50 43,75 
 57,50 46,25 
 52,50 47,50 
 57,50 46,25 
 52,50 47,50 
 52,50 47,50 
 60,00 45,00 
 45,00 51,25 
 57,50 46,25 
Bilinguals 40,00 45,00 
Signs 85,00 28,75 
 80,00 28,75 
 75,00 32,50 
 70,00 33,75 
 70,00 32,50 
 60,00 33,75 
 65,00 35,00 
 67,50 30,00 
 65,00 33,75 
 62,50 32,50 
 70,00 31,25 
 65,00 31,25 
 67,50 32,50 
 65,00 31,25 
 62,50 31,25 
 60,00 32,50 
 62,50 32,50 
 85,00 28,75 
 57,50 43,75 
Bilinguals 65,00 36,25 
Words 42,50 48,75 
 47,50 47,50 
 47,50 45,00 
 80,00 30,00 
 80,00 31,25 
 50,00 45,00 
 67,50 35,00 
 50,00 43,75 
 65,00 38,75 
 65,00 36,25 
 57,50 42,50 
 75,00 33,75 
 62,50 37,50 
 77,50 30,00 
 70,00 32,50 
 72,50 23,75 
 57,50 35,00 
 47,50 46,25 
 67,50 33,75 
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Experiment 7: Mean Number of Choices for pictures in the Triad-Comparison-Task with Iconic Signs 
(Item Analysis) 
  Deaf-Signs Hearing Biling_Signs Biling_Words 
Sign-Picture-Correspondence 96,75 43,75 76,37 75,00 
 79,25 58,75 71,37 72,50 
 79,25 26,25 63,87 32,50 
 89,25 38,75 78,87 72,50 
 76,75 58,75 63,87 47,50 
 29,25 21,25 31,37 47,50 
 89,25 76,25 78,87 80,00 
 89,25 83,75 76,37 95,00 
 96,75 51,25 83,87 80,00 
 74,25 46,25 43,87 62,50 
 76,75 68,75 73,87 72,50 
 96,75 78,75 81,37 67,50 
 96,75 36,25 63,87 67,50 
 36,75 11,25 23,87 17,50 
 94,25 41,25 63,87 52,50 
 61,75 23,75 66,37 50,00 
 94,25 68,75 78,87 60,00 
 81,75 68,75 68,87 65,00 
 86,75 71,25 78,87 80,00 
  86,75 51,25 66,37 50,00 
No Correspondence 7,50 47,60 21,75 33,82 
 22,50 53,85 40,50 36,32 
 15,00 41,35 26,75 30,07 
 21,25 52,60 36,75 42,57 
 16,25 48,85 33,00 31,32 
 20,00 61,35 36,75 48,82 
 12,50 45,10 26,75 33,82 
 22,50 58,85 34,25 38,82 
 10,00 33,85 29,25 38,82 
 28,75 60,10 39,25 47,57 
 15,00 38,85 23,00 33,82 
 48,75 72,60 59,25 48,82 
 15,00 33,85 24,25 33,82 
 18,75 51,35 36,75 37,57 
 11,25 27,60 23,00 20,07 
 23,75 52,60 38,00 40,07 
 2,50 33,85 23,00 22,57 
 23,75 60,10 34,25 42,57 
 17,50 48,85 25,50 30,07 
 20,00 51,35 44,25 36,32 
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 7,50 28,85 24,25 23,82 
 28,75 60,10 41,75 45,07 
 12,50 32,60 28,00 27,57 
 15,00 51,35 30,50 43,82 
 8,75 51,35 33,00 32,57 
 21,25 53,85 34,25 38,82 
 21,25 53,85 38,00 46,32 
 38,75 62,60 48,00 51,32 
 8,75 42,60 23,00 30,07 
 22,50 60,10 44,25 51,32 
 17,50 42,60 30,50 30,07 
 30,00 68,85 35,50 53,82 
 15,00 37,60 28,00 30,07 
 16,25 51,35 33,00 45,07 
 5,00 26,35 19,25 28,82 
 33,75 62,60 45,50 47,57 
 15,00 38,85 29,25 32,57 
 21,25 47,60 31,75 35,07 
 7,50 32,60 21,75 28,82 
  28,75 65,10 46,75 55,07 
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Appendix H 
Stimulus Items of Experiment 8: Rating of different Types of Iconic Signs  
Gesture Indexical Transparent Metonymic Metaphoric Classifier Opaque 
Banane Auge schwer Löcher streng malen Möbel 
duften Finger pflücken Bleistift heiß Dornen Fleisch 
Raub Gesicht Knopf Tasse bellen lesen süß 
Ring Haare Riemen Schrank brutal Gurke Feder 
Rucksack Kette bügeln Pfanne bunt Glas Gemüse 
schlafen Lippen Rahmen Butter Fett Bild gemütlich 
schreiben Mund anstecken Zange glänzend Apfel giftig 
stinken Rücken Hammer Schmuck Hund Baum grau 
tragen   schälen Bett Mord Bus Kleidung 
trinken  Griff Taube rot dünn Käse 
  rund Koffer wachsen groß(Bus) Möhre 
  Haus Vogel weiß grün naß 
  Skulptur Alkohol  küssen Sekt 
  picken Schublade  Matratze treu 
  fließen Tiere  Obst Verbrechen 
  Mond Gepäck  Rock warten 
  Wand bremsen  salat Werkzeug 
  Bügel Gefängnis  Sitze Wohnung 
  gießen Adler  Sofa gelb 
  Zapfen Schnee  Stein  
  Stiel Leine  Theke   
  Vase braten  Tisch  
  Tanne Küche  Wald  
  Schaum Rose  Zimmer  
   Hemd  Zug  
   Katze    
   backen    
   Bad    
   Blume    
   Tulpe    
   Herd    
      Bier       
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Rating Procedure (Experiment 8) 
 
Experiment 8: Sign Ratings (0-100) of Deaf and Hearing (Subject Analysis) 
  Gesture Indexical Transparent Metonymic Metaphoric Classifier Opaque 
Deaf 78 84 70 73 62 64 43 
 68 81 68 74 55 68 47 
 98 98 89 70 53 77 45 
 88 98 88 88 61 70 46 
 66 87 66 73 65 57 53 
 73 77 73 73 72 76 43 
 71 93 71 79 67 72 61 
 92 96 79 92 61 82 41 
 83 100 78 83 55 74 33 
 74 86 68 74 63 71 55 
 88 88 96 88 45 91 40 
 95 95 88 95 62 75 44 
 72 88 67 72 73 65 45 
 69 94 73 73 62 76 32 
 81 84 74 89 70 77 46 
 97 96 89 77 71 73 55 
 90 94 87 96 70 78 50 
 78 98 78 91 69 76 44 
 86 82 86 87 46 76 41 
  81 78 81 73 58 82 35 
Hearing 89 98 61 51 47 42 38 
 77 99 65 55 49 33 28 
 98 87 74 53 37 34 29 
 99 73 67 54 23 20 15 
 87 71 61 61 21 18 19 
 73 73 73 51 23 20 16 
 93 70 69 69 25 22 21 
 225 
 100 92 79 49 42 39 34 
 96 95 71 41 45 44 39 
 86 88 68 63 38 35 30 
 88 100 88 48 40 37 32 
 95 94 72 52 44 41 36 
 88 90 62 62 40 37 32 
 94 86 73 42 36 33 28 
 84 78 74 54 29 26 21 
 100 97 70 71 41 38 33 
 94 90 88 58 40 37 32 
 90 78 73 52 33 30 31 
 86 86 73 49 36 46 42 
  78 81 79 43 31 28 23 
 
Experiment 8: Sign Ratings (0-100) of Deaf and Hearing (Item Analysis) 
  Gehörlose Hörende 
Gesture 84 92 
 88 94 
 58 85 
 88 95 
 82 83 
 88 91 
 96 73 
 68 95 
 91 92 
  72 99 
Index 97 97 
 76 87 
 95 95 
 93 85 
 91 51 
 82 95 
 96 94 
  91 86 
Transparent 75 82 
 81 76 
 89 68 
 52 78 
 95 95 
 95 94 
 93 91 
 90 90 
 92 84 
 83 82 
 82 82 
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 99 80 
 75 79 
 77 76 
 57 74 
 91 73 
 91 65 
 81 62 
 55 61 
 32 55 
 46 53 
 79 48 
 89 38 
  67 34 
Metonymic 84 64 
 92 81 
 88 80 
 91 78 
 86 77 
 80 75 
 93 73 
 77 73 
 86 73 
 86 73 
 86 72 
 94 71 
 81 66 
 93 66 
 78 61 
 78 60 
 83 58 
 92 54 
 97 53 
 79 52 
 92 52 
 72 41 
 73 35 
 79 32 
 79 31 
 92 31 
 51 30 
 59 29 
 45 27 
 75 25 
 79 23 
  58 20 
Metaphoric 71 33 
 94 33 
 51 36 
 227 
 41 65 
 53 31 
 48 30 
 44 22 
 50 21 
 85 48 
 70 31 
 84 62 
  56 20 
Classifier 88 37 
 53 45 
 83 60 
 89 29 
 74 29 
 79 22 
 93 38 
 79 36 
 78 17 
 91 51 
 85 33 
 60 14 
 80 13 
 60 38 
 47 26 
 77 23 
 75 29 
 83 27 
 54 16 
 80 45 
 46 24 
 94 60 
 44 28 
 78 53 
  84 20 
Opaque 45 31 
 46 36 
 40 21 
 64 34 
 40 24 
 43 31 
 35 32 
 45 19 
 75 50 
 53 13 
 77 35 
 56 25 
 49 30 
 20 32 
228 
 28 31 
 41 29 
 36 46 
 42 17 
  14 16 
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